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PART A 
I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND MONITORING 
CAPABILITIES WITHIN AND BETWEEN FIRMS 
“Labor is prior to and independent of capital. Capital is  
only the fruit of labor, and could never have 
 existed if labor had not first existed” 
Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) 
There is a fundamental gap between the preferences of employees for maximizing private bene-
fits and the firm’s purpose of generating financial returns (Lazear and Shaw 2007). While an 
employee’s effort typically leads to benefits for the firm, it imposes costs on the employee 
(Holmström 1999). It is an essential challenge for organizations to offer agreements that provide 
sufficient benefits for both the firm and its employees (Lazear and Oyer 2007; Murphy 1999; 
Raith 2008).  
Accordingly, this dissertation focuses on organizational structures, incentives, and monitoring 
capabilities that govern exchange relationships between economic actors, both within and be-
tween firms. In particular, this thesis considers incentive structures of internal as well as exter-
nal staff on markets for outputs whose quality is difficult to monitor. Thereby, the analyses take 
both employees’ short-term income and especially their long-term interests into consideration 
and explain how firms select and compensate their employees. Moreover, a look at interfirm 
relationships shows how formal rules and provisions as well as informal concerns for long-term 
benefits affect supply chain transactions.  
A growing stream of research that deals with the organization of monitoring and incentive struc-
tures, intended to make employees contribute to business objectives, can be attributed to the 
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notion of corporate governance (Lazear 2000; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The approach of 
corporate governance involves mechanisms, processes, and structures that are supposed to 
match motivations of investors with those of managers, and to thus align collective actions 
(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009; Friebel and Guriev 2012; Jensen 2002). Corporate govern-
ance increasingly attracts attention from both academia and practice and thus yields a consider-
able bunch of sub-literatures (Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010). Research primarily draws on agen-
cy theory, the economic theory of incentives (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Castañer and Kavadis 
2013; Harris and Raviv 1979; Holmström 1999; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1990). Empirical studies mainly focus on executive compensation to answer the 
question of what criteria evaluate performance, provide orientation for employees when they 
choose among a set of actions, and finally maximize firm value (Core, Guay, and Larcker 2008; 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Holmström and Kaplan 2003; Kuhnen and Niessen 
2012).1 Results reveal that, because both the value as well as the utility function of an employee 
depends upon employers’ characteristics, labor and human capital are highly heterogeneous, i.e., 
matching firms with committed employees is far from being trivial (Frank and Obloj 2014; 
Lazear and Shaw 2007). Moreover, difficulties in performance measurement and a firm’s inabil-
ity to base employment agreements on employee’s contribution to total value lead to a variety of 
incentive contracts involving pay for (objective or subjective) performance, asset ownership, 
and job design (Holmström and Milgrom 1994).  
Fama (1980, 1991) follows Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) in 
that he views firms as an interplay of contracts between self-interested actors. Thereby, he pro-
vides a framework for distinct manifestations of employment contracts in consideration of in-
ternal and external labor markets. In this vein, the chapters of this thesis also emphasize the 
essential significance of self-interest and private returns of market actors. In the following, the 
Chapters I-III (Part B) are related to reflections of Fama (1991) and subsequent literature.  
                                                     
1  Nevertheless, recent articles also stress the impact of corporate governance on lower level employees 
(Friebel and Guriev 2012; Marquis and Lee 2013; Werner, Tosi, and Gomez-Mejia 2005). 
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Initially, Fama (1991) focuses on the fixed payoffs from labor contracts, in particular on the 
choice between time contracts versus salary contracts.2 He highlights the prevalence of time 
contracts for tasks with readily assessable outputs or tasks with inputs observable at low noise, 
and the use of salary contracts for jobs in which inputs are frequently unobservable and outputs 
are commonly affected by factors beyond the employee’s control (Baker and Jorgensen 2003; 
Holmström 1982).3  
Low-noise inputs or outputs enable the firm to force the employee to provide effort by the 
prospect of rewards or sanctions in the course of the subsequent contract; i.e., effort will be 
rewarded by higher wages in the subsequent contract, and shirking will be punished by lower 
wages (Harris and Raviv 1979).4 To enforce pure salary agreements in jobs in which objective 
performance can be measured only imperfectly, Fama (1991) draws on a dynamic perspective 
that incorporates an employee’s non-contractual career concerns. These concerns in terms of 
multi-period reputation effects may “force” the employee to supply adequate inputs and outputs, 
since in the long run, superior performance is assumed to lead to job offers with higher wages 
and lower performance is assumed to lead to poor wages, both on internal and external labor 
markets. Hence, according to Fama (1980), labor markets fully discipline employees without 
any additional incentive contract. Yet, Fama (1991) incorporates the results of Holmström 
(1982) and highlights that the effect of career concerns may lessen with age, as more 
experienced employees, and thus typically those that fill key positions, are closer to retirement.5 
Subsequent research confirmed both that career concerns matter (Bar-Isaac and Horner 2014; 
                                                     
2  Time contracts tie pay to working hours; salaries depict a weekly or monthly payoff that does not vary 
with working hours (Fama 1991).  
3  As illustrative examples, Fama (1991) brings in blue-collar and clerical workers who are typically 
employed on the basis of time contracts and accountants, researchers, engineers, i.e., jobs with mainly 
intellectual tasks, for the case of salary contracts. “Noise” describes imprecision of information about 
individual effort or performance. 
4  While Fama (1991) views the prospect of recontracting as sufficient to make employees provide effort, 
other studies consider direct pay for performance schemes. For example, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 
(2007) found piece rates to enhance productivity compared to fixed wages. Lazear (2000) provides evi-
dence that pay for performance increases work effort and supports appropriate employee selection. 
However, Freeman and Kleiner (2005) reveal that increasing productivity does not necessarily enhance 
profits. 
5  Holmström (1982) found that younger employees even work too hard in order to demonstrate their 
ability to the market. 
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Gibbons and Waldman 1999; Prendergast 1999) and that the importance of incentive payoffs 
varies with age (Chevalier and Ellison 1999; Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Ortega 2003). 
The economists Gibbons and Murphy draw on the reflections of Fama and Holmström and 
examine explicit incentives from compensation agreements and implicit incentives from career 
concerns in combination (Gibbons 1998; Gibbons and Murphy 1992). Gibbons (1998, 2005b) 
discusses repeated game models based on subjective performance measurement to illustrate the 
effect of concerns for reputation that underlie relational contracts and career models.6  
Based on this literature, Chapter I (Part B) builds upon career concerns of employees, highlights 
the importance of private returns, and studies effects of employees’ actions on business out-
comes. Specifically, the chapter focuses on incentive structures that govern activities in news 
publishing and assesses whether certain journalistic or editorial strategies enhance shareholder 
value. As inputs and outputs of journalistic work are only measureable with high noise, media 
outlets usually pay their internal and permanently employed journalists a fixed salary.7 Yet, 
results show that journalists are also affected by incentives that do not necessarily concur with 
increasing firm value. Rather, concerns for long-term reputation – not only on the internal but 
also on the external labor market – and private returns from stardom and product spinoffs con-
siderably shape journalistic action.8 
Likewise, Gibbons (1998) utilizes the multi-task models of Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and 
suggests that an employee’s choice of action is not only influenced by the contractual compen-
                                                     
6  A relational contract involves a fixed base salary as well as a relational-contract bonus. The bonus is 
paid if high performance is achieved. Although evaluation of performance may be subjective, the firm’s 
concern for its reputation in multi-period relationships may force it to honor the relational contract 
(Gibbons 2005b). 
7  A quote from Matthias Döpfner, CEO of Axel Springer Corporation, gives a striking impression of the 
way media outlets (are able to) monitor their reporters: “I don’t care where people do their job. It’s 
okay if they hang around in a beach bar in Berlin drinking Caipirinha all day, but at the end of the 
week, supply a story that the entire public talks about. You have to decide whether you want good or 
obedient journalists.” The original, “Mich interessiert nicht, wo die Leute arbeiten. Ist doch gut, wenn 
die in einer Strandbar in Berlin sitzen und den ganzen Tag Caipirinha trinken, aber am Ende der Woche 
eine Geschichte abliefern, über die die Republik redet. Man muss sich entscheiden, ob man gute oder 
gehorsame Journalisten will“, is in German (see di Lorenzo 2012); translated by the author. 
8  Based on Rosen’s hedonic price models (Rosen 1974; Thaler and Rosen 1976), recent research does 
frequently not focus only on monetary rewards, but also includes non-monetary incentives (Lazear and 
Shaw 2007). 
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sation from the firm but also by private returns, for example in that certain actions attract atten-
tion from other employers and thus increase the employee’s market value. In a similar vein, 
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) employ a model that involves an “uninformed boss” who 
informally assigns authority to an agent to ratify projects, but threatens him to withdraw authori-
ty in case of poor performance. Among others, the authors consider those situations possible in 
case of investment opportunities that require immediate decision before they disappear and thus 
keep the principal (i.e., the boss) from a detailed analysis, as it is the case with particular sensa-
tional news stories (see Chapter I (Part B)). Holding returns from reputation and authority con-
stant, large private returns from certain projects tempt the agent to renege on the informal 
agreement, even if reneging impairs the principal’s business outcomes. 
Chapter II (Part B) focuses on career paths of intellectuals within public media. While formal 
agreements between intellectuals – who are frequently asked to voice an opinion on 
contemporary events – and media outlets typically include not more than expense allowances, 
intellectuals are driven to perform (well) by the anticipation of considerable benefits from 
public attention, stardom, and reputation that “rub off” on their other activities, such as 
publication of nonfiction titles or giving talks and lectures; i.e., their behavior is mainly 
governed by chances for additional revenues from public attention in the long run. The chapter 
analyzes market evolution on a market for credence goods and takes the media’s decision-
making in terms of “worker selection” into account. Moreover, it addresses differences in 
intellectuals’ sets of incentives and opportunity costs that arise due to “customization”, for 
example in terms of the adjustment and translation of scientific insights and intellectual 
expertise into knowledge that is packaged in bite-sized pieces as usually demanded by mass 
media.  
Similarly, Gibbons (1998) considers incentives for skill acquisition within firms and Gibbons 
(2005b) transfers the line of argument to supplier-purchaser relationships in terms of 
customization and acquisition of purchaser-specific knowledge. He discusses a promotion 
model based on Prendergast (1993). As outlined in Chapter II (Part B), an agent’s opportunity 
Organizational Structures, Incentives, and Monitoring Capabilities within and between Firms  6 
costs and expected payoffs determine whether the agent customizes; and the difference between 
agents’ values for the firm affect the firm’s worker selection. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström 
(1994) and Kwon (2006) empirically addressed the interplay of productivity differences and 
wage variations. That is, while Chapter I (Part B) examines how firms treat and compensate 
their internal staff, Chapter II (Part B) emphasizes incentives and worker selection concerning 
external sources.9 
Finally, Chapter III (Part B) deals with the importance of formal as well as relational govern-
ance mechanisms for interfirm relationship dynamics. When firms draw on external sources and 
transact with other firms, the organizational design of such relationships can take various forms, 
ranging from one-time market transactions to dyadic alliances to networks to virtual companies 
(Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006). Research on interorganizational long-term relations is 
increasingly influenced by the network form of organization that involves joint ventures, R&D 
agreements, licensing, franchising, supply chain networks, or distribution networks (Campbell, 
Datar, and Sandino 2009; Dahlstrom, McNeiIly, and Speh 1996; Gulati 1995; McGee, Dowling, 
and Megginson 1995; Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 
2011). While networks may provide advantages such as economies of scale, accelerated dissem-
ination and replication of successful business models, or accumulation of specific market know-
how, research points to considerable challenges in regard to coordination and control as well as 
concerning the trade-off between secured cooperation while preserving the advantages of decen-
tralized decisions (Campbell, Datar, and Sandino 2009; Contractor, Wasserman, and Faust 
2006; Gilliland and Kim 2014; Mittal, Kamakura, and Govind 2004).  
The seminal reflections of Granovetter (1985, 2005) and Uzzi (1996) suggest that relational 
long-term transactions are enforced on a basis that differs from market transactions. Baker, 
Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) state that firms interact by the use of private enforcement mecha-
nisms based on informal agreements and unwritten expectations that operate by holding out or 
                                                     
9  However, this thesis does not intend to focus on the “make or buy”-decision, but refers to the ground-
breaking work of Grossmann and Hart (1986) and Holmström and Milgrom (1994) as well as to empir-
ical findings of, for example, Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Baker and Hubbard (2003), instead. 
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jeopardizing the prospects for future benefits from the transaction. That is, relational contracts 
are not restricted to intrafirm relations but also apply to networks and durable supply chain rela-
tionships. Gibbons (2005b) shows that relational contracts allow firms to circumvent problems 
in formal contracting in interfirm exchanges by facilitating subjective assessments, informal 
agreements, and flexible adjustments to new information ex post. Accordingly, an increasing 
body of literature highlights the importance not only of formal provisions but also of relational 
long-term concerns for the evolution, maintenance, and performance of networks and channel 
structures (Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007; 
Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Sheng et al. 2006; Wallenburg and 
Schäffler 2014). Chapter III (Part B) examines the role of formal rules and relational motives for 
the evolution of conflict between firms. The focus is on supply chain relationships in the gro-
cery context.  
Summed up, while Chapters I and II (Part B) provide evidence for the effects of certain incen-
tive structures on business outcomes and market evolution from a market perspective, Chap-
ter III (Part B) takes an empirical perspective towards the underlying management and control 
activities in interfirm exchanges. 
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II. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE  
1. The Economics of Sensationalism: Media Strategy and Business Outcomes 
“Truth is too simple for us: we do not like those who unmask our illusions” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) 
It goes nearly unchallenged that ambition for increased demand and therefore commercial forces 
induce newspapers to engage in sensationalism. This notion may appear reasonable, even self-
evident; as newspaper margins are generally low, selling advertising space becomes a central 
source of newspaper profits, and such space sells better if circulation is high (Germano 2013; 
McChesney 1987; Sun and Zhu 2013).  
Thus, publishers may try to increase circulation and – with the growing prevalence of the Inter-
net – online traffic volume with sensational news catering to readers’ need for entertainment in 
order to increase profits (Jensen 1979). Moreover, besides media outlets, advertisers or journal-
ists may benefit from sensationalized news coverage. Since advertising fees in print media are 
fixed in the short run, advertisers would receive the windfalls of greater audiences than they pay 
for in case of temporary sales boosts. Finally, journalists may have their own ideological prefer-
ences, strive for attention and personal fame to improve their career perspectives, and, therefore, 
favor reports on scandals (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 2006; Dunham 2013; Gentzkow and 
Shapiro 2006, 2010).  
However, who actually benefits, and to what extent, by reporting on alleged “scandals” remains 
largely unclear to date. Consequently, this study evaluates the business outcomes of the most 
spectacular German scandal in recent decades. Thereby, it seeks to enhance the current under-
standing of linkages between editorial strategies, market reception, and business outcomes in 
news publishing. The chapter focuses on the exceptional scandal surrounding Germany’s former 
Federal President Christian Wulff, who was accused of the unlawful acceptance of benefits and 
bribery while in public office and was finally forced to resign. Several newspapers have claimed 
that the German tabloid BILD made substantial profits after it became the driving force in re-
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porting on, even producing, the Wulff scandal. This study focuses on the BILD tabloid. An 
event-study approach (Brown and Warner 1985; Kolari and Pynnönen 2010; McChesney 1987) 
and econometric GARCH models (Bollerslev 1986; Charles and Darne 2014) explore whether 
over the “scandal lifecycle” there is any “first mover advantage” for BILD or BILD’s publisher 
that translates into profit in terms of an increase in circulation, additional traffic on BILD’s 
website, or superior share price performance. Moreover, the chapter looks at what journalists 
can gain from scandal reporting and whether advertisers are able to derive any benefit from 
sensationalized news coverage. 
The results provide an explanation for an intentional lack of thoroughly researched stories that 
are costly to produce because news corporations, as well as advertisers, come away empty-
handed. In contrast to public opinion, there is no evidence that the Axel Springer Corporation 
profited from the Wulff scandal in any monetary terms. That is, moving first does not necessari-
ly enhance profits as is commonly assumed, but rather incurs sizeable risks due to the high fixed 
costs of uncovering news and missing copyright regulations for the public good. Instead, sensa-
tionalism appears to be incited by self-seeking journalists that enhance their career perspectives 
and capture considerable private returns.  
The contribution of the first chapter is the following: 
 First, despite the prevalence of sensationalism in print media, the question of what can 
actually be gained from scandal reports remains surprisingly unanswered to date. Con-
sequently, various arguments on sources of “inaccuracies” in news coverage are inte-
grated by studying journalistic action in the context of economics (Besley and Prat 
2006; Djankov et al. 2003). The focus is on demand-induced biases that may indeed re-
sult in improved business outcomes (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010) as well as on supply-
induced biases that rather provide (non-)monetary private returns for reporters and jour-
nalists (Baron 2006). Thereby, the approach offers insights into the incentive structures 
in news publishing and highlights challenges concerning the governance of self-seeking 
employees.  
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 Second, while the literature has discussed benefits of investigative journalism (Hamil-
ton 2007; Logan and Sutter 2004), results provide reasons for an intentional lack of 
supplying such. They contradict public wisdom, which holds that publishers produce 
scandals to benefit monetarily. Thereby, the findings offer novel insights into a more ef-
fective resource allocation and market positioning to media experts, as well as into mar-
ket prospects and business model opportunities concerning (investigative) journalism 
for news media in general. 
 Third, while prior evidence examined the effect of sensationalism on business outcomes 
of highly regarded papers (McChesney 1987), this study extends that approach and is 
able to make a point for tabloids. Thereby, the analyses do not only consider circulation, 
but also daily information on share prices as well as data on online traffic volume. 
Hence, the study is able to account for the dissemination of news through various chan-
nels, which is particularly interesting in light of the increasing prevalence of online 
news services.  
 Finally, implications for advertisers are provided as results suggest that “first movers” 
do not necessarily attract more readers and thus their advertising space is not necessari-
ly more valuable.  
Thereby, this chapter reveals drivers and incentive structures in news publishing and links edito-
rial and journalistic strategies to business outcomes and private returns of various market actors: 
1. What motivates editorial strategies and journalistic activity? What information becomes 
news?  
2. Do investors consider the approach of covering events over the “scandal lifecycle” and 
overhyping related incidents as financially promising? Do they expect any additional 
revenues from the Wulff scandal? 
3. Does coverage of alleged scandals indeed result in increased demand from the reading 
public, and does it, thereby, maximize a publisher’s profit (demand-induced biases)? Or 
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is it rather the journalists who have a strong motive to engage in sensationalism to im-
prove their (future) pecuniary or nonpecuniary income (which does not necessarily in-
crease demand and, in turn, publisher’s profits; supply-induced biases)? Or, ultimately, 
do only advertisers benefit from the windfalls of greater audiences than they pay for? 
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2. Quality Kills the Mediastar? Career Paths of Public Intellectuals 
“How men long for celebrity! Some would willingly sacrifice 
their lives for fame, and not a few would rather be known  
by their crimes than not known at all.” 
John Sinclair (1754-1835) 
Research as well as media practitioners increasingly criticize phenomena like the medialization 
and flattening of society, or the downturn in “quality journalism”, especially within an area that 
used to be ruled by “the educated people”: the domain of public intellectuals (Gattone 2012; 
Hamilton 2007; Jacoby 1987; Posner 2001).10 This study adopts an economic perspective and 
considers demand and supply of intellectual output from a market perspective. On the demand 
side, media companies such as newspapers and TV stations act as gatekeepers for public intel-
lectual content and have to fill newspaper op-ed pages, book sections, and airtime (Misztal 
2012).11 On the supply side, freelance intellectuals or academics that are affiliated to universities 
may appreciate the comparatively easy access towards greater audiences und thus decide to 
perform on the public stage. 
Our data suggest that the market for public intellectuals yields few omnipresent “media stars” 
that are able to cover the market to a large extent. According to Adler (1985) and Rosen (1981), 
such a “superstar status” may lead to disproportional increases in monetary or psychological 
income. In case of high market concentration, stars may be able to attain larger market shares at 
costs that grow much less than proportionate (Rosen 1981), and acquire parts of customers’ cost 
savings that result from a reduction in media’s search effort (Adler 1985).  
Assuming disproportionate returns for superstars, the basic question concerning the market for 
public intellectual output is: What separates the media stars from the long tail of media midg-
                                                     
10  In this regard, “medialization and flattening of society” depict the notion that public opinion forming 
increasingly follows the suggestions of mass media.  
11  Op-ed pages (short form of “opposite the editor pages”) in newspapers or magazines are usually 
located opposite the editorial page and provide space for personal opinions and statements of named 
authors that describe their point of view on contemporary developments.  
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ets?12 Therefore, the study looks at the careers of scholars and pundits in a market that shows 
characteristics similar to “winner-takes-all-markets” (Frank and Cook 1995). Basically, there 
are two options to initiate a career in the market for public intellectuals: Either, stardom can be 
based on profound knowledge (i.e., “specialization” in a particular topic); or, it can be based on 
“relentless” self-marketing (which does not necessarily require any knowledge at all). That is, 
the analysis pays attention to an economic issue of universal interest (Ferreira and Sah 2012): 
Does it pay off to further perfect your skills and to engage in specialization or is it more favora-
ble to capitalize on your current skillset and to grab any chance for publicity and media atten-
tion? Therefore, effects of demand and supply preferences on career opportunities and choices 
of intellectuals are analyzed. Moreover, the study addresses the challenge of “quality measure-
ment” of intellectual output. Since intellectual output represents a credence good, similar to 
used cars, surgical treatments, or artistic performances, quality is, at least for the average indi-
vidual, difficult to monitor. A discussion of instruments that may signal quality within intellec-
tual discourse addresses this difficulty and derives implications for the development of quality 
through market evolution. 
Results show that engaging in self-marketing disproportionately enhances the odds for public 
stardom, i.e., incentives and options for performing publicly increase with differentiation, even 
if intellectuals go beyond their area of expertise. However, mass media do not necessarily act 
irrationally when giving credence to few media stars that operate beyond their capabilities. The 
public and the media seem to value entertainment higher than information and primarily aim at 
reducing search costs; in contrast, being well and reliably informed about contemporary events 
hardly yields any benefits for the average media customer (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). On 
the supply side, data suggest that distinguished academics do not necessarily perform within the 
public sphere since they face considerable opportunity costs. Preparing and accomplishing pub-
lic performances seem to come at the expense of scholarly work. As has become obvious in 
                                                     
12  The long tail refers to the low-frequency population of a power law distribution that asymptotically 
approaches the horizontal axis. Chris Anderson applied the long tail phenomenon to business contexts 
and especially highlights the importance of “long tail” products for online business models (Anderson 
2006): “The era of one-size-fits-all is ending, and in its place is something new, a market of multi-
tudes.” 
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recent years, increased specialization of knowledge and increased competition for publication in 
peer-reviewed journals for scientists leave no time for simultaneously taking part in public “in-
tellectual” discourses.  
The contribution of the second chapter is the following: 
 First, in case of quality uncertainties, markets usually respond with instruments that im-
prove customer’s confidence in the product, e.g., in terms of warranties, consumer in-
termediaries, increased verifiability, reputation, or competition (Posner 2001). While 
those tools are hardly applicable to the market for public intellectual output, this chapter 
discusses the problem of quality measurement. 
 Second, although the chapter is based on Posner (2001), it extends his rather morally-
based perspective on the decline in intellectuals’ output in that it focuses on the eco-
nomic reasoning for media presence of intellectuals. On the demand side, results high-
light the importance of search costs on markets for credence goods. On the supply side, 
differences in opportunity costs restrain the majority of “true” intellectuals from careers 
in mass media. 
 Third, Posner (2001) claims to conduct “A Study of Decline” but actually takes a non-
dynamic empirical approach. This analysis identifies discriminants that create and de-
stroy the chances for intellectual stardom, both static and over time.  
 Finally, during the last decades, a large number of markets developed into “winner-
takes-all-markets” (Frank and Cook 1995). In this regard, various studies empirically 
applied superstar theories to markets for entertainment goods (Ehrmann, Meiseberg, and 
Ritz 2009; Nelson and Glotfelty 2012; Walls 2010). This study applies superstar theory 
to a market that originally was supposed to focus on knowledge maximization instead 
of entertainment. However, results underline the notion that news and intellectual 
statements may increasingly be regarded from the perspective of “showbiz” (Mullaina-
than and Shleifer 2005). 
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Thereby, this chapter provides insights into the evolution of a market for credence goods and 
gives a rational explanation for the matching of demand and supply by emphasizing certain cost 
and incentive structures of market actors:  
1. What instruments on the market for public intellectual output may signal quality and 
thus increase customers’ benefit or decrease their search costs, respectively? 
2. What separates the media stars from the long tail of media midgets? Does it pay off to 
further engage in specialization or is it more favorable to capitalize on your current 
skillset by engaging in self-marketing?  
3. Have those factors that increase or decrease the chances for public stardom changed 
during the last years? 
4. What do media markets focus on – information or entertainment? 
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3. Dynamics of Conflict in Supply Chain Relationships and the Importance of 
Governance Mechanisms 
“Coming together is a beginning. 
Keeping together is progress. 
Working together is success.” 
Henry Ford (1863-1947) 
Commercial exchanges between firms are increasingly looked upon in the context of relational 
structures rather than as arm’s length one-time transactions (Lafontaine and Slade 2010). One of 
the inherent characteristics of such relationships is the occurrence of conflicts and disputes be-
tween exchange partners (Frazier 1999). Since it could impair the mutual benefits from the ex-
change relationship and lower the partners’ commitment to each other, conflict is a widely rec-
ognized indicator for relationship performance (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; 
Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1993; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999; Gilliland, Bello, and 
Gundlach 2010). Especially today’s frequently changing business practices and the increasing 
prevalence of multichannel strategies that aim at bypassing distributors and retailers result in 
higher conflict among long-established partners. Hence, understanding and managing the evolu-
tion of conflict becomes crucial for practitioners in order to maintain their vertical supply chain 
relationships (Ganesan et al. 2009).  
The construct of conflict received a lot of attention in past research on intrafirm (Amason 1996; 
Barki and Hartwick 2001; De Dreu and Weingart 2003; Ensley, Pearson, and Amason 2002; 
Jehn 1995; Jehn and Mannix 2001; Langfred 2007) as well as interfirm relationships (Bradford, 
Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 
2001; Koza and Dant 2007; Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Palmatier et al. 2006; Winsor et al. 
2012). Studies on the management of interfirm conflict especially focus on buyer-supplier rela-
tionships (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011). Yet, although scholars have called emphatically 
for considering the dynamics of conflict, empirical investigations of interfirm conflict develop-
ment and factors influencing transitions through various stages of conflict are scarce. Conse-
quently, this study explores the evolutionary dynamics of conflict in supply chain relationships, 
for what is ostensibly the first time based on all the five states of conflict development as pro-
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posed by the “dominant process model” (Pondy 1967). It is argued that the selection and im-
plementation of formal as well as relational governance mechanisms are central drivers of con-
flict transitions (Ganesan et al. 2009; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010). Relational ap-
proaches recognize that agreements between firms are governed and enforced by not only for-
mal hierarchy, rules and authority, but also by holding out the prospect of benefits from future 
transactions, assured by informal agreements and unwritten relational norms that affect ex-
change partners’ actions (Gibbons 2005a).  
Therefore, based on extensive longitudinal data from retailers of Germany’s two largest grocery 
chains, several competing structural equation models are employed to examine conflict from a 
process perspective and to provide insights into the relative importance of governance mecha-
nisms over the conflict “lifecycle”. While formal governance mechanisms appear to limit the 
evolution of task-related disagreements effectively, relational governance mechanisms come in 
useful for mitigating the escalation of conflicts and for keeping discussions on a technical level. 
Yet, if affective sentiments prevail, the effectiveness of relational governance mechanisms turns 
out to be impaired or even reversed.  
The contribution of the second chapter is the following: 
 First, to capture the dynamics of conflict, this study incorporates ostensibly for the first 
time all five states of conflict in reference to the well-established model by Pondy 
(1967). Thereby, the chapter departs from Brown, Cobb, and Lusch (2006), who also 
consider formal and informal governance mechanisms in supply chain relationships 
simultaneously but neglect the procedural character of conflict. Hence, the chapter fol-
lows Palmatier et al. (2013) by drawing on relationship dynamics.  
 Second, while it is pretty much accepted that conflict inexorably passes through distinct 
states, the focus of this study is on variables that may limit or speed up the transition 
from one state of conflict to the next, which improves the understanding and synthesis 
of prior insights.  
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 Third, following the claims of scholars of organizational economics as well as of mar-
keting and supply chain management, the approach of this chapter empirically enriches 
the underexplored phenomenon of relational exchange and simultaneously considers 
formal bureaucratic structures and informal relational patterns to explain behaviors 
within interfirm exchanges (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002; Blome, Schoenherr, 
and Kaesser 2013; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; 
Heide 1994; Lafontaine and Slade 2010; Poppo and Zenger 2002).  
 Fourth, while most research on buyer-supplier relationships has drawn on data from the 
US market, this analysis contributes to a more holistic view since the analyses are based 
on a European context.  
 Finally, a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict provides valuable implica-
tions not only for future research, but also for practitioners in terms of managing con-
flict by effectively governing and organizing supply chains.  
Thereby, this chapter gives heed to a more sophisticated understanding of the evolution of inter-
firm conflict, considers contingent factors of relationship dynamics, and provides implications 
for how to arrange buyer-supplier relationships: 
1. Does conflict inexorably evolve thorough distinct stages? Or are organizational charac-
teristics able to affect the dynamics of conflict? 
2. What about the relative importance of formal and relational governance mechanisms 
within interfirm exchanges?  
3. How can managers effectively govern their long-term transactions with suppliers and 
customers in light of conflict evolution? 
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III. INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The core of this dissertation contains three main chapters. Based on the concept of corporate 
governance, these chapters are interconnected by the idea of analyzing organizational structures, 
incentives, and monitoring capabilities within economic exchange relationships. Figure 1 illus-
trates the framework and the organization of chapters. By studying exchange relationships from 
a market perspective, the research framework considers market evolution as well as business 
outcomes of transactions among self-interested market actors and pays attention to the ways 
firms select, monitor, and reward internal and external staff. Moreover, from an organizational 
perspective, the framework looks upon the underlying management and control activities that 
affect interfirm exchanges and thereby sheds light on the importance of governance mechanisms 
for relationship dynamics.  
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PART B 
I. THE ECONOMICS OF SENSATIONALISM: MEDIA STRATEGY AND 
BUSINESS OUTCOMES 
“Truth is too simple for us: we do not like those who unmask our illusions” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) 
1. Abstract 
It goes nearly unchallenged that ambition for increased demand and therefore commercial forces 
induce newspapers to engage in sensationalism. However, who actually benefits, and to what 
extent, by reporting on alleged “scandals” remains largely unclear. Accordingly, this study 
evaluates the business outcomes of the most spectacular German scandal in recent decades. The 
results provide an explanation for an intentional lack of investigative journalism; while news 
corporations, as well as advertisers, come away empty-handed, sensationalism appears to be 
incited by self-seeking journalists.13 
  
                                                     
13  A preliminary version of this chapter was presented (with Prof. Dr. T. Ehrmann) at the EJO Confer-
ence, Daimler und Benz Foundation, Berlin (09/2013). 
The Economics of Sensationalism: Media Strategy and Business Outcomes  35 
2. Introduction 
Media coverage of alleged “scandals” in public life has increased considerably in recent dec-
ades. In particular, tabloid papers have faced criticism for engaging in “sensationalism”, where 
news stories are overhyped to increase consumer attention and newspaper circulation 
(Tjernstrom 2002). Reporters slant their stories, often in an exaggerated or trivial manner: That 
is, they tend to ignore facts that run counter to their stream of argument, or they over-report on 
matters that are insignificant to society at large (Baron 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; 
Hamilton 2004; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). 
Celebrities such as sport-VIPs, actors, or politicians find themselves in hyped and overinflated 
media reports; examples such as Tiger Woods, Charlie Sheen, or Bill Clinton abound. It has 
long been assumed that publishers focus on reporting such “scandals” to increase profits (Logan 
and Sutter 2004; McChesney 1987). This notion may appear reasonable, even self-evident; as 
newspaper margins are generally low, selling advertising space becomes a central source of 
newspaper profits, and such space sells better if circulation is high (Germano 2013; McChesney 
1987; Sun and Zhu 2013).  
Thus, publishers may try to increase circulation and – with the growing prevalence of the Inter-
net – online traffic volume with sensational news catering to readers’ need for entertainment 
(Jensen 1979). Yet, advertising fees in print media are usually fixed in the short run. Therefore, 
in the case of temporary sales boosts, only advertisers would receive the windfalls of greater 
audiences than they had paid for. Finally, editors and journalists may have their own ideological 
preferences, strive for attention and personal fame to improve their career perspectives and, 
therefore, favor reports on scandals (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 2006; Dunham 2013; 
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006, 2010).  
However, who actually benefits from newspaper reports on scandals remains largely unclear. 
Consequently, we study the economics of sensationalism, focusing on the following three ques-
tions: 1) Does coverage of alleged scandals indeed result in increased demand from the reading 
public, and does it, thereby, maximize a publisher’s profit (demand-induced slanting)? Or, 2) Is 
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it rather the journalists who have a strong motive to engage in sensationalism to improve their 
(future) pecuniary or nonpecuniary income (which does not necessarily increase demand and, in 
turn, publisher’s profits; supply-induced slanting)? Or, 3) Ultimately, do only advertisers benefit 
from the windfalls of greater audiences than they pay for? 
We focus on the exceptional scandal surrounding Germany’s former Federal President Christian 
Wulff, who was accused of the unlawful acceptance of benefits and bribery in public office and 
was finally forced to resign. Several newspapers have claimed that the German tabloid BILD 
made substantial profits after it became the driving force in reporting on, even producing, the 
Wulff scandal.  
For our study, we focus on the BILD tabloid. First, we identified outstanding events in the 
course of the Wulff scandal. Next, we assembled daily data on the BILD publisher’s stock mar-
ket performance and figures for the tabloid’s circulation; we also recorded traffic at BILD’s web 
portal. We apply an event-study approach (Brown and Warner 1985; Kolari and Pynnönen 
2010; McChesney 1987) to explore whether over the “scandal lifecycle” there is any “first mov-
er advantage” for BILD or BILD’s publisher that translates into profit. Additionally, we employ 
econometric Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) modeling 
(Bollerslev 1986) to verify the findings of the standard event-study approach. Moreover, we 
study what journalists can gain from scandal reporting (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999; 
Gibbons 1998; Holmström and Milgrom 1991).  
Our study seeks to enhance the current understanding of linkages between editorial strategies, 
market reception, and business outcomes in news publishing. Despite the prevalence of sensa-
tionalism in print media, the question of what can actually be gained from scandal reports re-
mains surprisingly unanswered to date. Our results reveal that sensational news and disclosure 
of political scandals hardly affect business outcomes of news outlets. Hence, the results contra-
dict public wisdom, which holds that publishers produce scandals to benefit monetarily. While 
the literature has discussed the benefits of investigative journalism (Hamilton 2007; Logan and 
Sutter 2004), we provide reasons for an intentional lack of supplying such. Thereby, we con-
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tribute to a more complete picture of the benefits of different editorial strategies. In addition, we 
integrate arguments regarding sources of “inaccuracies” in news coverage by studying both 
journalistic action in the context of economics and the impact of self-seeking journalists on 
newspaper content (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 2006; Djankov et al. 2003). Finally, we pro-
vide implications for advertisers, as results suggest that “first mover” advertising space is not 
necessarily more valuable. 
Next, we describe the economics of news and elaborate on biases within news coverage. After 
defining our research questions, we describe our data and research methodology. Finally, we 
present and discuss our results and conclusions. 
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3. Conceptual Background: The Economics of News 
The market for newspapers represents a two-sided platform (Armstrong 2006; Rochet and 
Tirole 2006). That is, newspapers offer two joint products, journalistic content and advertising 
space, to different sets of customers, readers and advertisers, on the basis of one physical good 
(Blankenburg and Friend 1994). Consumers’ demand, i.e., circulation, constitutes the link be-
tween revenues from sales and from advertising (Corden 1952). However, because readers value 
not only information but also entertainment (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005), political issues 
may be sensationalized to satisfy readers’ needs for amusement (Hamilton 2007).  
For news corporations, the production of news involves a high fixed-to-marginal costs ratio. All 
else equal, news suppliers should prefer news that is cheaper to produce. This tendency 
strengthens due to the public good character of news (Hamilton 2004); once information is re-
leased, competitors can free ride on investigation efforts and publish the same information (per-
haps in slightly changed livery).  
For consumers, similarly to other entertainment services, news represents an experience good 
with multidimensional characteristics, the quality of which is difficult to assess (Fan 2013; 
Hamilton 2004). Accordingly, a newspaper’s reputation and its brand positioning can help re-
duce consumers’ purchase uncertainty (Akerlof 1970) as well as their search costs to find a 
news outlet that typically offers the particular type of information or entertainment value they 
most desire.  
With those product characteristics in mind, according to Hamilton (2004), which information 
and events become “news” most likely depends upon their profit potential from the publisher’s 
perspective – but also from the viewpoint of the journalists who ultimately provide the storyline. 
However, these two perspectives do not necessarily concur.  
3.1 Demand-Induced Sensationalism 
Following previous literature, publishers’ primary focus is usually on profit maximization, ra-
ther than on knowledge maximization, by increasing newspaper demand (McManus 1994; 
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Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Schoenbach 2004).14 First, increased circulation leads to in-
creased turnover from sales (Corden 1952). Second, advertisers value access to large audiences 
(Ellman and Germano 2009). Thus, increased circulation allows charging higher prices for ad-
vertising space.15 Consequently, publishers may have an incentive to slant and sensationalize 
stories to cater to readers’ demand for entertainment, simultaneously downgrading information 
to a by-product (Jensen 1979; McManus 1994; Rothbauer and Sieg 2013; Schoenbach 2004; 
Suen 2004); in Jay Leno’s words: “politics is just show business for ugly people”. Mullainathan 
and Shleifer (2005) applied Hotelling models to illustrate that newspapers tend to follow read-
ers’ prior beliefs rather than confronting them with new and contradictory information, reducing 
readers’ “transportation costs”. In doing so, outlets strategically position themselves in the mar-
ket and develop into “brands”, reducing readers’ search costs to find a news provider that caters 
to their tastes (Hamilton 2004).  
Considering news an experience good, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006; 2010) empirically confirm 
that biases in news coverage often result from the motivation to develop a certain newspaper 
reputation and thereby increase circulation. Yet, establishing a brand name narrows the range of 
“product characteristics” a news outlet can efficiently offer; i.e., not every type of news is in-
deed profitable for a particular outlet to publish (e.g., highly detailed scientific content is unlike-
ly to meet readers’ interests for tabloids that usually cover stars’ private life stories, soccer 
events, fashion and the like).  
In particular, investigative stories centering on politics, politicians or government officials in-
volve considerable editorial resources and, therefore, are quite costly for news outlets to pro-
                                                     
14  Current theory (Hamilton 2010) and empirical research (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010) argue that non-
monetary incentives for news corporation owners today are almost negligible. While, of course, busi-
ness practices do not always have to be motivated primarily by profit, we follow the literature and as-
sume that economic logic largely determines newspaper content (“giving the audience what it wants”). 
Even if profit motives are not the primary focus, economic motives play an essential role to the extent 
that newspapers still at least must recover their expenses. This imperative requires them to follow an 
economic orientation (Alchian 1950; Becker 1962).  
15  We abstract from preferences of advertisers towards specific groups of readers (Hamilton 2010). 
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duce.16 Moreover, once such news is public, competitors can easily steal parts of the rents by 
also covering the story – which, in turn, may keep outlets from making high investments in such 
stories, instead favoring “pack journalism”.  
Accordingly, dropping margins, lower entry barriers and overcapacity (for news content and 
advertising space) may increase the pressure to follow readers’ preferences to ensure meeting 
circulation goals (Hamilton 2010). As suggested by the notion of “rational ignorance”, this may 
especially be the case for news on public affairs because consumers are unwilling to pay for 
societal benefits (Downs 1957; Hamilton 2004). Hence, whether there is any “first-mover ad-
vantage” for media outlets from uncovering a political scandal remains unclear.  
3.2 Supply-Induced Sensationalism 
While in public opinion it goes nearly unchallenged that ambition for increased demand and 
thus commercial forces induce newspapers to engage in sensationalism, we also consider rea-
sons that cause supply-induced biases that may result from (non)pecuniary incentives for jour-
nalists or editors (see also Balan, DeGraba, and Wickelgren 2009; Baron 2006; Djankov et al. 
2003; Dunham 2013; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Hamilton 2004; Jung 2009; Larcinese, 
Puglisi, and Snyder 2011; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2002; Tjernstrom 2002). Just as employees 
in other jobs with information asymmetries, journalists may act in a self-serving manner to cap-
ture additional (monetary and non-monetary) rents that do not necessarily maximize their out-
lets’ profits (Baron 2006; Gibbons 1998): They may compete for page one stories with other 
journalists, aim at winning journalism awards, or strive for personal stardom to advance their 
career prospects. Similar to outlets’ reputation, personal brand name capital may translate into 
increased salaries or product spinoffs such as book publications (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 
2006; Hamilton 2004, 2007) – just think of the Woodward-Bernstein story (Jensen 1979). 
Therefore, journalists may have profound private incentives to uncover sensational news. 
                                                     
16  Hamilton (2010) suggests that costs for producing an investigative story may reach $200,000 for a 
three-days-series comprising approximately ten articles.  
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Yet, not only for outlets but also for journalists, gathering information and composing attractive 
stories about public affairs require substantial effort. However, if they successfully expose a 
sensational story, they can increase their brand name capital considerably (Hamilton 2004); e.g., 
juries rewarding journalistic work are assumed to prefer honoring the reporters who initially 
took charge of a story rather than any “free-riders” copying them afterwards.  
Here, we do not solely focus on pecuniary rewards for news corporations, their owners, and 
advertising clients, but rather also take into account supply-induced biases. 
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4. The Marginal Value of the Wulff Scandal 
If sensational events boost newspaper demand and, thereby, newspaper profits, newspapers 
would have strong incentives to not only cover but engage in sensationalism, i.e., in overhyping 
stories and events, to “produce” scandals (Jensen 1979). The scandal that attracted the most 
attention in Germany in recent decades involves the incidents surrounding Germany’s former 
Federal President Christian Wulff, who was accused of the unlawful acceptance of benefits 
while in public office and was finally forced to resign. Several newspapers and blogs have 
claimed that the German tabloid BILD, which belongs to the Axel Springer Corporation, made 
substantial profits after it became the driving force in uncovering (or even producing) this scan-
dal.17  
The development of the affair shows conspicuous characteristics of an ideal “scandal lifecycle”, 
formerly observed during several political scandals. Initially, BILD revealed that Wulff received 
a loan from some businessperson under noticeably favorable conditions, supposedly in return 
for some political favor. Shortly before the story was published, Wulff left BILD’s editor a 
voicemail and tried to threaten him into stopping the release. However, BILD published the 
voicemail along with the story, thereby playing the central role in “uncovering” the scandal. 
This makes this particular tabloid a prime case to study in the context of slanting and sensation-
alism; that is, if news outlets can actually gain by engaging in scandal reporting, BILD should 
certainly have been able to do so.  
Other newspapers followed BILD and reported further accusations concerning questionable 
business deals and alleged bribery involving Wulff in multiple cases; the “scandal lifecycle” 
gathered momentum. Wulff resigned about two months after the initial article had been pub-
lished. Afterwards, the media focused on the legal proceedings and continued to report on 
Wulff’s private life (as well as his spouse’s, and the later divorce of the couple). Yet, after 
                                                     
17  BILD is Germany’s only nationwide tabloid, with a circulation of approximately 2.4 million (Sundays: 
1.3 million). BILD is the largest newspaper in terms of circulation in Germany and has long been the 
leader in terms of circulation of all daily newspapers across Europe. Subscriptions account for less than 
2% of sales (Sunday paper). Style, readership, and outreach are most similar to the British “Sun”, the 
Austrian “Kronen Zeitung”, or the Swiss “BLICK”. In the United States, the “New York Post” may be 
the most comparable to BILD.  
The Economics of Sensationalism: Media Strategy and Business Outcomes  43 
months of work by 24 investigators, 75 dossiers, and 120 reports of witnesses, the only thing 
that remained that was relevant from a legal perspective were two “suspicious” overnight stays 
at a hotel (amounting to less than 1,000 €). Ultimately, Wulff was acquitted, underscoring the 
suggestion that news suppliers sensationalized the story.  
Still, whether BILD indeed gained additional revenues from covering the alleged “scandal” 
remains unanswered to date. While historical evidence suggests that the “yellow journalists” 
were able to boost circulation but at the bottom line even lost profits during the Spanish-
American War (Lee 1937), McChesney (1987) found no evidence for any additional earnings 
from Watergate for the newspaper in charge, the Washington Post. In contrast, Woodward and 
Bernstein, the journalists who uncovered the story, apparently received significant private bene-
fits (Jensen 1979). In this study, we expand previous approaches and take a more nuanced view 
of the effects of scandal reporting on newspaper’s revenues. Today, most news corporations 
offer their news via print media as well as online. Hence, they can increase their revenues either 
by boosting a paper’s circulation (via increasing sales and advertising revenues) or by attracting 
more online users.18 Additionally, we consider the possibility of supply-induced sensationalism, 
i.e., producing “scandals” because of (non)pecuniary incentives for journalists or editors. 
Compared with news typically covered by BILD (e.g., entertainment stars, social life, sports – a 
quarter of BILD’s 1,000 permanently employed journalists cover sports topics – motorcars, self-
help, simplified, and low-detail/easy-content stories on current political/health/monetary topics), 
BILD’s coverage of the Wulff scandal can be considered a type of product differentiation. In 
fact, it could be considered the maximum possible one as, by covering the Wulff story, BILD 
engaged in politics reporting much more deeply than previously, suddenly “competing” with 
highly regarded news magazines such as the German SPIEGEL. Accordingly, one would as-
sume that the market should respond to this change in editorial strategy if it expects any effect 
on BILD’s profitability (Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998; Horner 2002; Klein and Leffler 1981). 
As the Axel Springer Corporation (the BILD publishing house) is market listed, one would 
                                                     
18  Printed versions are paid per each, with fixed short-run revenues from advertisement; online content is 
mostly free, with advertising fees that are usually paid per 1,000 clicks. 
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assume an adjustment of share prices (Fama 1965; Fama et al. 1969). Taking the opposite per-
spective, Anderson (2004) showed that the market punishes overly flawed, or false, news cover-
age with dropping stock market prices. 
While effects are assumed to fade out over time – as people “forget” and news outlets reposition 
themselves in the market – making long-term effects unlikely, we focus on circulation, online 
traffic, and share prices to try detect evidence that indicates at least (short-term) profits from 
reporting on the scandal.  
Accordingly, our research questions are: 
Research Question 1. Did the coverage of the Wulff scandal indeed produce increased demand 
from readership or advertisers, reflected by an increase in a) BILD’s circulation, b) BILD’s 
online traffic volume, or c) Axel Springer Corporation’s market value? 
Considering supply-induced sensationalism, we also explore whether journalists profited from 
the scandal. That is, we assess whether there is any evidence suggesting that journalists en-
hanced their (non-)monetary income (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 2006).  
Research Question 2. Did journalists profit from the coverage of the Wulff scandal? 
Prices for advertising space in print media remain constant in the short term; i.e., they are not 
adjustable in response to unexpected increases in circulation. Hence, we assess whether there is 
any chance for advertisers to capture the windfalls of a greater audience than they usually pay 
for (McChesney 1987).  
Research Question 3. Did BILD’s advertising clients receive the windfalls of greater audiences 
than they had paid for? 
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5. Data and Methods 
5.1 Data 
We initially compared existing chronologies of the Wulff scandal from different media outlets 
to identify outstanding events that may have any effect on the demand for BILD. Additionally, 
we conducted a thorough search in LexisNexis to avoid missing any events and to double-check 
that we assigned every event to the right date. We identified 71 specific events from December 
2011 to April 2013 (see Appendix A, Table 18). Concerning potential effects on Springer’s 
stock prices, we assigned every event to the first trading day that the information could be inte-
grated in the share price.19 Because some events belong to the same trading day, the GARCH 
models involve 58 event dates. Moreover, the GARCH approach controls for confounding 
events.20 To avoid biased results from the standard event-study approach, we exclude those 
events that coincide with confounding events, which finally leaves a sample of 43 event dates 
for the financial market analysis.21 We obtained historical data on the Axel Springer Corpora-
tion’s stock prices as well as on different market indices (HDAX, DAXsector media) from 
Datastream (Thomson Reuters).22 
For the analysis of abnormal increases in sales, we focus on BILD’s Sunday paper and obtain 
weekly data on BILD’s circulation from the German IVW.23 Every event or information that 
became public between Sunday and Saturday was attributed to the following Sunday edition. 
Due to multiple events within one week and after controlling for the New Year effect in 2012 
(confounding event), the final sample of events for the analysis of circulation consisted of 25 
event weeks.  
                                                     
19  Events after closing of the stock exchange, on weekends, or on holidays are assigned to the next trading 
day. 
20  We control for publications of financial reports by Springer and changes in the Corporation’s supervi-
sory board (time frame: +/- 5 days around the events). 
21  We exclude events that coincide with confounding events within a time frame of +/- 5 days around the 
events (see Appendix A, Table 18 for excluded events).  
22  The HDAX includes the 110 largest assets of the German Prime Standard and covers 95% of market 
capital. The DAXsector media includes 12 German assets that operate in the media sector.  
23  Axel Springer Corporation does not publish data on daily circulation. Hence, we used weekly data for 
the Sunday paper from the IVW, which corresponds to the AAM in the United States or the ABC in the 
United Kingdom. 
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Moreover, the IVW publishes monthly figures on visitors to a broad range of websites. We 
requested data on visits to BILD’s website as well as to the websites of BILD’s peers, which 
include the websites of SPIEGEL, FOCUS, WELT, and STERN. To provide a benchmark index 
for the event-study approach, we calculated the unweighted average of visits to peers’ websites. 
All events were assigned to the month in which they occurred. We tested 14 event months for 
abnormal reactions in online traffic. 
5.2 Event-Study Methodology 
To examine whether the Axel Springer Corporation profited from the Wulff scandal (RQ1c), we 
employ an event-study approach. The objective of event-studies is to determine whether an 
event causes abnormal reactions within a time series of returns (Brown and Warner 1985; 
McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Developed for financial market analyses, the underlying assump-
tion is based on the efficient-market hypothesis, which implies that share prices immediately 
incorporate all publicly available information. Thus, the price of a security reflects the value of 
all future cash flows the firm is assumed to generate (Fama et al. 1969; Geyskens, Gielens, and 
Dekimpe 2002).  
Using this methodology, we explore whether investors consider the approach of covering events 
over the “scandal lifecycle” and overhyping related incidents as financially promising and thus 
whether they expect any additional revenues from the Wulff scandal (Agrawal and Kamakura 
1995). Moreover, we transfer the event-study concept to time series data other than the share 
prices, i.e., to the development of abnormal “returns” concerning BILD’s circulation (RQ1a) 
and online traffic (RQ1b).  
Returns on a specific share represent the relative change in share prices:24 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑖𝑡− 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
,  (1) 
                                                     
24  We use the terminology of financial market analysis, describing the event-study methodology by 
means of stock prices. However, when applying the procedure to the analyses of circulation or online 
traffic, “returns” correspond to increases in circulation or online traffic, respectively.  
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where Pit represents the share price of asset i at day t, which is the offset relative to the event 
date. Hence, returns account for new information published between days t and t-1. Normal 
returns for asset i are estimated from the share price performance within an estimation period 
that precedes the event date. Then, abnormal returns (𝐴𝑅) are equivalent to the difference be-
tween actual returns (𝑅) and normal returns (𝑁𝑅): 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡. (2) 
We refer to the constant mean return model and to the market model to estimate normal returns 
(Kolari and Pynnönen 2010). The constant mean return model assumes that the mean of returns 
for asset i is constant over time; i.e., normal returns represent the average of returns within the 
estimation period: 
𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , (3) 
where T depicts the number of days in the estimation period. However, if a benchmark index is 
available, the market model is preferred over the constant mean return model. Then, daily re-
turns of asset i can be expressed as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (4) 
where Rmt is the return on a market index of assets on day t, α is the intercept, β is the systematic 
risk of asset i, and ε is the error term, with an expected value of zero. The estimates of daily 
abnormal returns are given as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 +  ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡),  (5) 
where ?̂? and ?̂? are estimated from an OLS regression of Rit on Rmt over the estimation period, 
and ARit represents the prediction error that is assumed to result from the event at time t 
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997).  
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To account for possible violations of the efficient-market assumption, we consider multi-day 
event windows (Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti 2010). Cumulative abnormal returns for an event 
window that ranges from t1 to t2 [t1; t2] are calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
. (6) 
Moreover, we determine average abnormal returns to examine whether the effects of the N 
events are systematically displaced relative to the event day:  
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 . (7) 
Finally, we construct cumulative average abnormal returns for various event windows to assess 
the holistic influence of events over the “scandal lifecycle”: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 =
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
. (8) 
We employ parametric as well as non-parametric test statistics to rule out non-normality in the 
distribution of excess returns. With regard to parametric tests, we refer to the statistic of 
Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) and its extensions (Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti 
2010; Kolari and Pynnönen 2010). That is, we correct for event-induced changes in variance 
and for potential autocorrelation of returns (Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti 2010). In the case of 
multi-day event windows, we correct for serial dependence in accordance with Mikkelson and 
Partch (1988). To test for significance of average abnormal returns across several events, we 
apply an adjustment of the statistic of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991); i.e., we correct 
for cross-correlations among estimation periods’ residuals following Kolari and Pynnönen 
(2010). We compute standardized statistics for cumulative average abnormal returns in accord-
ance with Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). Because 
benchmark data were available on a quarterly basis only, we did not create any “market index” 
for BILD’s circulation. Instead, we employ the constant mean return model and define the test 
statistic in reference to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). To tackle the potential problem of non-
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normally distributed excess returns, we apply Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank tests. Ap-
pendix B provides the details on the test statistics. 
5.3 Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) 
Modeling  
Common knowledge has it that time series of stock market returns frequently face problems of 
heteroscedasticity. To address this phenomenon and to test the robustness of the results of the 
previous event-study results, we additionally employ econometric GARCH models and thus 
validate the findings for Axel Springer Corporation’s stock price performance.25 GARCH mod-
els represent an extension of the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) meth-
odology. While ARCH models consider the effect of previous periods’ shocks on the current 
period’s volatility (Engle 1982), GARCH models also involve the effect of previous periods’ 
volatilities (Bollerslev 1986). In particular, we employ a GARCH(1,1) model to estimate the 
mean equation (9) and the variance equation (10): 
𝑅𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹_𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑚𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑔 + 𝜀𝑡  (9) 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹_𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝜚𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜏𝜎𝑡−1
2 , (10) 
with 𝜚 + 𝜏 < 1 (stationarity constraint) and positive coefficients in the variance equation (posi-
tivity constraint). 𝑅𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑔 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑔 are the log returns at day t on Axel Springer Corporation’s 
shares and on the market index, respectively.26  
EVENT is a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” on days within the event window, and 
“0” otherwise.27 In accordance with the previously described event-study approach, we con-
trolled for confounding events within a period of +/- 5 days by introducing the dummy 
                                                     
25  We employed Ramsey RESET tests for each estimation period’s OLS regression (Ramsey 1969). Tests 
yielded mixed results. For certain estimation periods, p-values dropped slightly below the 10% signifi-
cance level (min(p) = 0.096).  
26  Returns are calculated by 𝑅𝑡 =  100 ∗ [log(𝑃𝑡) − log(𝑃𝑡−1)]. 
27  We utilize different event windows, ranging from one day (event day, [0]) to 5 days (event day +/- 2 
days, [-2; 2]; see Results and Discussion). 
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CONF_EVENT. The residuals are assumed to be normally distributed: 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡
2).28 The vari-
ance equation (10) includes the dummies for events and confounding events as well as the 
lagged squared error terms 𝜀𝑡−1
2  and its own squared history 𝜎𝑡−1
2 . The model is estimated using 
maximum likelihood. With normally distributed errors that are conditional upon information Ιt-1, 
the density function is of the form:29 
𝑓(𝑦𝑡|𝛪𝑡−1) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑡
2
𝑒−
1
2
𝜀𝑡
2/𝜎𝑡
2
.  (11) 
where 𝜎𝑡
2 is specified in accordance with equation (10) and 𝜀𝑡 comes from equation (9). 
The log-likelihood function to be maximized can be defined as: 
𝑙𝑛 𝐿 = 𝑙𝑛 ∏
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑡
2
𝑒−
1
2
𝜀𝑡
2/𝜎𝑡
2
𝑛
𝑡=1 = −
1
2
∑ (𝑙𝑛 2𝜋 + 𝑙𝑛 𝜎𝑡
2 +  𝜀𝑡
2/𝜎𝑡
2)𝑛𝑡=1 , (12) 
where n is the number of observations.  
                                                     
28  In addition, we also considered Generalized Error Distribution and Student’s t-distribution; however, 
results remained the same. 
29  We also computed quasi-maximum likelihood covariances and standard errors as proposed by 
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). Those standard errors are robust if residuals are not conditionally 
normally distributed; however, results remained the same. 
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6. Results and Discussion 
6.1 Results: Event-Study Methodology 
Focusing on abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of single events, results re-
mained rather inconclusive (see Table 1).30 Only one event, the separation of the Wulff couple, 
showed significant abnormal returns that remain robust across both benchmark indices and test 
statistics (01/07/2013; p < 0.1). Furthermore, for the event window that involves five days 
around the event [-2; 2], there are no significant cumulative abnormal returns that hold for both 
the parametric and the non-parametric test statistic. 
We found a significant negative effect in aggregation five days after the respective event days 
(see Table 2). However, this effect holds for one benchmark index only, and only for the para-
metric test statistic. Moreover, because longer event windows are more sensitive to confounding 
influences and because it is reasonable to assume that single news events unfold their effect 
more quickly than within five days, we considered it unlikely that this effect could be attributed 
to the Wulff scandal. Cumulative average abnormal returns for event windows that range from 1 
day [0] to 11 days [-5; 5] remained insignificant (see Table 3).  
We repeated all of our analyses based on an estimation period of 120 days to place greater em-
phasis on developments closer to the event dates. The results remained similar to the previous 
ones. In summary, we do not find support for any linkages as proposed by RQ1c. 
  
                                                     
30  We controlled for thin trading bias. Yet, Springer Corporation’s shares are traded frequently; thus, thin 
trading is not a problem (Campbell and Wasley 1993; Cowan and Sergeant 1996). 
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Event Date 
(Trade) 
DAXsector media HDAX 
Day-0-Statistic  
[0] 
 
5-Days Event 
Window [-2; 2] 
 
Day-0-Statistic 
[0] 
 
5-Days Event 
Window [-2; 2] 
SARa  tcorr(AR)
b  SCARc tcorr(CAR)
b SARa tcorr(AR)
b SCARc tcorr(CAR)
b 
12/13/2011 -0.79 -1.10 0.42 0.19 0.45 0.83 0.30 0.61 
12/15/2011 0.12 0.23 -0.03 0.11 -0.31 -0.48 0.20 0.50 
12/16/2011 0.12 0.22 0.66 1.10 -0.04 -0.07 0.09 0.32 
12/19/2011 0.24 0.43 0.50 0.87 0.12 0.27 0.05 0.24 
12/21/2011 -0.10 -0.11 0.62 1.02 0.13 0.30 0.44 0.94 
12/23/2011 -0.13 -0.16 0.68 0.93 0.25 0.52 0.65 0.91 
01/02/2012 0.15 0.30 -0.11 -0.05 0.13 0.27 -0.12 -0.12 
01/05/2012 1.19 1.49 0.33 0.44 0.69 1.10 0.33 0.56 
01/06/2012 -0.34 -0.45 -0.13 -0.23 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.31 
01/11/2012 0.33 0.61 -0.26 -0.26 1.91† 1.66† 0.27 -0.10 
01/12/2012 0.17 0.34 -0.40 -0.40 -0.52 -0.79 0.24 -0.18 
01/13/2012 -0.27 -0.34 -0.21 -0.10 -0.44 -0.65 0.02 -0.54 
01/16/2012 -0.93 -1.26 0.10 0.23 -0.54 -0.90 -0.54 -0.81 
01/18/2012 0.99 1.34 0.61 0.98 0.63 1.02 -0.14 -0.24 
01/19/2012 0.38 0.61 1.36 2.04* 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.68 
01/20/2012 0.74 1.13 0.88 1.32 -0.04 -0.11 0.31 0.50 
01/23/2012 0.75 1.14 0.21 0.36 0.78 1.26 0.05 0.07 
01/24/2012 -0.88 -1.22 -0.02 0.02 -0.65 -1.01 -0.29 -0.44 
01/26/2012 -0.13 -0.10 -1.28 -1.70† -0.78 -1.17 -1.14 -1.73† 
01/31/2012 -0.30 -0.39 -0.46 -0.46 0.36 0.71 -0.26 -0.26 
02/01/2012 0.60 0.96 -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.15 0.09 0.27 
02/02/2012 -0.01 0.00 0.48 0.67 0.31 0.61 0.50 0.91 
02/06/2012 1.11 1.43 -0.43 -0.59 0.62 1.01 -0.29 -0.32 
02/08/2012 -0.70 -0.98 -0.72 -0.99 -0.59 -0.99 -0.48 -0.67 
02/10/2012 -0.82 -1.13 -0.82 -1.12 0.40 0.77 -0.49 -0.77 
02/13/2012 0.06 0.11 -0.67 -0.90 -0.16 -0.24 -0.27 -0.40 
02/16/2012 -1.53 -1.56 -1.21 -1.41 -1.11 -1.43 -0.80 -1.09 
02/17/2012 -0.14 -0.12 -1.27 -1.53 -0.28 -0.37 -1.04 -1.48 
05/22/2012 0.46 0.82 -0.79 -0.66 0.66 1.13 -0.36 -0.48 
06/01/2012 0.36 0.75 -0.05 0.19 0.38 0.82 0.07 0.30 
06/18/2012 0.29 0.68 0.26 0.64 -0.16 -0.22 0.44 0.67 
06/22/2012 -0.14 -0.08 -0.60 -0.70 -0.20 -0.29 -0.55 -0.66 
06/27/2012 0.63 1.06 0.13 0.51 1.12 1.52 0.04 0.09 
07/23/2012 -0.58 -0.98 0.55 0.91 -1.10 -1.51 0.20 0.72 
07/30/2012 0.18 0.48 -0.56 -0.61 -0.52 -0.84 -1.20 -1.64† 
08/21/2012 0.33 0.73 -0.23 -0.15 -0.30 -0.42 -0.59 -0.77 
08/24/2012 -0.09 0.05 -0.38 -0.35 0.07 0.27 -0.16 0.01 
09/10/2012 0.18 0.48 0.22 0.49 -0.09 -0.03 -0.54 -0.71 
12/03/2012 -0.52 -0.80 -0.64 -0.77 -0.34 -0.53 -0.42 -0.51 
01/07/2013 1.76† 1.64† -0.04 -0.26 2.09* 1.64† 0.85 0.77 
03/22/2013 0.41 0.73 -0.09 -0.14 0.56 1.07 -0.11 -0.16 
04/09/2013 1.09 1.39 0.64 0.93 0.63 1.09 0.85 1.41 
04/12/2013 0.12 0.11 0.89 1.32 0.73 1.20 1.24 2.22* 
Estimation Period: 250 days. Significance levels (two-tailed): * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. a Based on Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen 
(1991). b Based on Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test. c Based on Mikkelson and Partch (1988). 
Table 1: Stock Price Effects: Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
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Trading Day 
(relative to 
event day) 
DAXsector media 
 
HDAX 
AAR [%] t(AAR)a tcorr(AAR)
b AAR [%] t(AAR)a tcorr(AAR)
b 
 -5 -0.02 -0.01 -0.18 -0.07 -0.44 -0.40 
 -4 -0.08 -0.59 -0.41 -0.12 -0.92 -0.30 
 -3 0.05 0.47 0.78 0.00 0.08 0.14 
 -2 -0.02 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.03 
 -1 -0.12 -1.08 -0.45 -0.15 -1.11 -0.79 
 0 0.13 1.18 1.47 0.15 1.28 1.24 
 1 -0.06 -0.39 0.24 -0.12 -0.92 -0.23 
 2 -0.09 -0.82 -0.53 -0.13 -1.24 -0.56 
 3 -0.07 -0.71 -0.18 -0.07 -0.58 -0.24 
 4 -0.11 -0.81 -0.61 -0.02 -0.12 -0.12 
 5 -0.07 -0.54 0.01 -0.26 -2.58** -1.30 
Estimation Period: 250 days. Significance levels (two-tailed): ** p < 0.01. a Based on Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) 
and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). b Based on Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test.  
Table 2: Stock Price Effects: Average Abnormal Returns 
 
Event 
Window 
DAXsector media 
 
HDAX 
CAAR [%]    t(CAAR)a  tcorr(CAAR)
b CAAR [%] t(CAAR)a tcorr(CAAR)
b 
 -5; +5 -0.47 -1.01 0.05 -0.79 -1.54 -0.78 
 -2; +2 -0.17 -0.55 0.33 -0.24 -0.65 -0.18 
 -1; 1 -0.05 -0.09 0.71 -0.12 -0.19 0.11 
 -1; +0 0.01 0.14 0.70 0.00 0.24 0.29 
 0; 0 0.13 1.18 1.47 0.15 1.28 1.24 
 0; 1 0.07 0.60 1.18 0.03 0.51 0.69 
Estimation Period: 250 days. a Based on Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). b Based on 
Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test.  
Table 3: Stock Price Effects: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
 
To assess the effects of the scandal on Springer Corporation’s revenues, we analyzed circulation 
figures as well as online traffic on BILD’s website.31 However, statistics that referred to the 
circulation of BILD’s Sunday paper showed no significant reactions of the readership, i.e., no 
effects on sales of single editions (see Table 4) or in the aggregate (see Table 5 and Table 6).32 
That is, nor can RQ1a be affirmed. 
                                                     
31  To relate the results with the underlying statistical test, we head the columns of subsequent tables in 
accordance with the respective test statistic (see Appendix B). Again, as we now apply the event-study 
methodology by means of circulation and online traffic instead of share prices, “returns” correspond to 
increases in circulation or online traffic, respectively. 
32  We also considered event windows that include two [0; 1] and three editions [-1; 1]. 
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Event Date 
(Paper) 
Edition-0-Statistic [0]  
3-Editions Event 
Window [-1;1] 
 
2-Editions Event 
Window [0;1] 
SARa  tcorr(AR)
b SCARa tcorr(CAR)
b SCARa tcorr(CAR)
b 
01/22/2012 0.50 0.78 0.70 0.94 0.38 0.33 
01/29/2012 -0.06 -0.33 -0.06 -0.26 -0.26 -0.90 
02/05/2012 -0.31 -0.98 -0.23 -0.87 -0.24 -0.85 
02/12/2012 -0.02 -0.26 -0.15 -0.49 0.04 0.05 
02/19/2012 0.08 0.46 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.05 
03/04/2012 0.33 0.98 0.11 0.23 0.20 0.52 
03/11/2012 -0.04 -0.20 0.01 -0.04 -0.22 -0.71 
04/29/2012 0.73 1.57 0.40 0.83 0.24 0.28 
05/13/2012 0.32 0.98 0.06 0.23 0.34 1.08 
05/20/2012 0.15 0.46 0.43 1.28 0.32 0.99 
05/27/2012 0.31 0.92 -0.31 -0.04 -0.49 -0.47 
06/03/2012 -1.03 -1.57 0.05 0.49 -0.15 0.00 
06/17/2012 -0.34 -1.11 0.14 -0.11 -0.39 -1.22 
06/24/2012 -0.19 -0.59 -0.05 -0.19 0.16 0.47 
07/01/2012 0.38 1.24 -0.03 -0.08 0.11 0.38 
07/29/2012 -0.01 0.07 0.09 0.26 0.16 0.52 
08/05/2012 0.26 0.78 0.22 0.79 0.27 0.90 
08/12/2012 0.13 0.46 0.60 1.51 0.56 1.37 
08/26/2012 -0.50 -1.31 0.02 -0.19 -0.43 -1.22 
09/09/2012 -0.45 -1.37 -0.37 -1.13 -0.35 -1.04 
09/16/2012 -0.04 -0.07 -0.50 -1.40 -0.30 -0.85 
10/07/2012 -0.03 -0.07 -0.46 -0.64 -0.63 -1.04 
10/14/2012 -0.84 -1.44 -0.12 -0.04 -0.13 -0.05 
12/09/2012 -0.47 -1.44 -0.26 -0.75 -0.15 -0.38 
01/13/2013 0.52 0.72 -0.27 -0.30 0.36 0.47 
Estimation Period: 50 editions. a Based on Brown and Warner (1985). b Based on Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test. 
Table 4: Circulation Effects: Abnormal Increases and Cumulative Abnormal Increases in Circulation  
 
Edition  
(relative to event 
edition) 
AAR [%] t(AAR)a tcorr(AAR)
b 
 -1 0.32 0.44 0.58 
 0 -0.27 -0.37 -0.46 
 1  -0.05 -0.08 -0.14 
Estimation Period: 50 editions. a Based on Brown and Warner (1985). b Based on 
Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test. 
Table 5: Circulation Effects: Average Abnormal Increases in Circu-
lation 
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Event Window CAAR [%] t(CAAR)a tcorr(CAAR)
b 
 -1; 1 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 
 0; 0 -0.27 -0.37 -0.46 
 0; 1 -0.32 -0.32 -0.46 
Estimation Period: 50 editions. a Based on Brown and Warner (1985). b Based on 
Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test. 
Table 6: Circulation Effects: Cumulative Average Abnormal In-
creases in Circulation 
 
With regard to visits to BILD’s website, the statistics of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen 
(1991) suggest that online traffic for BILD became even worse compared to its peers in Decem-
ber 2011, the month that captures the first events of the scandal (see Table 7).  
Readers who wished information about the details of the scandal apparently preferred BILD’s 
competitors, which are more distinguished in regard to public affairs and issues having an im-
pact on society-at-large.33 However, the non-parametric tests could not reinforce this notion, 
leading to mixed results for RQ1b.34 
We reran all event-study analyses on Springer Corporation’s share prices, BILD’s circulation, 
and BILD’s online traffic volume considering only the events of December 2011 to February 
2012, that is, when the “scandal lifecycle” reached its peak, culminating in Wulff’s resignation. 
Yet, results remained insignificant.  
 
                                                     
33  For example, with the exception of March 2011 (the Fukushima nuclear disaster), online traffic on 
Spiegel’s website reached an all-time high in February 2012 (Wulff’s resignation; p < 0.05). Similarly, 
a 2012 study on readers’ trust in news outlets revealed that although 81% generally trust news coverage 
offered by regional newspapers by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (71%), Spiegel (70%) and 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (68%), only 30% trust the reliability of BILD’s news (GPRA 2012). 
34  Because of longer time intervals for online traffic data, event-date clustering may be of special concern. 
Hence, we do not offer any statistics for multi-month windows, but instead employed regressions using 
event dummies (McChesney 1987). Results still remained insignificant. 
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Event Date  
(Online) 
Month-0-Statistic [0] 
SARa tcorr(AR)
b 
12/2011 -1.73† -1.53 
01/2012 0.18 0.23 
02/2012 -0.65 -0.74 
03/2012 0.46 0.51 
04/2012 0.28 0.34 
05/2012 -0.82 -1.02 
06/2012 -1.04 -1.31 
07/2012 0.02 -0.11 
08/2012 -0.69 -0.91 
09/2012 -1.06 -1.31 
10/2012 0.26 0.34 
12/2012 0.24 0.34 
01/2013 0.25 0.40 
03/2013 1.31 1.53 
Estimation Period: 60 months. Significance level (two-tailed): † p < 0.1. a Based on 
Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991). b Based on Corrado’s (1989) non-
parametric rank test.  
Table 7: Online Effects: Abnormal Increases in Online Traffic Vol-
ume 
 
6.2 Results: GARCH Modeling 
To establish the robustness of previous results, we also employed econometric GARCH models 
and included event dummies. We utilized different event windows, ranging from one day [0] to 
five days [-2; 2]; i.e., EVENT took the value of 1 just on the precise day of the event or on the 
days within the event window. For both the [0]- and the [-2; 2]-model, all Q-statistics of the 
standardized residuals came out insignificant, indicating no remaining serial correlation in the 
mean equations. Moreover, Q-statistics and Lagrange multiplier tests showed that there appears 
to be no ARCH left in the variance equations; i.e., we assume that the models are correctly spec-
ified.  
Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the standardized residuals and the conditional variances, respec-
tively, of the [0]- and the [-2; 2]-model. They exhibit conspicuous volatility clusters that occur 
approximately quarterly and correspond to the publication of financial reports. 
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Figure 2: Standardized Residuals of GARCH Models 
 
 
Figure 3: Conditional Variances of GARCH Models 
 
Table 8: Summary of Results: GARCH Models 
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 Event Day [0] Event Window [-2; 2] 
 Mean Equation 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Constant -0.007 0.027 -0.001 0.034 
Rmt,log 0.693*** 0.047 0.692*** 0.050 
EVENT 0.073 0.070 0.017 0.050 
CONF_EVENT -0.073 0.083 -0.085 0.084 
 Variance Equation 
Constant 0.049* 0.022 0.046* 0.023 
εt−1
2  0.132* 0.053 0.104* 0.048 
σt−1
2  0.492*** 0.143 0.537*** 0.149 
EVENT 0.058* 0.027 0.020 0.013 
CONF_EVENT 0.159*** 0.043 0.144*** 0.043 
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
The Economics of Sensationalism: Media Strategy and Business Outcomes  58 
Table 8 provides the parameter estimates of the GARCH models for both the mean and variance 
equations. Columns two and three refer to the model that only considers the particular event 
day. The model of columns four and five also consider an event window of +/- 2 days around 
the event. For both models, the stationary as well as the positivity constraint are met as coeffi-
cients are positive and 𝜚 and 𝜏 sum up to less than unity.35  
The results reveal that the events of the Wulff scandal did not directly affect returns on share 
investments. This finding holds for both models and thus reaffirms the outcome of the standard 
event-study approach (p > 0.1).36 However, considering the precise event day only, results show 
that the scandal increased the share’s conditional volatility (p < 0.05). That is, coverage of the 
Wulff scandal appears to have had no direct effect upon Axel Springer Corporation’s share 
prices, but imposed additional risk on outlet’s shares. However, the coefficient is relatively 
small and the effect does not hold for the event window of five days (p > 0.1). That is, the effect 
of the events on volatility seems to be smoothing out rather quick. We also employed models 
with event windows shorter than five days. However, results remained similar to those of the 
[-2; 2]-model as EVENT does not significantly affect returns on Axel Springer Corporation’s 
shares or its volatility (p > 0.1). As a look at Figure 3 already suggested, publications of finan-
cial reports by Springer obviously increase the share’s volatility; i.e., CONF_EVENT is highly 
significant for both models (p < 0.001).  
6.3 Discussion 
In summary, in marked contrast to public opinion, there is no evidence that indicates that Axel 
Springer Corporation profited monetarily from the Wulff scandal. The scandal neither increased 
the outlet’s profit from sales or advertising nor affected its share prices. That is, moving first 
does not necessarily enhance profits as is commonly assumed, but rather incurs sizeable risks 
                                                     
35  The models utilized the returns of the HDAX as benchmark index. We also employed GARCH models 
that utilized the DAXsector media. However, those models violate the positivity constraint that under-
lies GARCH models. Therefore, results are not reported here. 
36  CONF_EVENT may remain insignificant in the mean equation because positive and negative influ-
ences balance out over time. However, including confounding events in the standard event-study ap-
proach revealed that they affect share prices.  
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due to the high fixed costs of uncovering news and waiving copyright regulations for the public 
good (RQ1). 
While we could not acquire adequate quantitative data on journalists’ employment agreements 
and earning capacities, there are some qualitative but nonetheless strong indications that, pri-
marily, the reporters benefited from the scandal (RQ2). The leading journalists received the 
highly prestigious “Henri Nannen Prize” in the category “Best Investigative Performance” for 
reporting on the Wulff scandal. Winning such prizes usually leads to extended stardom and 
higher salaries (Anderson 2004). After winning the prize, as previously suggested by Hamilton 
(2004) for self-serving journalists trying to establish a “brand name”, the leading reporters could 
capture additional income by writing down the story and publishing a book about it, and finally, 
they sold the film rights to a German production company.  
Accordingly, journalists seeking out sensational stories seem to work in a way that significantly 
enhances their own career prospects. Put differently, media outlets may be able to hire investi-
gative journalists at lower wages in exchange for a certain degree of freedom of choice concern-
ing which stories they want to cover within their job (Fama 1991; Lazear and Shaw 2007). 
Concerning RQ3, as increases in circulation did not occur, advertisements did obviously not 
reach a significantly larger audience than they were assumed to. Hence, advertisers should keep 
in mind that media outlets’ coverage of scandals does not necessarily increase circulation and 
thus reach of their advertisement. That is, in contrast to the frequent assumption, even the “first 
mover’s” advertising space does not seem to become more valuable when focusing on sensa-
tional news.  
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7. Conclusions 
It is commonly believed that sensational events boost newspaper demand and, in turn, outlets’ 
profits. Accordingly, newspapers and media corporations are frequently accused of overhyping, 
or even producing, “scandals”. Yet, our results show that business outcomes are rarely affected 
by sensational news reports, neither in terms of a boost in circulation or online traffic volume, 
nor in terms of increases in shareholder value. Even if profits are affected, the effects do not 
always enhance profits as commonly assumed, but can decrease them (see Anderson 2004). 
That is, contrary to public wisdom, sensationalism is not necessarily demand-induced.  
In particular, coverage of the Wulff scandal did not result in increased sales for BILD. Rather, 
disproportionate costs of uncovering “true” stories incur sizeable risks on business outcomes 
und thus may give reasons for an intentional lack of supplying investigative journalism. 
Moreover, competitors may free ride on investigation efforts, recycle the news, and steal parts 
of the rents.  
Yet, journalists can benefit from focusing on spectacular news. When choosing what stories to 
cover, journalists may be motivated by intrinsic or extrinsic values (i.e., the individually per-
ceived attractiveness of an activity where their journalistic talent is employed versus the lure of 
money), or by some combination of both. As the economics of awards literature notes, people 
strive not only for higher incomes but also for to gain social distinction or peer group ac-
ceptance (Frey 2005; Frey and Neckermann 2008). Data on journalists’ motivations are unavail-
able, so we cannot extend the analysis to cover psychological rewards. However, taken together, 
the coverage of the Wulff scandal appears to be based on journalists’ private motivations in 
terms of profiting from extra monetary income (e.g., from “ancillary sales” in terms of books or 
film rights), psychological income (e.g., recognition among peers and the public, reputation, 
journalism prizes) and enhanced career prospects, rather than by profit-maximizing choices of 
news outlets. 
Although our study is based on German news reports, we do not expect structural differences to 
the coverage of scandals elsewhere, so that our results should generalize to other settings. That 
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is, we “think global, but drink local” (Compaine and Cunningham 2011). However, as we con-
sider the effects of a specific scandal on a single newspaper outlet, generalizability may be lim-
ited concerning the various types of media outlets: Our results suggest that tabloids are hardly 
able to benefit from political scandals in any monetary terms, even if news is sensationalized 
and the scandal lifecycle can be extended over time. Thereby, analogous conclusions for highly 
regarded papers cannot necessarily be drawn. Moreover, we only study short-term effects of the 
scandal, as data on e.g., long-term attitudinal effects on the readership induced by scandal re-
porting over time were unfortunately unavailable.37  
Nevertheless, our results confirm those of McChesney (1987). Axel Springer Corporation was 
unable to squeeze any profit from the scandal despite the severity of the scandal, high public 
interest, and the appearance that BILD was highly involved in covering the scandal as a first 
mover with access to exclusive information. This inability emphasizes our findings and makes 
any impact of comparably minor scandals on business outcomes even more unlikely.  
Moreover, we do not assume that self-serving behaviors and private motivations of journalists 
are restricted to BILD. Data on journalists’ contractual agreements and the success of story 
spinoffs, e.g., book publications, could supply additional insights. While we examined whether 
news corporations benefit from covering a supposedly self-created scandal, future research 
could focus on benefits inherent in competitors’ fast-follower strategies. More-detailed data also 
could deepen understanding of how to make scandal reporting more profitable from a publish-
er’s perspective, especially in the case of online compared to print media.  
                                                     
37  Yet, BILD has been publicly criticized for dramatizing stories and overhyping insignificant issues for 
decades, without ever feeling a need to change the reporting style (Mittelberg 1967; Reimann 2007) – 
which may indicate that attitudes of readers do not change much or do not matter much in terms of 
changing its economic prospects. 
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II. QUALITY KILLS THE MEDIASTAR? CAREER PATHS OF PUBLIC 
INTELLECTUALS 
“How men long for celebrity! Some would willingly sacrifice 
their lives for fame, and not a few would rather be known  
by their crimes than not known at all.” 
John Sinclair (1754-1835) 
1. Abstract 
Recent commercial crises entailed that appraisals of experts frequently missed the mark, making 
their predictions become obsolete, and fueling the discussion on the decline in intellectuals’ 
reliability. While intellectuals originally were assumed to base their public presence on sound 
analyses of society, nowadays intellectuals are blamed for primarily striving for prominence, 
giving birth to the role of the “public intellectual”. We adopt an economic perspective and take 
a market-oriented view on intellectual output. We see demand for public intellectual content 
coming from all kinds of media that act as consumer intermediaries and, therefore, not only 
value information but rather appreciate entertainment. Supply comes either from specialized 
experts that inform within the area of their expertise and thus get access to an increased audi-
ence for their day-to-day activity; or from non-specialists that play across the board and are 
merely tuned to attention and fame.  
To determine the market, we refer to the listings of the German magazine Cicero that comprise 
the 500 most influential intellectuals in Germany for the years 2007 and 2012. Data suggest that 
the market for public intellectuals brings forth few omnipresent “media stars” that are able to 
cover the market to a large extent. On such markets with “winner-takes-all” characteristics, the 
best performers may be able to command substantially higher (non-)monetary incomes. Hence, 
we focus on particular career paths of scholars and pundits and ask: What separates the media 
stars from the long tail of media midgets? Thereby, we pay attention to an economic issue of 
universal interest: Does it pay off to further engage in specialization or is it more favorable to 
capitalize on your current skillset and to engage in dissemination? 
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We assess news media and TV presence of Germany’s most influential intellectuals and identify 
discriminants that create and destroy the chances for intellectual stardom, both static and over 
time. Thereby, based on our results, we cautiously draw some conclusions that address the de-
velopment of quality of public intellectual output.38 
  
                                                     
38  A preliminary version of this chapter was presented (with Prof. Dr. T. Ehrmann) at the 89th Annual 
Conference of the Western Economic Association International, Denver, USA (06/2014). 
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2. Introduction 
Mirages and improper predictions in the course of the economic crisis fired the discussion on 
the decline in intellectuals’ reliability that initially got going by the seminal works of Russel 
Jacoby (1987) and Richard A. Posner (2001). While intellectuals originally were assumed to 
base their public presence on interventions that were drawn from sound and recognized scien-
tific methods, Jacoby (1987) and Posner (2001) broached the issue of a decline in quality of 
intellectual output. Posner gave rise to the role of a public intellectual that “uses general ideas 
drawn from history, philosophy, political science, economics, law, literature, ideas that are part 
of the cultural intellectual tradition of the world, to address contemporary events, usually of a 
political or ideological flavor, and does so in the popular media” (Posner 2002). Posner (2001) 
especially highlighted the lack of quality assurance of intellectual content that is disseminated to 
the general public. Moreover, recent studies assessed negligible real-world effects of intellectual 
output as well as the shrinking success of intellectuals in shaping the societal and political dis-
course (Bates 2011; Collins 2011). The increasing prevalence of “anti-intellectualism” within 
society (Claussen 2011) enabled intellectual rioters to take part in the process of public opinion-
making. Just think of Hans-Olaf Henkel, former president of the Federation of German Industry 
(BDI), who jumped on the bandwagon of euro skepticism and publicized his anti-euro stance in 
several TV talk shows (at this point, we do not want to link his radical media presence with his 
book publication that took place simultaneously). Or, to give an example from the US, think of 
the career path of Mehmet Oz, who was hired as a professor at the Department of Surgery at 
Columbia University in 2001, who was among the 100 Most Influential People in 2008 (Time 
Magazine), and who finally won his first “Daytime Emmy Award for Outstanding Talk Show 
Host” in 2010. Yet, we are not able to take a stand on the platitude that “everything was better 
in the old days”. However, we set up some testable hypotheses, examine them empirically, and 
cautiously evaluate their effect on the particular supply of public intellectual output. 
Our data suggest that the market for public intellectuals yields few omnipresent “media stars” 
that are able to cover the market to a large extent (the top 35 public intellectuals are responsible 
for one third of intellectual media presence). According to Adler (1985) and Rosen (1981), the 
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superstar status may lead to disproportional increases in monetary or psychological income. In 
case of high market concentration, stars may be able to attain larger market shares at costs that 
grow much less than proportionate (Rosen 1981), and acquire parts of customers’ cost savings 
that result from reduced search effort (Adler 1985). In this regard, various studies empirically 
applied superstar theories on different markets. For example, Ehrmann, Meiseberg, and Ritz 
(2009) assessed superstar effects in deluxe gastronomy, or Nelson and Glotfelty (2012) ana-
lyzed the relationship between movie star power and earnings of box offices. Addressing the 
entertainment value of media content (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2002, 2005), we draw on Ad-
ler’s (1985) statement “the more you know, the more you enjoy”. That is, the entertainment 
value of a particular intellectual is a function of his popularity, e.g., because consumers may not 
just take the intellectual’s message, but also discuss it with knowledgeable peers (Adler 1985).  
Assuming disproportionate returns for superstars, the basic question concerning the market for 
public intellectual output is: What separates the media stars from the long tail of media midg-
ets? Therefore, we examine the careers of scholars and pundits in a market that shows character-
istics similar to “winner-takes-all-markets” with disproportionate pecuniary or psychological 
incomes for top performers (Frank and Cook 1995). Basically, there are two options to initiate a 
career in the market for public intellectuals: Either, stardom can be based on profound 
knowledge (i.e., “specialization” in a particular topic); or, it can be based on “relentless” self-
marketing (which does not necessarily require any knowledge at all). That is, we pay attention 
to an economic issue of universal interest (Ferreira and Sah 2012): Does it pay off to further 
engage in specialization or is it more favorable to capitalize on your current skillset by engaging 
in dissemination? Hence, we analyze the impact of certain opportunity costs and expected pay-
offs on career opportunities and choices of intellectuals (Gibbons 1998, 2005; Prendergast 
1993). 
On the demand side, we consider interests of media companies such as newspapers and TV 
stations (Misztal 2012). In this context, the media act as a gatekeeper for public intellectual 
content and fill newspaper op-ed pages, book sections, and airtime in accordance with consum-
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ers’ needs. Thereby, consumers do not only value information but also entertainment (Jensen 
1979). On the supply side, freelance intellectuals or academics that are affiliated to universities 
may appreciate the comparatively easy access towards greater audiences. Specialized experts 
may benefit from an accelerated dissemination of their insights through the mass media, be it 
for monetary or non-monetary reasons. While this kind of publicity is assumed to be of (at least 
subliminal) informational character, non-specialists that talk beyond their area of expertise may 
prefer infotainment and are merely geared towards attention and publicity. 
Yet, quality of public intellectuals’ argumentation is, at least for the average individual, difficult 
to monitor. Intellectual output represents a credence good, similar to used cars, surgical treat-
ments, or artistic performances. In case of quality uncertainties, markets usually respond with 
instruments that improve customer’s confidence in the product, e.g., in terms of warranties, 
consumer intermediaries, increased verifiability, reputation, or competition (Posner 2001). For 
example, while the voice of an actor and the melody of a song should be crucial for the evalua-
tion of musicians’ performance, recent research on music perception revealed that visual infor-
mation may superimpose audible quality features and, therefore, affect performance evaluation 
(Tsay 2013). Accordingly, intellectuals may find appropriate tools that strikingly suggest quality 
and thus increase customers’ benefit, or decrease their searching costs (Akerlof 1970; Deuchert, 
Adjamah, and Pauly 2005).  
In order to clarify conditions on the market for public intellectuals, we focus on print media and 
TV presence of Germany’s 500 most influential intellectuals in 2007 and 2012 (with reference 
to Cicero magazine) and identify discriminants that create and destroy the chances for intellec-
tual stardom, both static and over time. Thereby, we enhance Posner’s (2001) attempt, which 
claims to be “A Study of Decline” but actually represents a non-dynamic empirical approach. 
Moreover, we indeed give some ideas on quality measurement in public intellectual discourses, 
while Posner (2001) merely rants against declining quality. In addition to scholarly citations that 
are hardly recognized by media, we take a look upon intellectuals’ specialized expertise con-
cerning the issues they address in order to cautiously assess the quality of their output and pro-
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vide a measure that indeed depicts the tradeoff between time for public discourses and time for 
academia. Finally, while Posner (2001) takes a polemic and moral perspective to criticize the 
decline in intellectuals’ output, we focus on the economic reasoning for media presence of intel-
lectual rioters. 
We proceed as follows: First, we describe the market for public intellectuals with a focus on 
demand and supply. Afterwards, we will elaborate on quality assessment and monitoring of 
credence goods in general, and of intellectual content in particular. After deriving our hypothe-
ses towards the chances and motives of intellectuals for media stardom, we describe our data 
and methodological approach. Then, we present and discuss our results conclude. 
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3. The Market for Public Intellectuals 
Research as well as media practitioners increasingly observe phenomena like the medialization 
and flattening of society, or the downturn in “quality journalism”, especially within an area that 
used to be ruled by the “educated people”: the market for public intellectuals (Gattone 2012; 
Hamilton 2007; Jacoby 1987; Posner 2001).39 Thereby, reasoning varies with point of view. 
Either a downturn in quality that results from sloppy scientific procedures or the lack of real-
world consequences is criticized (Claussen 2011; Collins 2011; Hubbard 2004).  
For the U.S., Richard A. Posner (2001) empirically tested developments and trends on the mar-
ket for public intellectuals, tellingly entitled “Public Intellectuals – a Study of Decline”. We 
follow Posner (2001) and examine the careers of public intellectuals in terms of markets that 
offer credence goods, that is, intellectual content whose quality is hard to assess.40  
Demand for public intellectual content is induced by all kinds of media that have to fill an in-
creasing amount of newspaper pages, radio pieces, or broadcasting time. Public intellectuals are 
consulted to voice an opinion on questions of political or ideological importance (Posner 2001). 
For journalists or reporters, it may be noticeably cheaper to ask an intellectual to fill a few sec-
onds of air time than to get fully knowledgeable of specific occurrences and their societal con-
sequences on their own. However, several studies elaborate on the syndrome of “anti-
intellectualism” in media that depicts reluctance to intellectual content (Claussen 2011; 
Garnham 1995; Hamilton 2007, 2010; Holderman 2003; Ritzer 2006). Media are not primary 
demanders but intermediaries between intellectuals and the general public, with the latter valu-
ing not only pure information but also entertainment (Jensen 1979; Posner 2001). Therefore, 
besides hard unbiased facts, media demand stories that cater to consumers’ gusto for amuse-
ment, downgrading information to a by-product (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Rothbauer 
and Sieg 2013). Hence, producing marketable “news” not only requires relevant information but 
                                                     
39  In this regard, “medialization and flattening of society” emphasize the notion that public opinion form-
ing increasingly follows the suggestions of mass media.  
40  For the moment, we suppose that quality matters. Thus, intellectual content as credence good has to be 
accompanied by reliable signals for quality.  
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also an appealing form of representation, communication skills, and rhetoric ingenuity; for the 
sake of drama, extreme positions that encourage contentions may be sold like hotcakes (Posner 
2001).  
Demand is satisfied either by freelance intellectuals or by academics that are affiliated to uni-
versities. Especially for fulltime academics, there may be considerable incentives to profit from 
synergies by performing en passant on the public stage. First, publicity and prominence may 
“rub off” on other activities, such as publication of nonfiction titles or giving talks and lectures, 
and thus may enhance chances for additional revenues. Second, some intellectuals may just 
enjoy public attention, the “little fame in between”, and only crave for publicity and stardom, 
hazarding temporary consequences of losses of pecuniary income (Posner 2001).41 While the 
first motivation of increased sales in textbooks may be negligible in Germany due to language 
barriers and the dominance of US American literature, we particularly emphasize the second 
incentive. Low entry costs for intellectuals in regard to mass media facilitate access to the popu-
lace and allow for tremendous stardom beyond the scientific community (Drezner 2008; 
Gattone 2012). Due to the increasing prevalence of web-based communication and dissemina-
tion, such as blogs, size of successful public intellectuals’ audiences may be multiplied at low 
costs, leaving disproportional (non)pecuniary rewards to them.42  
Yet, not every intellectual decides to perform publicly. Intellectuals may either choose to spe-
cialize and to write and speak only about one’s own subject, or to generalize and also address 
topics beyond their own disciplines (Hubbard 2004). Increasing specialization within research 
made it considerably costly to translate scientific insights into the sort of news that is demanded 
by media companies and that arouses public interest. Accordingly, several studies found a nega-
tive relationship between media presence and academic workload (Cronin and Shaw 2002; 
Danowski and Park 2009; Landes and Posner 2000; Misztal 2012; Park 2006). Especially young 
                                                     
41  Losses of pecuniary income may result, for example, from eschewing highly remunerated executive 
trainings in favor of allowances from TV stations, which involves costs for preparing public perfor-
mances and risks of losing scientific reputation (Gattone 2012; Park 2006). 
42  Based on Rosen’s hedonic price models (Rosen 1974; Thaler and Rosen 1976), recent research does 
frequently not focus only on monetary rewards, but also includes non-monetary incentives (Lazear and 
Shaw 2007). 
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researchers are dependent upon ongoing scientific publication and scholarly productivity to 
brighten their career prospects; therefore, opportunity costs keep them from devoting them-
selves to the public discourse. They first have to “walk the walk” before they “talk the talk” 
(Posner 2001). In contrast, pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns from scientific publication less-
en with age – new job opportunities become less likely and marginal psychological utility from 
applause for new scientific insights shrinks.43 Similarly, scholars like Gibbons (1998) or 
Holmström (1982) show that career concerns hardly discipline employees that are close to re-
tirement and thus stress the importance additional (non-) monetary incentives for more experi-
enced workers.44 At the same time, style of writing improves and life experience that is assumed 
necessary to comment on topics of ideological flavor increases with age, preferring elderly re-
searchers to juniors. Besides opportunity costs, intellectuals face the risk of embarrassing one-
self within the public discourse. Primarily academics that publicly speak beyond their expertise 
risk to be degraded to amateurs by their academic peers, and thus may lose parts of their reputa-
tion within the scientific community. Enhanced specialization of research and knowledge has 
made it even more difficult – for affiliated and especially for unaffiliated – to conscientiously 
comment on general matters (Posner 2001).  
Yet, it remains arguable whether media are able and willing to separate experts from non-
experts. The market for public intellectuals shows that media focus on few faces that cover large 
parts of the market and thereby achieve celebrity status (Goodell 1977; Posner 2001). While 
these media stars reduce search costs on the side of the media, they can pocket some of these 
cost savings in form of increased prices for lectures and talks (Adler 1985). However, most 
intellectuals are merged in the long tail and do not perform very well on the public stage – 
whether intentionally or inevitably. Although according to Chris Anderson, the guru of the long 
tail theory, “the era of one-size-fits-all is ending” (Anderson 2006), prior research suggests that 
the phenomenon of superstars on the market for public intellectuals is rather persistent (Landes 
                                                     
43  For reasons of German pension law, offerings for new professorships become increasingly unlikely 
with age.  
44  Empirical research confirms this notion and shows that the importance of supplementary incentive 
payoffs varies with age (Chevalier and Ellison 1999; Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Ortega 2003). 
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and Posner 2000). Consequently, we examine what separates the media stars from the long tail 
and whether these separators vary over time. 
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4. Quality of Intellectual Output: Some Ideas on the Problem of Measurement  
The quality of intellectual output is, at least for the average individual, difficult to monitor. 
Hence, intellectual work represents a credence good, similar to used cars, surgical treatments, or 
artistic performances. In case of quality uncertainties, markets usually respond with instruments 
that improve customers’ confidence in the product, e.g., in terms of warranties, consumer inter-
mediaries, increased verifiability, reputation, or competition (Horner 2002; Posner 2001). Ac-
cordingly, intellectuals have to find tools that signal quality and increase customers’ benefit or 
decrease their searching costs, respectively (Akerlof 1970; Deuchert, Adjamah, and Pauly 
2005).  
At first glance, one could assume that the competition for publicity among the variety of intel-
lectuals ensures quality on its own (Drezner 2008; Posner 2001). While this may be the case if 
quality is observable or can be assured in other ways, Posner (2001) argues that the market for 
public intellectuals, contrary to the market for scientific publishing, lacks quality screening, 
review processes, effective intermediaries, and the possibility of reputational sanctions.45 Espe-
cially those academics that are beyond their scientific zenith can leave the market – in case their 
superficiality in the public discourse comes to light – at very low costs. Reputational sanctions 
would only affect them marginally because they are not dependent upon ongoing scientific pub-
lications to the extent younger researchers are (Posner 2001). Moreover, intermediaries, i.e., 
journalists and reporters, are unlikely to be able and willing to prove the substance of special-
ized intellectual content; and as it is the case with any kind of news, intellectual content cannot 
be accompanied by legally enforceable warranties (Hamilton 2007; Posner 2001). Hence, those 
tools that are usually assumed to increase consumers’ trust in credence goods are hardly appli-
cable to the market for public intellectual output. Furthermore, similar to the market for news, 
the market for public intellectuals’ “news” may ascribe more value to entertainment than to 
information (Jensen 1979; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). The fact that the top 35 public in-
tellectuals in Germany account for one third of intellectuals’ media presence and that those 
                                                     
45  For a prominent example of failed quality screening of intellectual output, see the Sokal affair. 
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frequently address cross-sectional issues (see below) gives rise to the assumption that relevance 
of the issue might be preferred to rigor of analyses. Of course, one could argue that those intel-
lectuals are of superior ability and even outperform specialists of other disciplines on foreign 
terrain. Yet, while we assume that there may be a handful of intellectuals that are able to speak 
knowingly about questions of cross-sectional importance, we suggest that, for the average intel-
lectual, the quality of output deteriorates with diversification of issues (Freese 2009; Hubbard 
2004). Especially today’s requirements within academia, like publishing in peer-reviewed jour-
nals, involve scientific specialization and make it more difficult for generalists to play across the 
board (Posner 2001). While discussing and researching close to one’s own discipline may dull 
the sense for relevance, double blind review processes usually avoid serious fallacies. Moreo-
ver, specialists on a certain issue have a sufficient overview of existing evidence; hence, redun-
dancies are scarcer and argumentation is likely to be more rigorously (Stern 2009). Consequent-
ly, outstanding scientific reputation may signify quality of public intellectual content. Nelson 
(1997) denoted citations as “academia’s version of applause”. Reputation in terms of recog-
nized scientific work, titles, or awards may signal credibility and reliability (Cronin and Shaw 
2002; Davenport and Cronin 2000; Park 2006; Posner 2001).  
Within the further course of this paper, we are not going to criticize the output of any particular 
intellectual, but rather cautiously analyze the rules of the market for public intellectuals. We pay 
attention to certain criteria that might signal informational quality and analyze their effect on 
demand and supply functions for (public) intellectual work. 
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5. Hypotheses 
Demand as well as supply of public intellectual content is considerably high, especially due to 
major uncertainties concerning social and economic developments that foster need for intellec-
tual output and because of very low barriers to entry on the supply side (Danowski and Park 
2009; Freese 2009). Yet, determinants that affect demand and supply functions and, therefore, 
influence the chances for intellectual stardom remain unclear to date.  
Specialization of knowledge makes it impracticable for the media to overlook the whole range 
of academic research and intellectual sub-areas, even if they were interested in doing so. There-
fore, media are not inevitably irrational in giving the floor to distinguished intellectuals, even if 
they speak beyond the area of their expertise. To sacrifice informational specificity and quality 
of specialized knowledge and to focus on few intellectuals, instead, that are consulted with re-
gard to a broad range of issues across various disciplines may yield higher overall utility 
(Posner 2001). Moreover, a focus on few superstars with broad visibility may please consumers 
that increasingly prefer entertainment to information and reduces their searching costs (Adler 
1985; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). 
Hypothesis 1. With an increasing spread of issues that an intellectual addresses, a high media 
presence of this intellectual becomes more likely. 
Similarly, we consider academic titles and affiliation to universities as credentials that are ob-
servable at very low costs (Posner 2001). Especially in markets for credence goods, where 
quality of the output is difficult to assess, the customers may have a look at the quality of the 
input (Fama 1991). Consequently, affiliated intellectuals may face higher demand than freelanc-
ers. In contrast, the phenomenon of anti-intellectualism suggests that credentials valued in aca-
demia hardly impress the general public (Claussen 2011; Hamilton 2007). 
Hypothesis 2. Intellectuals that are affiliated to a university are a) more likely or b) less likely 
to be considered in mass media. 
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From the perspective of the supply side, there is mixed evidence concerning the preference of 
distinguished scholars to perform publicly (Holderman 2003; Landes and Posner 2000; Misztal 
2012; Posner 2001). Rules of the games in the market of public intellectualism appear to differ 
from those of scientific practices (Misztal 2012). The pressure that media and public apply on 
scientists to translate their knowledge into bite-sized pieces may lead to increased opportunity 
costs for intellectuals and thus may keep them from going public (Park 2006). Specialization of 
knowledge heats up the trade-off between rigor and relevance and limits the ability of special-
ized academics to get a public hearing (Posner 2001). Moreover, highly regarded scholars may 
have more reputation at risk in case they make a fool of themselves within public performances. 
However, when it comes to issues that require specialized knowledge, we assume that recog-
nized scientists have a cost advantage that results from their experience in research. They are 
already able to employ the specific tools necessary to produce a specific output. Furthermore, 
especially academics at an advanced position within the academic lifecycle may profit from 
synergies by simultaneously performing on the public stage.46 As both pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary marginal benefits from further scientific publishing diminish, distinguished scholars may 
appreciate the comparatively easy access towards greater audiences to increase fame and popu-
larity.  
Hypothesis 3. With an increasing number of scholarly citations an intellectual has received, a 
high media presence of this intellectual becomes a) more likely or b) less likely. 
Especially young academics first have to become scientific specialists before they take part in 
public discourse. They usually do not have sufficient credentials at their command to enter intel-
lectual dialogues and are, instead, dependent upon ongoing scholarly productivity to brighten 
their career prospects (Posner 2001). Resources that are spent for simplifying scientific 
knowledge and for preparing public performances are not available for academia. That is, pub-
licity and stardom beyond the scientific community may come at the expense of research and 
                                                     
46  Just think of a head of an institute that can command hundreds of research assistants like Hans-Werner 
Sinn. 
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scientific publications and vice versa (Park 2006). In other words, active scholars are assumed 
to simultaneously perform on the public stage less likely.  
Hypothesis 4. Intellectuals that are active in scientific research are considered in mass media 
less likely. 
Finally, we take a dynamic approach and identify changing impacts of factors that promote or 
inhibit public stardom over time. The prevalent consensus is that importance, credibility, and 
informational quality of public intellectual output are deteriorating (Park 2006; Posner 2001; 
Stern 2009). Moreover, recent economic and financial crises may have strengthened the effect 
of anti-intellectualism by reducing believe in academics’ opinions. Hence, we abide by the 
broad consensus, take a dynamic perspective, and test the following presumptions. 
Hypothesis 5. In explaining the media presence of intellectuals, a) the positive effect of spread 
of issues intensifies, b) the positive (negative) effect of affiliation to universities lessens (intensi-
fies), c) the positive (negative) effect of scholarly citations lessens (intensifies), and d) the nega-
tive effect of active scholarship intensifies over time. 
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6. Sample, Variables, and Methods 
6.1 Sample 
Not every intellectual is an academic, not every academic is an intellectual, and not every intel-
lectual is a public intellectual (Stern 2009). Hence, it is not an easy task to determine inviolably 
who indeed represents a public intellectual, not to mention the challenge of setting up a com-
plete list of public intellectuals. Criteria, standards, and procedures may ever be criticized. Max 
A. Höfer developed the most recognized procedure in Germany to assess the influence of intel-
lectuals. The procedure is based on people’s (1) presence within the 160 most important Ger-
man-language newspapers and magazines, (2) online citations, (3) hits on Google Scholar, and 
(4) number of cross-references within the biographic archive Munzinger. A list of the 500 most 
influential intellectuals in Germany was published in the magazine Cicero for 2007 and for 
2012.47 In order to avoid any self-induced subjectivity, we based our sample on Cicero’s compi-
lation. To avoid upward biases in our data on media mentions (see below), we deleted those 
intellectuals with common surnames. Hence, we obtained a final sample of 442 intellectuals for 
2007 and 436 for 2012.48 A complete list of both samples can be found in Appendix C, Table 19 
and Table 20.  
6.2 Variables 
Similar to Landes and Posner (2000), we conducted a thorough search within LexisNexis to get 
data on MEDIAMENTIONS, i.e., the number of LexisNexis references, of the intellectuals with-
in a five-year period ahead of the rankings, that is, from 2003 to 2007 for the 2007 ranking; and 
from 2008 to 2012 for the 2012 ranking.49 We label the top 35 intellectuals by 
MEDIAMENTIONS of each ranking as MEDIASTARs. For each ranking, they account for one 
                                                     
47  Cicero is a German magazine that is published monthly and endeavors to provide upmarket journalism 
on politics and culture. 
48  We deleted those intellectuals whose surnames were among the 100 most common surnames in Ger-
many.  
49  We focused on „German Language News” in LexisNexis. Searching in LexisNexis implies the ad-
vantage that only media mentions are being considered, without any reference to scholarly articles. 
Therefore, hits in LexisNexis are a better index for non-scholarly prominence than Google hits (Landes 
and Posner 2000). Furthermore, LexisNexis is able to separate the two survey periods more sharply 
than Google (Danowski and Park 2009). 
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third of overall media mentions of the total ranking (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). Moreover, the 
standard deviation halves itself when excluding the MEDIASTARs, displaying that these values 
disproportionately vary from the rest of the sample. We label those 35 intellectuals that are least 
prominent in terms of media mentions as MEDIAMIDGETs. As a second indicator for promi-
nence and public stardom, we consider TALKVIS, which reflects whether the intellectual has 
ever been visiting one of Germany’s major political talk shows.50 
 
Figure 4: LexisNexis References as a Function of Rank (2007 Sample) 
 
 
Figure 5: LexisNexis References as a Function of Rank (2012 Sample) 
 
                                                     
50  We considered the talk shows „Günther Jauch“, „Maybrit Illner“, „Menschen bei Maischberger“, 
„Hart aber Fair“, and „Anne Will“. Because first broadcast of some of these talk shows was after 
2007, we focus on the 2012 ranking. 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
0 100 200 300 400 500
M
E
D
IA
M
E
N
T
IO
N
S
(2
0
0
3
 -
2
0
0
7
)
Rank (MEDIAMENTIONS)
35
35
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
0 100 200 300 400 500
M
E
D
IA
M
E
N
T
IO
N
S
 
(2
0
0
8
 -
2
0
1
2
)
Rank (MEDIAMENTIONS)
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
0 100 200 300 400 500
M
E
D
IA
M
E
N
T
IO
N
S
(2
0
0
3
 -
2
0
0
7
)
Rank (MEDIAMENTIONS)
35
35
0
2,000
4,000
6,00
8
10
0 100 200 300 400 500
M
E
D
IA
M
E
N
T
IO
N
S
 
(2
0
0
8
 -
2
0
1
2
)
Rank (MEDIAMENTIONS)
Quality Kills The Mediastar? Career Paths of Public Intellectuals  86 
In order to indicate intellectuals that cover an exceptional broad spread of issues, we provide the 
variable WIDESPREAD that takes the value of “1” in case the number of issues covered exceeds 
the average by one standard deviation, and “0” otherwise. We count the number of issues by 
referring to the number of different categories that the intellectual is assigned to on Amazon. 
REPUTATION is the number of total scholarly citations the intellectual accounts for by 2007 or 
2012, respectively, according to Thomson Reuters’ “Web of Science” (WoS). We consider cita-
tions recorded by the Arts and Humanities Citation Index, the Science Citation Index Expanded, 
and the Social Science Citation Index. The dummy AFFILIATED indicates whether the intellec-
tual has or ever had a full professorship at a university. Moreover, ACTIVESCHOL signals 
whether the intellectual was publishing within a five-year period ahead of the rankings with 
reference to the WoS database. Additionally, we assign every intellectual to a scientific field 
according to OECD’s “Fields of Science and Technology” (FoS). We provide corresponding 
dummy variables as controls. HUMAN signals that the intellectual is assigned to the field of 
humanities, SOCIAL represents social science, NATURAL stands for natural science, and 
MEDICAL signifies medical and health science as field of research. Moreover, the category 
OTHER comprises journalists, writers, and bloggers. Furthermore, we include the dummy vari-
able SEX as well as AGE into our statistics (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994).51 Finally, 
RANKING12 takes the value of “1” if the observation belongs to the 2012 ranking, and “0” 
otherwise.  
6.3 Methods 
We use stepwise logistic regressions to model the impact of the independent variable on the 
chances to be considered a MEDIASTAR (Hair 2010). In a first model, we only consider the 
2012 ranking; in a second model, we include the 2007 ranking and afterwards assess changes in 
effects over time by adding an interaction term with RANKING12 (Model 3). Additionally, we 
assess whether the variables under examination affect the chance to become a guest in TV talk 
shows (Model 4). The approach can be formalized as follows: 
                                                     
51  We count AGE from date of birth and stopped at the time the respective ranking was set up, i.e., 2007 
or 2012.  
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𝑃𝑖 =
1
1+𝑒−𝑧𝑖
, (1) 
where P defines the probability for MEDIASTAR or TALKVIS, respectively, and i indicates 
the model (with i = 1,…, 4). Logits z can be defined as:  
𝑧𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖,0 + 𝛽𝑖,1 ∗ 𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,2 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,3 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐿𝐼𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖 (2) 
      +𝛽𝑖,4 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,5 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗
9
𝑗=6 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,1   
      +𝑘𝑖 ∗ ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑙
9+𝑛
𝑙=10 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐼𝑁𝐺12𝑖 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,2, 
where Xi,1 is a vector of dummy variables for the scientific fields (FoS), k is the gatekeeper for 
interaction terms (with k = 1 for Model 3, 0 otherwise), n is the number of included interaction 
terms, and Xi,2 is a vector of moderated variables. 
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7. Results and Discussion 
Table 9 shows descriptive statistics for the full sample, both for 2007 and for 2012. Noticeable 
is the high average AGE of approximately 60 years for both samples. That is, in correspondence 
with prior research (Landes and Posner 2000), the veterans with considerable life experience 
shape the intellectual discourse.  
Moreover, natural and medical scientists are significantly underrepresented compared with re-
searchers for social science and humanities.52 Social and humanities scholars may find it easier 
to deal with mass media because their suggestions are often geared to facts and figures to a 
lesser extent compared to, for example, natural scientists. Therefore, they face a lower risk of 
getting busted or of disgracing themselves (Hagstrom 1964). Furthermore, women are un-
derrepresented as well, especially in the 2012 sample. While 16% of Germany’s full-time uni-
versity professors were female in 2007, their quota climbed up to 20% in 2012.53 Yet, the 
amount of female among the most influential intellectuals declined from 14.7% in 2007 to 
13.8% in 2012.54 
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics of the sample composed of MEDIASTARs and 
MEDIAMIDGETs for 2007, 2012 and in total. MEDIASTAR and MEDIAMIDGET do not 
differ significantly in AGE (p > 0.1). That is, AGE appears to be a requirement for access to 
intellectual discourses (see Table 9) but no differentiator.  
Medical scientists are unrepresented; yet, one natural scientist made it into the 
MEDIAMIDGET category for 2007. WIDESPREAD is more frequent among MEDIASTARs 
(p < 0.05). As noted above, we think that it is overly costly for those intellectuals that play on an 
exceptional broad field to indeed acquire specialized knowledge on every topic they address. 
                                                     
52  For comparison: in Germany there are 97,000 social scientists (including economists), 44,000 humani-
ties scholars and 65,000 natural scientists (figures refer to employees that are subject to social insur-
ance contributions according to data from the Federal Employment Agency).  
53  Information refer to Germany’s Federal Office of Statistics. 
54  While humanities scholars frequently ruminate on gender diversity, only 14% of German philosophy 
professors are women (compared to, for example, 23% in economics and law). Moreover, percentage 
of women among scientific staff is significantly lower (p < 0.05) in philosophy (27%) than in econom-
ics (30%). 
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 2007 (N=442) 2012 (N=436) 
     
AGE** 59.8 (13.2) 62.4  (12.9) 
     
TALKVIS (1|0)*     
TALKVIS (1) -  108 (24.8) 
No TALKVIS (0) -  328 (75.2) 
     
Number of Issues** 9.5  (4.2) 9.5  (4.2) 
     
WIDESPREAD (1|0)*     
WIDESPREAD (1) 64  (14.5) 65  (14.9) 
Not WIDESPREAD (0) 378  (85.5) 371  (85.1) 
     
REPUTATION** 248.6  (2,241.1) 375.7  (2,958.9) 
     
MEDIAMENTIONS** 479.7  (598.6) 836  (981.7) 
     
AFIILIATED (1|0)*     
AFFILIATED (1) 135 (30.5) 159 (36.5) 
Not AFFILIATED (0) 307 (69.5) 277 (63.5) 
     
ACTIVESCHOL (1|0)*     
ACTIVESCHOL (1) 217  (49.1) 219 (50.2) 
Not ACTIVESCHOL (0) 225  (50.9) 217  (49.8) 
     
SEX (1|0)*     
Male (0) 377  (85.3) 376 (86.2) 
Female (1) 65  (14.7) 60 (13.8) 
     
Scientific Field*     
HUMAN 208  (47.1) 206 (47.2) 
SOCIAL 73  (16.5) 89 (20.4) 
MEDICAL 4  (0.9) 6 (1.4) 
NATURAL 15  (3.4) 12 (2.8) 
OTHER 142  (32.1) 123 (28.2) 
     
* Count (percentage in brackets). ** Mean (standard deviation in brackets). 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for the total Sample of Intellectuals 
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 2007 (N=70) 2012 (N=70) Total (N=140) 
AGE**       
MEDIASTAR 63.2 (12.0) 63.9 (13.1) 63.5  (12.5) 
MEDIAMIDGET 62.3 (14.1) 67.4 (11.9) 64.8 (13.3) 
Total 62.8  (13.1) 65.6 (12.6) 64.1 (12.9) 
       
Number of Issues**       
MEDIASTAR 10.4  (5.0) 10.7 (4.7) 10.5 (4.9) 
MEDIAMIDGET 8.8  (3.7) 9.8 (3.3) 9.3 (3.5) 
Total 9.6  (4.5) 10.2 (4.1) 9.9 (4.3) 
       
WIDESPREAD (1|0)*       
WIDESPREAD (1)       
MEDIASTAR 11  (78.6) 10 (76.9) 21 (77.8) 
MEDIAMIDGET 3  (21.4) 3  (23.1) 6 (22.2) 
Total 14  (20.0) 13  (18.6) 27 (19.3) 
Not WIDESPREAD (0)       
MEDIASTAR 24  (42.9) 25  (43.9) 49 (43.4) 
MEDIAMIDGET 32  (57.1) 32  (56.1) 64 (56.6) 
Total 56  (80.0) 57  (81.4) 113 (80.7) 
       
REPUTATION**       
MEDIASTAR 23.5 (79.8) 31.9 (122.6) 27.7 (103.5) 
MEDIAMIDGET 70.7 (308.5) 65.1 (200.4) 67.9 (260.2) 
Total 47.1  (226.6) 48.5 (167.0) 47.8 (199.0) 
       
MEDIAMENTIONS**       
MEDIASTAR 2,036.5 (950.9) 3,421.2 (1,456.6) 2,728.9 (1,411.5) 
MEDIAMIDGET 36.2  (13.8) 61.6 (22.4) 48.9 (22.5) 
Total 1,036.4  (1,205.2)  1,741.4  (1,970.5) 0 (0.0) 
       
AFIILIATED (1|0)*       
AFFILIATED (1)       
MEDIASTAR 8  (34.8) 11  (34.4) 19 (34.5) 
MEDIAMIDGET 15  (65.2) 21 (65.6) 36 (65.5) 
Total 23  (32.9) 32  (45.7) 55 (39.3) 
Not AFFILIATED (0)       
MEDIASTAR 27  (57.4) 24  (63.2) 51 (60.0) 
MEDIAMIDGET 20  (42.6) 14  (36.8) 34 (40.0) 
Total 47  (67.1) 38  (54.3) 85 (60.7) 
       
ACTIVESCHOL (1|0)*       
ACTIVESCHOL (1)       
MEDIASTAR 18  (52.9) 13 (37.1) 31 (44.9) 
MEDIAMIDGET 16  (47.1) 22  (62.9) 38 (55.1) 
Total 34  (48.6) 35 (50.0) 69 (49.3) 
Not ACTIVESCHOL (0)       
MEDIASTAR 17  (47.2) 22  (62.9) 39 (54.9) 
MEDIAMIDGET 19  (52.8) 13 (37.1) 32 (45.1) 
Total 36  (51.4) 35 (50.0) 71  (50.7) 
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 2007 (N=70) 2012 (N=70) Total (N=140) 
SEX (1|0)*       
Male (0)       
MEDIASTAR 30  (47.6) 27 (45.0) 57 (46.3) 
MEDIAMIDGET 33  (52.4) 33  (55.0) 66 (53.7) 
Total 63  (90.0) 60  (85.7) 123 (87.9) 
Female (1)       
MEDIASTAR 5  (71.4) 8  (80.0) 13 (76.5) 
MEDIAMIDGET 2  (28.6) 2  (20.0) 4 (23.5) 
Total 7  (10.0) 10 (14.3) 17 (12.1) 
       
Scientific Field*       
HUMAN       
MEDIASTAR 14  (46.7) 17 (53.1) 31 (50.0) 
MEDIAMIDGET 16  (53.3) 15  (46.9) 31 (50.0) 
Total 30  (42.9)  32 (45.7) 62 (44.3) 
SOCIAL       
MEDIASTAR 7  (70.0) 7  (43.8) 14 (53.8) 
MEDIAMIDGET 3  (30.0) 9 (56.3) 12  (46.2) 
Total 10  (14.3) 16  (22.9) 26 (18.6) 
NATURAL       
MEDIASTAR 0  (0.0) 0  (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
MEDIAMIDGET 1  (100.0) 0  (0.0) 1 (100.0) 
Total 1  (1.4)  0 (0.0) 1 (0.7) 
OTHER       
MEDIASTAR 14  (48.3) 11 (50.0) 25  (49.0) 
MEDIAMIDGET 15  (51.7) 11 (50.0) 26 (51.0) 
Total 29  (41.4) 22  (31.4) 51 (36.4) 
* Count (percentage in brackets); ** Mean (standard deviation in brackets). 
Example of interpretation: In 2007, there were 14 humanities scholars (HUMAN) assigned to the group of MEDIASTAR. This 
amount corresponds to 46.7% of all humanities scholars within the 2007 sample (30 in total). 30 intellectuals of the 2007 sample 
are assigned to humanities. This amount corresponds to 42.9% of the 2007 sample (N=70). 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Mediastars and Mediamidgets  
 
Accordingly, MEDIASTARs seem to focus on infotainment rather than substantial meaning. 
ACTIVESCHOL occurs less often among MEDIASTARs, at least for the 2012 sample 
(p < 0.05). MEDIAMIDGETs appear to be characterized by higher REPUTATION; however, 
differences are insignificant (p > 0.1). While AFFILIATED is more frequent in the 2012 sample 
than in the 2007 ranking (p < 0.1, see Table 9), unaffiliated intellectuals dominate the group of 
MEDIASTARs. Summed up, with spreading universities and reduced teaching loads, the ratio 
of academics among the total sample of intellectuals may increase (Posner 2001). Yet, top posi-
tions appear to be occupied by intellectual rioters that usually take up extreme positions on 
matters of cross-sectional importance like Alice Schwarzer, who even does not possess a higher 
education entrance qualification, Peter Handke, or Martin Walser. 
[continued] 
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Table 11 and Table 12 show Pearson correlations for the sample of MEDIASTARs and 
MEDIAMIDGETs and for the total 2012 sample, respectively. 
To test our hypotheses, we employed stepwise binary logistic regressions as a multivariate 
method to analyze the impact of the independent variables on the chances for MEDIASTAR 
(Models 1-3) and TALKVIS (Model 4). In Table 13, we report the estimated logit coefficients 
(b) and the odds ratios (Exp(b)) that indicate the effect of the independent variables on the odds 
of becoming a MEDIASTAR instead of a MEDIAMIDGET and of having visited a talk show 
(TALKVIS), respectively.  
Model 1 includes the 2012 sample of MEDIASTARs and MEDIAMIDGETs. While SEX 
comes out to be insignificant, HUMAN and SOCIAL foster MEDIASTAR in comparison to the 
reference category OTHER (p < 0.l). Moreover, as supposed (H1), WIDESPREAD appears to 
increase the odds for MEDIASTAR (p < 0.1), which fuels the discussion on deterioration of 
intellectual output. Intellectuals that engage in dissemination and address cross-sectional issues 
are more frequently demanded by mass media. Thereby, they achieve superstar status and may 
benefit disproportionately from further engaging in product differentiation beyond their own 
expertise (Adler 1985; Rosen 1981).55 In line with H2b, results show that AFFILIATED makes 
ensuing public stardom less likely (p < 0.01). That is, AFFILIATED does not seem to signal 
credibility and to increase demand, but rather highlights the phenomenon of anti-intellectualism. 
REPUTATION is far from having any effect on media mentions for all models, rejecting H3.56 
However, ACTIVESCHOL makes success on the public stage less likely (p < 0.05). This con-
firms the idea that sacrificing resources for simplifying scientific knowledge and for preparing 
public performances comes at the expense of research and scientific publications and vice versa 
(H4). Model 2 adds MEDIASTARs and MEDIAMIDGETs of 2007 to the analysis. While 
Nagelkerke’s R² and the percentage of correct classifications decrease slightly compared with 
                                                     
55  To revisit and substantiate our comment in the introduction: MEDIASTARs published significantly 
more books than MEDIAMIDGETs during the period of observation (2003-2012; p < 0.05). We as-
sume that outstanding media presence rubs off on book sales (Posner 2001). 
56  Results may be insignificant due to different citation habits of scientific disciplines. However, we made 
huge efforts in order to derive any effect from REPUTAION – to no avail. 
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Model 1, the impact of the independent variables seems to be fairly robust. The positive influ-
ence of WIDESPREAD on public stardom does not intensify over time but holds, although at 
lower significance for 2012 (rejecting H5a). In opposition to H5b and H5c, influences of 
AFFILIATED and REPUTATION remain constant. Yet, ACTIVESCHOL appears to become 
insignificant when considering both the 2007 and the 2012 sample. Consequently, we introduce 
an interaction term in order to assess the time varying influence of scholar’s publication effort 
(Model 3). Being actively publishing had not influenced the odds for MEDIASTAR during the 
five-year period before the 2007 ranking. In contrast, results show that ACTIVESCHOL im-
paired the probability of performing publicly during the last years, supporting H5d (p < 0.1). A 
possible reasoning may be the increased specialization of knowledge and professionalization of 
scholarship. That is, opportunity costs of going public increased accordingly. Researchers have 
to make huge efforts to get published within refereed journals and, therefore, are kept from 
preparing and conducting public performances. Moreover, time variance may be induced by 
enhanced competition among public intellectuals, making it more difficult to survive as an intel-
lectual MEDIASTAR. For instance, while it was sufficient to be labeled MEDIASTAR in 2007 
by getting 1,241 MEDIAMENTIONS, for the 2012 sample an intellectual needed 2,356 men-
tions within five years (sample means increased accordingly; see Table 10).57 
Results for TALKVIS (Model 4) are rather mixed. Being a female intellectual seems to increase 
the odds for TALKVIS (p < 0.01) and thereby fits former insights of research (Holderman 
2003).58 Yet, being a humanities scholar (HUMAN) comes out to work in the opposite direction 
(p < 0.001). We assume that the impact of HUMAN is caused by the fact that political talk 
shows deal with rather concrete up-to-date topics, while humanities scholars focus on more 
general long-term developments and ethics. Therefore, the reference group OTHER, which 
includes journalists and publicists, may be preferred by talk show producers. Again, being an 
active scholar reduces the chances of getting recognized in public, likely for similar reasons as 
                                                     
57  Data to evaluate growth of the LexisNexis database during the entire period from 2003 to 2012 was 
unavailable. However, figures on a sample basis that were provided by LexisNexis upon request sug-
gest that the database grew slower in the category “German Language News” than the threshold that 
has to be exceeded to be assigned to the group of MEDIASTARs. 
58  See Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) for a detailed consideration. 
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in the case of media mentions and in support of H4 (p < 0.001). However, H1-H3 could not be 
supported in the case of intellectual’s TV presence. While WIDESPREAD and AFFILIATED 
show the expected signs, they remain insignificant. 
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) MEDIASTAR 1        
(2) WIDESPREAD 0.272** 1       
(3) REPUTATION -0.101 -0.094 1      
(4) AFFILIATED -0.249** -0.134 0.255** 1     
(5) ACTIVESCHOL -0.100 -0.047 0.234** 0.289** 1    
(6) SEX 0.197* 0.151 -0.042 -0.075 0.075 1   
(7) HUMAN 0.000 0.002 -0.132 0.137 0.185* 0.065 1  
(8) SOCIAL 0.037 -0.140 0.214* 0.481** 0.154 -0.009 -0.426** 1 
(9) NATURAL -0.085 -0.041 0.761** 0.105 0.086 -0.032 -0.076 -0.041 
Significance levels (two-tailed): ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Table 11: Pearson Correlations for the 2007 and 2012 Sample of Mediastars and Mediamidgets (N=140) 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) TALKVIS 1         
(2) WIDESPREAD 0.013 1        
(3) REPUTATION -0.060 -0.045 1       
(4) AFFILIATED -0.093 -0.023 0.160** 1      
(5) ACTIVESCHOL -0.268** -0.060 0.123** 0.287** 1     
(6) SEX 0.110* -0.036 -0.041 -0.109* -0.028 1    
(7) HUMAN -0.224** 0.094* -0.114* -0.058 0.088 0.062 1   
(8) SOCIAL 0.078 -0.068 -0.040 0.432** 0.083 -0.070 -0.479** 1  
(9) NATURAL -0.032 -0.031 0.337** 0.135** 0.111* -0.027 -0.159** -0.085 1 
(10) MEDICAL 0.023 0.006 0.460** 0.115* 0.078 -0.047 -0.112* -0.060 -0.020 
Significance levels (two-tailed): ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Table 12: Pearson Correlations for the total 2012 Sample of Intellectuals (N=436) 
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 DV: MEDIASTAR   DV: TALKVIS  
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x RANKING12 
 
 
n 
χ2 
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Nagelkerke R2 
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 -1.264  .283 
 (1.107) 
  
 1.430† 4.179 
  (.792) 
  
 .000  1.000 
 (.002) 
 
 -2.147** .117 
 (.828) 
 
 -1.317* .268 
 (.622) 
 
 1.335 3.801 
 (.973) 
 
 1.389† 4.012 
 (.795) 
 
 2.200† 9.023 
 (1.162) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 70 
 21.488** 
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 71.4% 
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 (.752) 
  
 1.553** 4.726 
 (.540) 
 
 .000 1.000 
 (.002) 
 
 -1.939** .144 
 (.565) 
 
 -.335 .716 
 (.417) 
 
 .912 2.488 
 (.646) 
 
 1.014* 2.758 
 (.505) 
 
 2.300** 9.973 
 (.773) 
 
 -18.025 .000 
    (----)b 
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 32.465*** 
 161.616 
 .276 
 
 70.0% 
 
 -1.305† .271 
  (.770) 
 
  1.568** 4.799 
  (.542) 
 
  .000 1.000 
  (.002) 
   
  -1.975** .139 
  (.575) 
 
  .131 1.140 
  (.504) 
 
  .958 2.607 
  (.665) 
 
  1.023* 2.781 
  (.510) 
 
  2.420**11.244 
  (.795) 
 
  -18.892  .000 
     (----)b 
 
   
 
 
  -.962† .382 
  (.575) 
  
 
   140 
  35.342*** 
  158.739 
  .297 
 
  70.0% 
  
 -1.172** .310 
 (.431) 
 
 .141 1.152 
 (.334) 
 
 .000 1.000 
 (.000) 
 
 -.180 .835 
 (.329) 
 
 -1.228*** .293 
 (.269) 
 
 .870** 2.388 
 (.327) 
 
 -1.071*** .343 
 (.295) 
 
 .234 1.264 
 (.380) 
 
 .219 1.245 
 (.964) 
 
 1.947 7.008 
 (1.389) 
 
 
 
 
  
 435a 
 63.544*** 
 424.033 
 .202 
 
 76.8% 
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. Standard errors in brackets.  
a One intellectual within the Cicero list already died before broadcasting of the political talk shows that we consider began.  
b Only one case of a natural scientist. 
Table 13: Logistic Regression Results 
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8. Limitations 
The study has some limitations. It is quite difficult to set up an entire listing of public intellectu-
als because compilation depends on definition, criteria, and sampling procedure. However, by 
relying on Germany’s most recognized and most extensive source when it comes to intellectu-
als, we aim at avoiding any self-induced subjectivity. Moreover, when collecting data on media 
mentions we refer to the procedure of Posner (2001). The insignificant effect of REPUTATION 
may be ascribed to different citation habits with respect to different scientific fields. Yet, we not 
only test the metric variable REPUTATION but also transformed the variable in order to miti-
gate this potential bias. However, results did not vary significantly. Finally, one could think of a 
battery of other signals for quality of intellectual work than ACTIVESCHOL, REPUTATION, 
WIDESPREAD, or AFFILIATED, e.g., governmental activities or affiliation to think tanks 
rather than universities.  
Quality Kills The Mediastar? Career Paths of Public Intellectuals  98 
9. Conclusions 
In times of increasingly specialized knowledge, the media are not able to knowingly address all 
questions of public interest based on own investigations. Therefore, it is much cheaper for them 
to ask an intellectual to voice an opinion on a specific topic and to fill some seconds of broad-
casting time or to provide some lines for newspapers. Thereby, the market brings fourth few 
omnipresent media stars that cover large parts of the market and thus are able to obtain higher 
(non-)monetary incomes due to superstar effects (Adler 1985; Rosen 1981).  
Although our approach is based on Posner’s (2001) remarks on the decline in public intellectual 
work, we clearly set us apart from his analyses. First, and probably most striking, we indeed 
give some ideas on quality measurement in public intellectual discourses and applied them em-
pirically (both static and over time), while Posner (2001) merely rants against declining quality 
and, nevertheless, only chooses a static empirical approach.59 In addition to scholarly citations 
that are hardly recognized by media, we provide WIDESPREAD that is more likely to explain 
demand and that also allows for conclusions on quality, especially in light of increased speciali-
zation of knowledge. Posner (2001) comprehensibly notes that performing publicly comes at the 
expense of research; since citations are directed to the past, we introduce ACTIVESCHOL to 
indeed depict the tradeoff between time for public discourses and time for academia.60 Finally, 
while Posner (2001) takes a polemic and morally-based perspective to criticize the decline in 
intellectuals’ output, we focus on the economic reasoning for media presence of intellectual 
rioters. 
Hence, within this paper we take a look upon certain career paths of scholars and pundits and 
refer to the question: What separates the media stars from the long tail of media midgets? 
Thereby, we pay attention to an economic issue of universal interest: Does it pay off to further 
                                                     
59  Besides, at the same time he confounds wrong judgments of intellectuals with wrongly deduced judg-
ments. 
60  Posner (2001) also admits that public intellectuals are usually “past the zenith of his scholarly produc-
tivity”. 
Quality Kills The Mediastar? Career Paths of Public Intellectuals  99 
engage in specialization or is it more favorable to capitalize on your current skillset and to en-
gage in “relentless” self-marketing? 
Covering a broad range of different issues and going beyond the area of one’s expertise dispro-
portionately increase the odds for public stardom, giving rise to a “winner-takes-all-market” 
where the best known performers are able to snatch large incomes (Frank and Cook 1995). That 
is, intellectuals that are highly demanded by mass media, i.e., that achieve superstar status, may 
benefit from further engaging in product differentiation beyond their own expertise because they 
can absorb parts of the media’s cost savings (Rosen 1981). Within technical discussions with 
specialists that require profound knowledge and expertise, they would be likely to come out 
second best due to considerable cost disadvantages. That is, incentives and options for perform-
ing publicly increase with differentiation, i.e., the range of issues that an intellectual addresses. 
Consequently, intellectuals may appreciate the possibility of bypassing scientific peer review 
procedures, and thus capitalize on their current knowledge in order to reach prominence and 
fame by performing publicly instead of engaging in specialization. Yet, this way quality of in-
tellectual output might deteriorate by preferring infotainment to rigor and generalization to spe-
cialization (Bates 2011). Nevertheless, the public and the mass media do not necessarily act 
irrationally when giving credence to few media stars that operate beyond their capabilities. In 
case that there is little benefit from being well and reliably informed about intellectual output, 
quality of intellectual news might be of minor importance. Instead, public and media seem to 
value entertainment higher than information (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) and primarily 
aim at reducing search costs. Therefore, they rather focus on few notorious faces than quarrying 
for a specific expert on a particular problem. 
On the supply side, data suggest that distinguished academics do not necessarily perform within 
the public sphere. Intellectuals that are affiliated to universities or that are actively publishing 
scientific articles tend to represent media midgets rather than media stars. Preparing and accom-
plishing public performances seem to come at the expense of scholarly work. As has become 
obvious in recent years, increased specialization of knowledge and increased competition for 
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publication in peer-reviewed journals for scientists leave no time for simultaneously taking part 
in intellectual discourses. Moreover, the risk of making a fool of oneself in public disputes may 
keep researchers from engaging in dissemination. Instead, top positions appear to be occupied 
by intellectual rioters. 
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III. DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT IN SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONSHIPS AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
“Coming together is a beginning. 
Keeping together is progress. 
Working together is success.” 
Henry Ford (1863-1947) 
1. Abstract  
The level of conflict present among supply chain partners largely determines the partners’ abil-
ity to realize relationship performance goals because conflict can substantially decrease the 
benefits of cooperation and can even create costs that largely exceed cooperation benefits. Ac-
cordingly, the phenomenon of interfirm conflict has received considerable research attention. 
Although scholars have called emphatically for studying the dynamics of conflict, empirical 
investigations of interorganizational conflict development and factors influencing transitions 
through various stages of conflict are scarce. Recent work on relationship dynamics further 
suggests that since cooperations evolve over time, the effects of relationship characteristics 
(e.g., governance mechanisms) on exchange outcomes vary. However, conflict dynamics are not 
yet well understood.  
Consequently, we explore the evolutionary dynamics of conflict in supply chain relationships, 
for what is ostensibly the first time based on all five states of conflict development as proposed 
by the “dominant process model” (Pondy 1967). We argue that the selection and implementa-
tion of formal as well as relational governance mechanisms are central drivers of conflict dy-
namics and thus study their potential moderating effects on transitions between different states 
of conflict (“states of conflict” include latent, cognitive, affective, and manifest conflict that 
finally result in the aftermath of conflict). That is, we integrate the two distinct concepts of for-
mal and relational mechanisms of interfirm governance, which enables us to study their effects 
jointly. 
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Therefore, based on extensive longitudinal data from retailers of Germany’s two largest grocery 
chains, we employ several competing structural equation models to examine conflict from a 
process perspective and to provide insights into the relative importance of governance mecha-
nisms over the conflict “lifecycle”. While formal governance mechanisms appear to effectively 
limit the evolution of task-related disagreements and conflicts, relational governance mecha-
nisms become useful for mitigating the escalation of conflicts and for keeping discussions on a 
technical level. However, if affective sentiments prevail, the effectiveness of relational govern-
ance mechanisms becomes impaired or even reversed.61 
  
                                                     
61  A preliminary version of this chapter was presented (with Dr. B. Meiseberg and Prof. Dr. R. P. Dant) at 
the 6th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks, Agadir, Morocco 
(11/2013). Parts of the argumentation and preliminary exploratory analyses can also be found in 
Lengers, Dant, and Meiseberg (forthcoming). 
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2. Introduction 
Commercial exchanges between market players are increasingly viewed in the context of rela-
tional structures rather than as arm’s length one-time transactions (Lafontaine and Slade 2010). 
One of the inherent characteristics of such relationships is the occurrence of conflicts and dis-
putes between exchange partners (Frazier 1999). Because it could impair the mutual benefits 
from the exchange relationship and lower the partners’ commitment to each other, conflict is a 
widely recognized indicator for relationship performance (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 
2004; Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1993; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999; Gilliland, Bello, 
and Gundlach 2010). Therefore, the construct of conflict received much attention in past re-
search on intraorganizational (Amason 1996; Barki and Hartwick 2001; De Dreu and Weingart 
2003; Ensley, Pearson, and Amason 2002; Jehn 1995; Jehn and Mannix 2001; Langfred 2007) 
as well as interorganizational relationships (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Gilliland, 
Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001; Koza and Dant 2007; Malhotra 
and Lumineau 2011; Palmatier et al. 2006; Winsor et al. 2012). Studies on the evolution and 
management of interfirm conflict particularly focus on buyer-supplier relationships (Parmigiani 
and Rivera-Santos 2011). Today’s frequently changing business practices and the increasing 
prevalence of multichannel strategies that target bypassing distributors and retailers result in 
higher conflict among old-established partners. Hence, understanding and managing the evolu-
tion of conflict becomes crucial for practitioners to maintain their vertical supply chain relation-
ships (Ganesan et al. 2009).  
Based on the recognized conceptual framework of Pondy (1967), there is a broad consensus that 
conflicts evolve along distinct states of (1) latent, (2) cognitive, (3) affective, and (4) manifest 
conflict that finally result in (5) the aftermath of conflict (Lewicki, Weiss, and Lewin 1992; 
Thomas 1992). Despite emphatic calls for investigating conflict as a process (Frazier 1999; 
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999), past research neglected the dynamics of conflict to a 
great extent. Although Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz (2004), Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp (1995a, 1995b), and Winsor et al. (2012) represent few exceptions as they consider 
two different conflict states, they omit examining factors that may affect the transition from one 
Dynamics of Conflict in Supply Chain Relationships  109 
state of conflict to the next; i.e., they provide at most moderate hints for managing the dynamics 
of conflict effectively. However, considerations concerning the evolution of boundaries over 
time and investigations that factor in contingencies of relationship dynamics will be of major 
significance within interorganizational research (Fawcett et al. 2012; Palmatier et al. 2013). To 
consider contingent factors, we examine the way firms organize and manage their supply chains 
(Ganesan et al. 2009; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010). We focus on governance structures 
that are implemented within supply chains to stop the exchange parties from behaving in an 
opportunistic manner and to thus decrease interorganizational tension and conflict (Brown, Dev, 
and Lee 2000; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Sheng et al. 2006). 
Several scholars, e.g., Klein and Leffler (1981) with their concept of self-enforcing contracts, 
Heide (1994) in terms of “market versus non-market governance”, or more recently Baker, 
Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) and Gibbons (2005) with their integrative framework of “rela-
tional contracts”, stress the inherent incompleteness of formal rules and the importance of in-
formal patterns. Relational approaches recognize that agreements between firms are governed 
and enforced not only by formal hierarchy, rules and authority but also by holding out the pro-
spect of benefits from future transactions, assured by informal agreements and unwritten rela-
tional norms between firms that affect exchange partners’ actions (Gibbons 2005). 
Based on extensive longitudinal data on wholesaler-retailer relationships of Germany’s two 
major grocery chains, we employ structural equation modelling and test several hypotheses on 
the moderating effects of formal bureaucratic structures and relational governance on the dy-
namics of conflict. Our research contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, to cap-
ture the dynamics of conflict, this study empirically incorporates, ostensibly for the first time, 
all five states of conflict in reference to the well-established model by Pondy (1967). We depart 
from Brown, Cobb, and Lusch (2006) and draw on relationship dynamics in accordance with 
Palmatier et al. (2013). Second, while it is commonly accepted that conflict inexorably passes 
through those states, we focus on variables that may limit or speed up the transition from one 
state of conflict to the next, which improves our understanding of prior insights. Third, follow-
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ing the claims of scholars of organizational economics as well as of marketing and supply chain 
management, we empirically enrich the underexplored phenomenon of relational exchange and 
simultaneously consider formal bureaucratic structures and informal relational patterns to ex-
plain behaviors within interfirm exchanges (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002; Blome, 
Schoenherr, and Kaesser 2013; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 
2010; Heide 1994; Lafontaine and Slade 2010; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Fourth, while most 
research has drawn on data from buyer-supplier relationships in the US market, this study con-
tributes to a more holistic view because the analyses are based on a European context. Finally, a 
better understanding of the dynamics of conflict provides valuable implications not only for 
future research but also for practitioners in terms of managing conflict by effectively governing 
and organizing supply chains.  
This paper is organized as follows: We begin with an overview of the relevant literature. We 
then present hypotheses and describe the data, measures and methods. We offer results from 
structural equation modelling and finally conclude.  
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3. Theoretical Background 
3.1 Supply Chain Conflict 
The phenomenon of interfirm conflict in supply chains has been studied in the context of vari-
ous buyer-supplier relationships such as the distribution of automobiles, beer, chemicals, cloth-
ing, engine parts, furniture, groceries, household durables, pharmaceuticals, and sports products 
(Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006; Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1993; Chung, Sternquist, and Chen 
2006; Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 
1995a; Lado, Dant, and Tekleab 2008; Lusch 1976a; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007; 
Rosenberg and Stern 1971; Runyan, Sternquist, and Chung 2010; Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant 
2011; Subramani and Venkatraman 2003; Wilkinson 1981). While early literature has focused 
on goal incongruences (Hunger and Stern 1976; Stern, Sternthal, and Craig 1973) and the exer-
tion of coercive power (Brown, Lusch, and Muehling 1983; Gaski 1984; Lusch 1976b) as being 
crucial for the emergence of conflict, more recent studies have emphasized the impact of asym-
metric dependence, commitment, and the presence of a relational mindset that surrounds the 
exchange partnership (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; 
Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001; Jap and Ganesan 2000). In addition, a range of studies and 
meta-analyses of supply chain literature on the consequences of interfirm conflict emphasized 
the (long-lasting) detrimental effects of conflict on economic and relational outcomes 
(Anderson, Ross, and Weitz 1998; Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Brown, Cobb, and 
Lusch 2006; Ganesan et al. 2009; Koza and Dant 2007; Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; 
Palmatier et al. 2006; Runyan, Sternquist, and Chung 2010) and established interfirm conflict as 
an indicator for relationship performance (Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1993; Geyskens, 
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Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Jap and Ganesan 2000; 
Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007).62  
Within this paper, we draw on the work of Pondy (1967) as well as on more recent research on 
conflict theory and conceptualize the consecutive states of latent, cognitive, affective, and mani-
fest conflict that end up in the aftermath of conflict:63 We conceptualize latent conflict as under-
lying structural conditions in terms of competition over scarce resources, goal incongruences 
and autonomy needs of supply chain agents that cause subsequent perceptions of conflict 
(Winsor et al. 2012). Research on cognitive conflict is quite widespread and looks upon disa-
greements between supply chain partners over how to achieve mutual goals and how to address 
business challenges (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004). We conceptualize affective con-
flict as non-task-related discrepancies reflected as anger and frustration toward an exchange 
partner (Jehn and Mannix 2001; Kaufmann and Stern 1988; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 
1995a). In addition to cognitive conflict, affective conflict constitutes an intermediate state be-
tween latent conditions and manifest conflict that is characterized by overt harmful behavior that 
actively impedes the exchange partner’s goals (Winsor et al. 2012). Finally, the conflict after-
math describes retained hostilities toward the other party subsequent to preceding conflict epi-
sodes (Kaufmann and Stern 1988).  
Scholars of intraorganizational conflicts have already applied multiple of these constructs in 
one and the same study to disclose their sequential properties, primarily in the context of deci-
sion making in teams and team performance (De Dreu and Weingart 2003; Ensley, Pearson, and 
                                                     
62
  We view conflict as a “cost of participation” (Pondy 1967) that may be reduced by adequate govern-
ance mechanisms (MacLeod 2000). We assume that, ceteris paribus, conflict impedes relationship per-
formance and, therefore, constitutes an adequate outcome measure for relationship success. This notion 
is in line with previous empirical management studies (Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Palmatier, 
Dant, and Grewal 2007). Because we focus on relationships that persist over the time of examination, 
we do not consider relationship termination or breach, which may constitute the climax of conflict-
laden action; efficient breach is beyond the scope of this study (Macneil, 1982). 
63
  There are numerous models that deal with conflict, negotiation, and litigation within an organizational 
context. Yet, the model of Pondy (1967) takes a very comprehensive view that allows for investigating 
conflict between departments or even entire firms (Lewicki, Weiss, and Lewin 1992) and facilitates the 
attempt to take a dynamic approach for analyzing interfirm boundaries (Winsor et al. 2012).  
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Amason 2002; Jehn 1995; Jehn and Mannix 2001).64 However, while it goes nearly unchal-
lenged that conflict inexorably passes through distinct states, studies in the context of interor-
ganizational relations that examine the dynamic process of conflict are scarce (Frazier 1999). 
The prevailing approach is to explain the evolution of conflict using one overarching construct, 
disregarding the need for differentiation. Against this background, it may not appear surprising 
that scholars reach unexpected and contradicting results in regard to antecedents and conse-
quences of conflict. For example, Brown, Cobb, and Lusch (2006) found that explicit contract-
ing tends to increase conflict, although it was initially designed as an instrument to reduce con-
flict. In contrast, other scholars such as Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant (2011) stress the conflict 
suppressing abilities of explicit contract utilization. Although Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 
(2004) and Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995a, 1995b) represent the first approaches toward 
a more nuanced view on the construct of interfirm conflict by simultaneously focusing on cog-
nitive and affective conflict, they provide no hints concerning the dynamics of conflict devel-
opment in terms of the transition between distinct conflict states. By extending their approaches 
to cover multiple states of conflict and by considering contingent factors that influence the tran-
sition of conflict, this study may resolve contradictions on how to effectively manage conflict in 
supply chains. 
3.2 Supply Chain Governance 
In supply chain relations, as in most other interfirm affairs, contracts determine the way compa-
nies organize and govern their transactions (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006; Ferguson, Paulin, 
and Bergeron 2005).65 Contracts and governance structures are implemented to ensure goal 
                                                     
64  During our argumentation, particularly throughout the development of distinct hypotheses, we will 
occasionally draw on intraorganizational studies because empirical evidence for time-varying proper-
ties of conflict evolution is more extensive in this context. Pondy’s (1967) model of conflict was initial-
ly developed for relationships within firms, but afterwards frequently adopted to an interorganizational 
context, giving cause that the underlying assumptions are transferable to a large extent. Moreover, the 
concept of relational contracting, which this study refers to, gives an integrative framework for rela-
tional contracts between and within firms (Gibbons 2005). That is, although there are specific dispari-
ties, e.g., due to ownership issues, assumptions concerning governance by means of formal and infor-
mal mechanisms are not limited to intraorganizational settings. 
65  Vice versa, we follow Williamson (2000) and define governance structures as the “institutional frame-
works within which the integrity of the contract is decided.” 
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alignment between the exchange parties, to restrain them from behaving in an opportunistic 
manner, and to facilitate coordination (Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Lado, Dant, and Tekleab 
2008; Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007; Samaha, Palmatier, and 
Dant 2011). Research on interorganizational relations has adopted diverse theoretical perspec-
tives including agency theory, transaction cost economics, and relational exchange theory 
(Lafontaine and Slade 2010). At a very general level, empirical marketing studies can be sepa-
rated into two different areas. Much of the early supply chain research solely deals with either 
transaction cost economics or relational exchange theory. That is, it only considers one side of 
the story (Dwyer and Oh 1988; Kaufmann and Stern 1988). While market exchanges miss the 
possibility to economize on specific investments due to the risk of one-time transactions, trans-
action cost theory considers governance by formal rules for mitigating opportunistic behaviors 
(Williamson 1985). Within this line of research, empirical studies identified inter alia factors 
such as the formal hierarchy of authority, bureaucratization of channel structures, authoritative 
enforcement and utilization of written contracts, or the use of formal incentive systems as an-
swers to the risk of losing relationship-specific investments (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 
2000; Dwyer and Oh 1988; Dwyer and Welsh 1985; Gundlach and Achrol 1993; Subramani and 
Venkatraman 2003). Early transaction cost theory was charged with overestimating the power 
of hierarchy while neglecting the abilities resulting from the social embeddedness of relational 
exchanges to govern interfirm ties (Granovetter 1985). Originating from contract law and initi-
ating another emergent stream of research, Macneil (1980), in the course of his theory of rela-
tional exchange, developed a set of contract norms that characterize transactions by capturing 
their relational embeddedness. In accordance with Macneil (1980), exchanges range from dis-
crete one-time transactions to relational exchanges featured by well-marked relational contract 
norms. The prevalence of these informal relational norms is assumed to mitigate hazards arising 
from incomplete contracts among supply chain firms as they express adequate behavioral guide-
lines, signal stability, and provide reasons for repeated beneficial interactions (Cannon, Achrol, 
and Gundlach 2000; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Morris and Carter 
2005; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). Empirical research has made reference to relational 
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governance in terms of “relationalism” (Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007), “social embed-
dedness” (Uzzi 1999), or the general prevalence of relational or social norms within interfirm 
exchanges (Achrol 1997; Brown, Grzeskowiak, and Dev 2009; Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 
2000). 
In case of the occurrence of uncontracted-for events, expectations of benefits in the course of 
future transactions prevent supply chain partners from jeopardizing the relation through oppor-
tunistic behaviors and thus offer an incentive to perform in accordance with norms and stand-
ards characterizing the relation (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002, 2011; Brown, Dev, and Lee 
2000; Gibbons 2005; Lafontaine and Slade 2010; Levin 2003). Therefore, relational norms that 
signal potential for future exchanges function as enforcement mechanisms on their own (Heide 
1994; Klein 2000). That is, the concept of relational contracts recognizes that agreements be-
tween firms are governed and enforced not only by formal hierarchy of authority, but also by 
holding out the prospect of profits from future transactions, assured by informal agreements and 
unwritten relational norms between firms that affect current behaviors (Gibbons 2005; Gilliland, 
Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Macneil 1980). Accordingly, more recent studies adapt the perspec-
tive of relational contracting theory and aim at explaining the occurrence of multiple, i.e., for-
mal and relational, governance mechanisms simultaneously (Brown, Grzeskowiak, and Dev 
2009; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Koza and Dant 2007; 
Subramani and Venkatraman 2003), or try to clarify the interplay between these mechanisms 
(Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000; Poppo and Zenger 2002). 
While some articles suggest a substituting linkage between formal and relational governance 
(Boyle et al. 1992; Ferguson, Paulin, and Bergeron 2005; Gundlach and Achrol 1993), the 
emergent consensus in contracting theory is that formal and relational mechanisms facilitate 
each other (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002; Dahlstrom, McNeiIly, and Speh 1996; Poppo 
and Zenger 2002). However, within this study, we do not side solely with one of these perspec-
tives. Rather, we recognize that these mechanisms are intertwined and thus, in accordance with 
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the calls of other scholars, explore formal and relational mechanisms in combination (Gibbons 
2005; Wallenburg and Schäffler 2014).  
We conceptualize formal governance in terms of the construct of bureaucratization (Dwyer and 
Welsh 1985). In this context, formal governance is typically composed of three distinct dimen-
sions: formalization, i.e., the degree to which procedures and decisions within the supply chain 
follow well-defined rules and guidelines; centralization, i.e., the degree to which decisions are 
made by formal authorities, in our case by the wholesaler; and participation, i.e., the degree to 
which the wholesaler and the retailer are involved in each other’s decision processes (Boyle and 
Dwyer 1995; Dwyer and Oh 1987; Paswan, Dant, and Lumpkin 1998). Capturing the notion of 
informal mechanisms, we define relational governance as the degree to which actions and be-
haviors of exchange partners are controlled, coordinated, and regulated through various rela-
tional norms that characterize the exchange between firms (Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Koza 
and Dant 2007). While opinions on which norms from Macneil’s (1980) set should be included 
to build the construct of relational governance diverge, we focus on the three most common 
contracting norms: mutuality describes the characteristic that benefits and costs between ex-
change parties are evenly shared over time; flexibility represents the willingness of parties to an 
exchange to make adjustments for changing circumstances; and solidarity depicts the degree to 
which the exchange parties ascribe importance to preserving the relationship (Achrol 1997; 
Kaufmann and Dant 1992). 
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4. Hypotheses 
Echoing Ganesan et al. (2009), firms have to answer the question of how they can support and 
sustain their supply chain relations in case of increased levels of conflict. Consequently, we 
develop and empirically test a set of hypotheses that predicts a contingent influence of formal 
and relational governance mechanisms on the transition of interfirm conflict.  
4.1 Evolution of Cognitive Conflict  
Similar to Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995a) on the basis of bilateral deterrence theory or 
Malhotra and Lumineau (2011) by stressing the ability of formal provisions to coordinate recip-
rocal actions, many authors put emphasis on the conflict mitigating effects of hierarchical gov-
ernance, particularly when the conflict depicts functional challenges and task-related responsi-
bilities. In this regard, formal structures are assumed to remove ambiguity and to avoid disa-
greements. 
Moreover, there is a broad consensus that relational norms characterizing an exchange play a 
crucial role in determining behaviors and actions of supply chain partners in the course of con-
flict episodes (Lusch and Brown 1996; Sheng et al. 2006). Within relational exchanges, perfor-
mance is secured by expectations of future benefits that ensure that behaviors of supply chain 
partners do not need to be controlled in every detail but are assumed to comply with mutual 
requirements (Klein 2000). Hence, the prevalence of relational governance allows for autono-
mous actions and enables retailers to adapt flexibly to local market conditions (Brown, Cobb, 
and Lusch 2006). Opinions on how to complete tasks and how to address upcoming challenges 
may be discussed less intensely in the confidence of mutual long-term orientation. However, 
Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern (2001) argue that affective sentiments towards an exchange partner 
are associated with the attribution of negative developments to the partner’s actions rather than 
to one’s actions or environmental circumstances. Moreover, affective conflict constrains bilat-
eral communication and concerted behaviors (Koza and Dant 2007); therefore, this may impede 
or even invert the effectiveness relational norms when violated. 
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Hypothesis 1a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from 
latent into cognitive conflict. 
Hypothesis 1b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition 
from latent into cognitive conflict. 
Hypothesis 2a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from 
affective into cognitive conflict. 
Hypothesis 2b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships accelerates the transi-
tion from affective into cognitive conflict. 
4.2 Evolution of Affective Conflict  
In their study on the effects of supplier fairness on retailers’ sentiments, Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp (1995b) underline the positive effect of suppliers’ procedural fairness on relation-
ship quality and affective attitudes, measured in terms of impartiality and explanation. Addi-
tionally, Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz (2004) and Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant (2011) 
found that hierarchical authority and formal rules suppress the detrimental effects of cognitive 
conflict. However, while formal instructions may avoid disagreements on organizational pro-
cesses, constraining the autonomy of independent retailers may cause frustration among supply 
chain partners. For example, Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan (2007) showed that the imposition of 
formal regulations is being perceived as intrusive, thereby raising the likelihood of tension and 
hostility to emerge. However, we assume the effect of perceived procedural fairness will pre-
vail. 
Relational governance may lead to increased tolerance toward goal incongruences in awareness 
of the fact that both parties are interested in sustaining the relationship (Kaufmann and Stern 
1988). Disagreements are rarely ascribed to self-seeking interests and self-serving intentions 
(Ensley, Pearson, and Amason 2002; Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007). Intraorganizational 
research delivers corresponding empirical incidents. For example, Amason and Sapienza (1997) 
established an inverse relation between mutuality and affective conflict.  
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Hypothesis 3a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from 
latent into affective conflict. 
Hypothesis 3b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition 
from latent into affective conflict. 
Hypothesis 4a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from 
cognitive into affective conflict. 
Hypothesis 4b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition 
from cognitive into affective conflict. 
4.3 Evolution of Manifest Conflict  
Formal governance mechanisms function as clear guidelines and procedures specifying the 
rights and obligations of exchange partners with clear consequences for violating these obliga-
tions (Jap and Ganesan 2000; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a; Winsor et al. 2012). 
Therefore, obvious interference in response to disagreements and actions that oppose the part-
ner’s intentions may become less likely when formal rules are present. In contrast, some schol-
ars found formal governance to reinforce the evolution of conflict, primarily arguing that hierar-
chical instructions clash with an agent’s own intentions (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006; 
Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010). Particularly for affective tensions among supply chain 
partners, partners’ actions may be increasingly perceived as inhibiting and jamming (Hibbard, 
Kumar, and Stern 2001; Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant 2011).  
In contrast, scholars agree to the greatest extent that exchange partners eschew relationship-
damaging behaviors and opportunistic actions that may threaten relationship continuity as long 
as the boundary promises valuable future transactions, reflected by high levels of relational 
norms (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007). Thus, cognitive conflict 
will be less likely to lead to conflict-laden behaviors in those exchanges that are characterized 
by a greater implementation of relational governance to avoid relationship termination 
(Malhotra and Lumineau 2011). However, in accordance with the transition from affective to 
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cognitive conflict, we assume that frustration and tension, i.e., affective conflict, among supply 
chain partners may lead to the ascription of negative business developments to the partner’s 
actions (Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001) and thus to an increase in manifest conflict. 
Hypothesis 5a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from 
cognitive into manifest conflict. 
Hypothesis 5b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition 
from cognitive into manifest conflict. 
Hypothesis 6a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships accelerates the transition 
from affective into manifest conflict. 
Hypothesis 6b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships accelerates the transi-
tion from affective into manifest conflict. 
4.4 Evolution of Conflict Aftermath  
Malhotra and Lumineau (2011) stress the importance of reliable coordination in the time subse-
quent to manifest interfirm conflicts. However, in accordance with the prior chain of reasoning, 
we assume that formal governance in case of manifest conflict-laden actions may intensify per-
ceptions of inhibition and interference even in the long run, while a pronounced relational mind-
set may alleviate long-lasting detrimental effects.  
Hypothesis 7a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships strengthens the effect of 
manifest conflict on conflict aftermath.  
Hypothesis 7b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the effect of 
manifest conflict on conflict aftermath. 
4.5 Evolution of Latent Conflict  
Prior research neglected the effects of the aftermath of preceding conflicts on future develop-
ments of supply chain relationships and on upcoming conflict episodes to the greatest extent 
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(Malhotra and Lumineau 2011). Formal regulations and central decisions made by wholesalers 
may differ from retailers’ intentions, ignore their regional and specific market knowledge, and 
discourage them from acting autonomously and independently (Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 
2010; Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007). Because latent conflict depicts goal incompatibilities 
and drives for autonomy, we assume that formal regulations aggravate the emergence of new 
conflict episodes in terms of latent conflict conditions. 
Because relational governance allows for flexible and self-paced actions of retailers, we finally 
highlight the autonomy enabling properties of relational governance and suggest that the after-
math of preceding disputes will be less likely to lead to latent conflict if supply chain partners 
preserve a relational mindset.  
Hypothesis 8a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships accelerates the transition 
from the aftermath of preceding conflict episodes into latent conflict. 
Hypothesis 8b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition 
from the aftermath of preceding conflict episodes into latent conflict. 
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5. Methodological Approach 
5.1 Sampling Procedure and Data Collection 
Germany’s two major grocery chains, accountable for approximately one-half of Germany’s 
annual turnover in food retailing, distribute their products through company-owned as well as 
through approximately 6,000 independent stores per chain. To test our hypotheses, we used 
longitudinal data from a sample of independent retailers, who provided information concerning 
their relationship to their respective wholesaler. The data were gathered through a nationwide 
self-administered online questionnaire directed at store owners (see Appendix D for the relevant 
items in English and Appendix E for the original version of the complete questionnaire in Ger-
man). In this way, we minimized potential key-informant biases because owners are assumed 
fully knowledgeable regarding their business with the wholesaler (Bagozzi and Phillips 1982).  
We collected panel data in two waves with six months of temporal separation (t=1, t=2). Each 
wave included an initial invitation that held out the prospect of a summary of the survey results 
and a reminder that we sent out two weeks after the initial invitation to all non-respondents. All 
respondents were assured that their data would be treated confidentially and anonymously to 
ensure that our analysis does not suffer from social desirability bias. There were 3,776 store 
owners initially contacted by telephone to query for their willingness to participate; 1,490 were 
subsequently invited to the online survey via email; 730 of them answered the questionnaire 
(49.0%). Exclusion of questionnaires with missing data resulted in an adjusted sample size of 
567 in the first wave (38.1%). Respondents were again contacted for the second wave, yielding 
a final sample of 254 retailers that answered both surveys completely.  
Table 14 shows characteristics of the sample. The average retailer surveyed is approximately 47 
years old and is working in retailing since 26 (thereof 20 years in a leading position). The aver-
age relationship duration between retailers and wholesalers in our sample is 15 years. Those 
figures underline the notion that retailers can be assumed to be informed and highly experienced 
concerning the dealings with their respective wholesaler. 
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 Mean Min Max S.D. 
Age [years] 46.86 24.00 67.00 9.09 
Experience in retailing [years] 25.98 3.00 50.00 9.88 
Experience in management [years] 20.19 2.00 44.00 8.82 
Duration of the cooperation [years] 15.13 0.50 52.00 11.76 
Supply frequency [1/week] 2.19 0.50 6.00 0.92 
Sales area [m²] 1,551.30 55.00 5,800.00 967.18 
Employees [full-time equivalent] 27.72 1.00 115.00 20.17 
Product range [no. of articles] 16,478.57 20.00 65,000.00 8,761.97 
Gender  
Male Female 
85.83% 14.17% 
Sales 
< 1 
mio. € 
1-2 
mio. € 
3-5 
mio. € 
6-10 
mio. € 
11-50 
mio. € 
> 50 
mio. € 
4.66% 7.63% 41.10% 31.78% 13.56% 1.27% 
Table 14: Sample Characteristics 
 
To address potential non-response bias, we employed several tests and compared demographic 
information as well as answers to the items of early and late respondents for both waves. The 
results suggest that early and late respondents belong to the same population (p > 0.1). 
Moreover, we compared those respondents that only answered the first survey with those that 
answered both waves. Again, the results indicate that both groups originate from the same 
population (p > 0.1). Hence, non-response bias appears to be negligible in our case. Because we 
collected self-reported data from a single source, there are concerns of common method bias 
(Kreiser et al. 2010). The study controls for common method bias in the self-reported variables 
using Harman’s single-factor test. The test yielded more than one factor, and no factor 
accounted for a majority of variance. Thus, according to Podsakoff et al. (2003), common 
method bias is not an issue. Moreover, the longitudinal study design minimizes common 
method bias as well as potential endogeneity issues (Podsakoff et al. 2003).  
5.2 Measures 
All of our reflective measures are based on existing literature and have already been applied in 
the context of buyer-supplier relationships.66 Items were minimally adjusted to fit the retailer-
wholesaler background; i.e., we postulate content validity of our measures. Retailers that were 
                                                     
66  The only exception is the measure for manifest conflict that has been applied in an intrateam context 
(Barki and Hartwick 2001).  
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involved in the questionnaire development provided valuable insights into the relevance of 
items and wording of questions. A pretest assessed item comprehensibility. For both survey 
waves, we used identical measurement items and collected information for all exogenous and 
endogenous variables. All perceptual measures were anchored using 7-point Likert scales. 
Conflict States. While most studies employ a general construct of conflict, there is no homoge-
nous approach to the measurement of the different states of conflict (Brown and Day 1981; 
Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Rosenberg and Stern 1971). Consequently, we conducted an 
extensive literature review and compared existing operationalizations on an item basis to carve 
out commonly used and recognized measures that fit our conceptualizations. For the composite 
second-order construct of latent conflict, we draw on the early operationalization of Etgar 
(1979) because, to our knowledge, his is the sole study that simultaneously considers the three 
components of latent conflict, i.e., competition over scarce resources, goal divergence, and au-
tonomy needs. Task-related cognitive conflict is likely the most considered measure of conflict. 
To measure cognitive conflict, we abide by Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz (2004) and Ku-
mar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995a). To capture non-task-related discrepancies such as anger 
and frustration toward an exchange partner reflecting affective conflict, we refer to the measures 
of Jehn and Mannix (2001) and Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995a). To stress the character-
istic of manifest conflict in terms of knowingly interfering with the goal attainment of the ex-
change partner, we use the measure of interference established by Barki and Hartwick (2001). 
Finally, we adopt the measures of Kaufmann and Stern (1988) to scale the long-lasting impact 
of past conflicts in terms of conflict aftermath. 
Formal Governance. In accordance with our conceptualization, we measure the implementation 
of formal governance as a composite second-order construct, composed by measures of formali-
zation, centralization, and participation. In doing so, we make use of the widely recognized 
measures developed by Dwyer and Welsh (1985).  
Relational Governance. As with formal governance, we view relational governance as a second-
order construct, reflected by several sub-dimensions. As mentioned earlier, within this study, we 
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focus on the most common contracting norms of mutuality, flexibility, and solidarity (Achrol 
1997). We refer to the operationalizations of Brown, Dev, and Lee (2000), Kaufmann and Dant 
(1992), and Lado, Dant, and Tekleab (2008) and measure the sub-dimensions using their items. 
For second-order constructs, we initially establish reliable first-order factors. Therefore, we 
verified and secured the reliability of second-order scales, averaged their items, and thereby 
built the indicators for the factor analyses and structural models (see Appendix D, Table 21, for 
the full battery of constructs, measures, Cronbach’s alphas, and composite reliabilities). 
5.3 Measurement Model 
We employed five autonomous measurement models. Each model includes a conflict state at 
t=2, the preceding conflict states according to Pondy (1967) at t=1, and both governance 
mechanisms at t=1. We employed exploratory factor analyses to ensure that all indicators solely 
load on their respective factor. During the confirmatory factor analyses, we estimated the 
loadings of each construct on its corresponding items and allowed for correlations between each 
construct. We assessed both convergent and discriminant validity for all our models. We 
evaluated whether our items are indeed related to their corresponding construct; across all 
models, all of the factor loadings (λs) were large, highly significant, and in the predicted 
direction; i.e., each item loads strongly on its respective construct, demonstrating convergent 
validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Moreover, correlations among constructs ranging from -
0.49 to 0.68 signify discriminant validity because they are clearly less than unity. We also 
computed composite reliabilities and average variance extracted (AVE) for each of the factors 
applied. Across the analyses, composite reliabilities are greater than 0.7 and AVEs are greater 
than 0.5, indicating internal reliability and reconfirming the assumption of discriminant validity. 
Hence, we infer that our measures are reliable and valid.  
Table 15 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for all our measures.
67
 While correlations 
among different conflict states show (expected) positive correlations, relational governance 
                                                     
67  There are correlations outside the range of -0.49 to 0.68. However, those variables are not included 
within one and the same measurement model or structural model. 
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appears to be negatively correlated with all states of conflict. Moreover, formal governance 
seems to be positively related to most conflict states. 
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Factor Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1.  Formal Governance 3.48 .94 1            
2.  Relational Governance 4.36 .96 .23** 1           
3.  Latent Conflict (t=1) 2.31 .99 .63** -.43** 1          
4.  Latent Conflict (t=2) 2.75 1.22 .39** -.34** .73** 1         
5.  Cognitive Conflict (t=1) 2.51 1.38 .19** -.40** .68** .50** 1        
6.  Cognitive Conflict (t=2) 2.59 1.27 -.02 -.44** .50** .55** .57** 1       
7.  Affective Conflict (t=1) 1.58 1.14 .05 -.49** .61** .44** .57** .50** 1      
8.  Affective Conflict (t=2) 1.91 1.40 .14* -.38** .55** .60** .49** .63** .67** 1     
9.  Manifest Conflict (t=1) 1.55 1.23 .35** -.49** .77** .58** .63** .41** .71** .55** 1    
10. Manifest Conflict (t=2) 1.93 1.12 .32** -.40** .71** .73** .57** .59** .62** .70** .72** 1   
11. Conflict Aftermath (t=1) 1.12 .86 .14* -.36** .45** .36** .40** .37** .45** .42** .53** .45** 1  
12. Conflict Aftermath (t=2) .92 .70 .26** -.38** .52** .44** .33** .39** .48** .52** .54** .57** .43** 1 
Significance levels (two-tailed): ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
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6. Analysis and Results 
In accordance with our measurement model, we developed five distinct structural equation 
models. For each model, we utilized data from t=1 for exogenous factors (preceding conflict 
states, governance mechanisms, and moderators) and data from t=2 for endogenous conflict 
states to achieve temporal separation and to indeed assess the dynamics of conflict. Model 1 
considers the evolution of cognitive conflict (see Figure 6), Model 2 focuses on affective con-
flict (see Figure 7), Model 3 on manifest conflict (see Figure 8), Model 4 on the aftermath of 
conflict (see Figure 9), and finally, Model 5 examines the evolution of latent conflict conditions 
that originate from preceding conflict cycles (see Figure 10). We employed curve estimations 
for every direct effect within our structural equation models. Results suggest that all relation-
ships are sufficiently linear to be included in covariance-based structural equation models. We 
also checked for potential multicollinearity for each of our structural models. Variance inflation 
scores indicate that multicollinearity is not a concern. 
 
Figure 6: Model 1 – Evolution of Cognitive Conflict 
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Figure 7: Model 2 – Evolution of Affective Conflict 
 
 
Figure 8: Model 3 – Evolution of Manifest Conflict 
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Figure 9: Model 4 – Evolution of Conflict Aftermath 
 
 
Figure 10: Model 5 – Evolution of Latent Conflict 
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mechanisms on conflict transitions. Finally, the “quasi moderation”-model considers both direct 
and moderating effects of formal and relational governance (see Figure 6 to Figure 10). Hence, 
we can compare the different sub-models to determine which of them fits our data best. Table 
16 summarizes various model fit indices. We provide the chi-squares in addition to their respec-
tive degrees of freedom and p-values as well as the GFI, AGFI, TLI, NFI, SRMR, RMSEA, 
CFI, and χ²/d.f. statistics. 
The vast majority of sub-models show sufficient model fit with GFI > 0.9, TLI > 0.9, NFI > 0.9, 
SRMR < 0.08, RMSEA < 0.08, CFI > 0.9, and χ²/d.f. <2.5. However, while a model may have a 
sufficient fit, this does not assure that the best model has been proposed (Hair et al. 1998). We 
could compare the sub-models based on χ²-statistics to determine the best among them (Koza 
and Dant 2007). The difference in χ² between two models is also χ²-distributed; degrees of free-
dom can be determined by calculating the difference in degrees of freedom, accordingly. That 
is, we assess whether a reduction of restrictions within a model, i.e., a loss in degrees of free-
dom, leads to a statistically significant improvement with reference to the χ²-distribution (Koza 
and Dant 2007). For Models 1 to 4, the “quasi moderation”-model fits best (p < 0.05). However, 
for Model 5, there is no statistically significant improvement of model fit after introducing 
moderators (p > 0.1). Hence, we propose the “direct effects”-model in this case.  
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Model Sub-Model χ² d.f. p-level GFI AGFI TLI NFI SRMR RMSEA CFI χ²/d.f. 
1 
Direct Effects Only 265.67  159 .000 .913 .873 .954 .918 .060 .051 .965 1.671 
Full Moderation 270.75  157 .000 .911 .869 .950 .917 .066 .054 .963 1.725 
Quasi Moderation* 255.01  155 .000 .917 .876 .955 .921 .057 .051 .967 1.645 
2 
Direct Effects Only 308.75  161 .000 .903 .860 .943 .913 .059 .060 .956 1.918 
Full Moderation 304.56  159 .000 .903 .859 .943 .915 .062 .060 .957 1.915 
Quasi Moderation* 297.90  157 .000 .906 .861 .944 .916 .057 .060 .958 1.897 
3 
Direct Effects Only 331.52  160 .000 .893 .846 .929 .903 .061 .065 .946 2.072 
Full Moderation 339.40  158 .000 .890 .840 .924 .900 .064 .067 .943 2.148 
Quasi Moderation* 319.07  156 .000 .897 .848 .931 .906 .060 .064 .949 2.045 
4 
Direct Effects Only 169.37  64 .000 .911 .854 .894 .888 .072 .080 .926 2.646 
Full Moderation 173.40  64 .000 .910 .853 .890 .885 .073 .082 .923 2.709 
Quasi Moderation* 155.87  62 .000 .919 .862 .903 .897 .070 .077 .934 2.514 
5 
Direct Effects Only* 109.05  65 .001 .944 .910 .945 .909 .059 .052 .960 1.678 
Full Moderation 136.95  65 .000 .931 .889 .910 .886 .077 .066 .935 2.107 
Quasi Moderation 106.12  63 .001 .946 .910 .944 .912 .058 .052 .961 1.684 
* Proposed Model 
Table 16: Summary Statistics of Competing Sub-Models 
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Table 17 reports the path coefficients for the five proposed structural models. With reference to 
Model 1, the evolution of cognitive conflict appears to be dependent on the prevalence of formal 
governance mechanisms rather than on relational patterns. Relational governance does not in-
fluence the transition from latent and affective conflict into cognitive conflict, rejecting H1b and 
H2b (p > 0.1). That is, task-related disagreements cannot be avoided or mitigated by relational 
structures. In contrast, formal governance directly reduces cognitive conflict (p < 0.01) and 
moderates the transition from affective into cognitive conflict, supporting H2a (p < 0.1); i.e., 
supply chain partners seem to confine themselves to interact in accordance with formal regula-
tions in times of affective conflict. However, the interaction term of formal governance and 
latent conflict remains insignificant (p > 0.1). Similar to the evolution of cognitive conflict, we 
do not see that formal or relational governance mechanisms moderate the transition from latent 
into affective conflict (in rejection of H3a, b; p > 0.1). That is, governance mechanisms do not 
appear to be able to tackle the aggravation of initial conflict conditions. However, while the 
interaction term of cognitive conflict and formal governance shows the predicted sign but re-
mains insignificant (p > 0.1), relational governance limits the transition from cognitive into 
affective conflict, supporting H4b (p < 0.01). That is, a relational mindset prevents conflicts 
from drifting off the functional level. 
Toward higher conflict states (Models 3 to 5), formal governance seems to increase the levels of 
conflict directly (p < 0.001; p < 0.001; p < 0.01). That is, the more a conflict escalates, the more 
dysfunctional formal governance becomes. Accordingly, H5a must be rejected because formal 
governance does not mitigate the transition from cognitive into manifest conflict (p > 0.1). Re-
sults for H6a and H7a, which state a dramatizing influence of formal governance, remain insig-
nificant as well (p > 0.1). Hence, formal governance appears to be unable to avoid detrimental 
transformations of advanced conflict states and directly exacerbates conflict development. In 
contrast, we found strong evidence for relational governance to effectively counter conflict 
escalation. Relational governance directly reduces the degree of endogenous conflict states 
within Models 3 to 5 (p < 0.01; p < 0.001; p < 0.01). Moreover, in support of H5b, a relational 
mindset among supply chain partners keeps them from taking harmful actions when cognitive 
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conflict occurs (p < 0.001). However, for existing hostilities among business partners, the effec-
tiveness of relational governance appears to be reduced. In support of H6b, firms seem to attrib-
ute negative business developments to the actions of their exchange partners. Relational norms 
may be violated, causing disappointment and accelerating the transition from affective to mani-
fest conflict (p < 0.05). However, confirming H7b, relational governance mechanisms appear to 
inhibit the formation of long-lasting hostilities subsequent to situations of manifest conflict 
(p < 0.001). With reference to H8a and b, the results of the assessment of competing sub-models 
reveal that the “direct effects”-model fit our data better than those models that also consider 
moderation. Therefore, we must over-rule H8a and H8b. 
Table 17: Summary of Results: Structural Equation Models 
  
 Endogenous Factor 
Exogenous Factor 
CC 
(Model 1) 
AC 
(Model 2) 
MC 
(Model 3) 
CA 
(Model 4) 
LC 
(Model 5) 
Formal Governance (FG) 
-.367** 
(.183) 
-.086 
(.197) 
.272*** 
(.073) 
.365*** 
(.075) 
.409** 
(.111) 
Relational Governance (RG) 
-.007 
(.132) 
-.127 
(.143) 
-.194** 
(.081) 
-.366*** 
(.075) 
-.358** 
(.110) 
Latent Conflict (LC) 
.602*** 
(.212) 
.375† 
(.294) 
   
Cognitive Conflict (CC)  
.116 
(.118) 
.128† 
(.061) 
  
Affective Conflict (AC) 
.235* 
(.124) 
 
.503*** 
(.114) 
  
Manifest Conflict (MC)    
-.130 
(.075) 
 
Conflict Aftermath (CA)     
.085 
(.118) 
LC X FG 
.056 
(.083) 
.149 
(.103) 
   
LC X RG 
-.089 
(.098) 
.120 
(.116) 
   
CC X FG  
-.060 
(.116) 
.032 
(.074) 
  
CC X RG  
-.244** 
(.122) 
-.266*** 
(.086) 
  
AC X FG 
-.161† 
(.107) 
 
-.027 
(.087) 
  
AC X RG 
.111 
(.090) 
 
.257* 
(.079) 
  
MC X FG    
.004 
(.045) 
 
MC X RG    
-.348*** 
(.053) 
 
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. Standard errors in brackets. 
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7. Conclusions 
In the course of emerging multichannel relationships, conflict between exchange partners is 
more likely to arise and thus threatens the continuity of potentially beneficial supply chain rela-
tionships. Hence, scholars assume that effective management and handling of interorganization-
al conflict will become key factors in shaping successful long-term relationships. Governance 
structures determine the way firms organize and manage their supply chains, define mechanisms 
for coordinating actions among exchange partners, and thus constitute adequate instruments to 
secure sustaining supply chain relationships (Ganesan et al. 2009). Therefore, in this study, we 
take a more nuanced view on interorganizational conflict and examine conflict as a process of 
five distinct states (Pondy 1967). Additionally, we draw on relational as well as formal govern-
ance and make a case for considering both mechanisms when investigating the dynamics of 
conflict. Specifically, we argue that formal and relational governance mechanisms affect the 
dynamics of interfirm conflict in that they limit or accelerate the transition between distinct 
states of conflict. Data suggest that formal governance effectively mitigates the evolution of 
cognitive conflict on functional topics and tasks as it clearly specifies reliabilities and obliga-
tions. However, formal governance appears to be unable to limit the transition between ad-
vanced conflict stages; in fact, it directly increases levels of conflict toward higher states. How-
ever, relational mechanisms and the presence of relational norms seem to limit the progression 
of cognitive and manifest conflict into subsequent states. In contrast, if frustration and hostili-
ties, i.e., affective conflict, prevail within a supply chain relationship, the effectiveness of rela-
tional mechanisms is not only impaired but even inverted. Direct effects of relational govern-
ance reduce conflict, particularly for advanced states of conflict. 
Contributions of this study are diverse. First, this study empirically incorporates all five states of 
conflict, ostensibly for the first time, in reference to the recognized model of Pondy (1967) and 
thus takes a step toward capturing the dynamics of relationships and procedural characteristics 
of conflicts. Second, while prior studies proceed from the assumption that conflict inexorably 
passes through distinct states, we argue for considering contingent effects that limit or accelerate 
the transition from one state of conflict to the next. Third, by simultaneously incorporating the 
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formal hierarchy of authority as well as informal relational patterns as mechanisms to govern 
interfirm exchanges, we take a more holistic view on supply chain governance and thereby 
comply with Lafontaine’s and Slade’s (2010) call for empirically enriching the underexplored 
phenomenon of relational exchange. Moreover, we supplement empirical research on supply 
chain relationships because we focus on a European context. Finally, a better understanding of 
the dynamics of conflict provides valuable implications not only for future research but also for 
practitioners in terms of managing conflict by adequately organizing their supply chains.  
Despite our efforts to avoid biases that surround many empirical studies, our investigation is 
subject to limitations. First, we gathered data considering only one side of the dyad. Because 
wholesalers’ perceptions of existing conflict and of employed supply chain governance may 
differ from retailers’ perceptions, research that considers both perspectives would allow for 
additional insights. Second, while we examined the effects of formal and informal governance 
mechanisms on the dynamics of conflict, there may be other relationship characteristics that 
moderate the transition of conflict. The approach of considering supply chain governance is 
reasonable but non-exhaustive. As an example, several scholars argue that the dependence struc-
ture among supply chain partners affects the occurrence of conflict (Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp 1995a). Hence, this study represents only a first step toward a nuanced view on 
conflict evolution. Third, our sample consists of supply chain relationships between independent 
grocery retailers and their respective wholesalers. These boundaries are assumed to be – at least 
to some degree – durably persistent and thus can cope with severe levels of conflict. That is, the 
generalizability of our study is restricted to more complex interfirm boundaries that show at 
least minimum levels of long-term orientation. Therefore, to a certain extent, the results may be 
applicable to other contexts, e.g., to franchise relationships or car dealer networks, but should be 
treated with caution in the context of short-term exchanges. Finally, while we measured our 
variables with six months of temporal separation, there is no consensus on response cycles of 
conflict states. That is, our approach of data gathering may not support an analysis of effects 
with longer response cycles. As already called for by Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal (2007), future 
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research should take a closer look at response cycles of key interorganizational factors to facili-
tate longitudinal examinations. 
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF EVENTS 
Event 
No. 
Event Description Event Date 
 1 Wulff is accused of having misled German Lower Saxony’s parliament during 
his prime ministership concerning a personal credit from Egon Geerkens 
(businessman) 
12/12/2011 
 2 Federal President’s Office confirms credit from Geerkens 12/13/2011 
 3 Wulff gives a first statement: No business relationship to Geerkens, only to his 
wife 
12/15/2011 
 4 Media substantiates business relationship 12/16/2011 
 5 Wulff gives a second statement: No reprehensible behavior 12/17/2011 
 6 Wulff is accused of taking vacations at Geerkens’ charge and thus publishes 
list of holidays  
12/18/2011 
 7 Documents regarding personal credit become public 12/19/2011 
 8 Geerkens: I attended the negotiation on the credit 12/21/2011 
 9 Wulff apologizes for his handling of the credit affair and dismisses his long-
time spokesman Glaeseker 
12/22/2011 
 10 Media speculates about an infringement of the constitution with regard to a 
lobby event ("Nord-Sued-Dialog") 
12/23/2011 
 11 A statement of the BW Bank incriminates Wulff 12/30/2011 
 12 Media links a credit from the BW Bank for Wulff to the VW-Porsche deal 12/31/2011 
 13 Media: Wulff urged BILD’s chief editor to stop coverage (voicemail) 01/01/2012 
 14 Wulff gives a TV interview 01/04/2012 
 15 BILD publishes wording of voicemail 01/06/2012 
 16 Lobby event is discussed in the judiciary committee of Anglo Saxony’s par-
liament 
01/10/2012 
 17 First noteworthy resistance movements within Wulff’s own party 01/12/2012 
 18 Wulff’s lawyer announces publication of answers towards media’s catalog of 
questions 
01/12/2012 
 19 Media: Wulff was invited to the Oktoberfest by film financier David Groe-
newold 
01/14/2012 
 20 Prime Minister of Lower Saxony demands clarification 01/14/2012 
 21 Public prosecution department: No reasonable suspicion against Wulff 01/16/2012 
 22 Media: Anglo Saxony’s government was actively looking for sponsors of the 
lobby event 
01/18/2012 
 23 Publication of Wulff’s answers towards media’s catalog of questions 01/18/2012 
 24 House search at Wulff’s acquaintances 01/19/2012 
 25 Media: Glaeseker supposed to be involved in organization of the lobby event 01/20/2012 
 26 Media: Federal state-paid cookbooks distributed at the "North-South-
Dialogue" 
01/21/2012 
 27 Opposition in Lower Saxony wants to bring a charge against Wulff 01/22/2012 
 28 Media: Looking for sponsors for the lobby event on behalf of Wulff 01/24/2012 
 29 Public prosecution department searches Glaeseker’s office 01/26/2012 
 30 Media: Further business relationships to Geerkens 01/30/2012 
 31 Media: Federal President’s Office already knew about shady travel behaviors 
of Glaeseker 
02/01/2012 
 32 Public prosecution department proves acceptance of advantages: Wulff drove 
new Audi free of charge 
02/02/2012 
 33 Media: Wulff received a Skoda at favorable conditions 02/04/2012 
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Event 
No. 
Event Description Event Date 
 34 Media: Groenewold financed Wulff’s vacations 02/08/2012 
 35 Media: Groenewold provided firm cellphone to Wulff 02/10/2012 
 36 Media: Jam producer paid for Wulff’s hotel stay during German Film Ball 02/11/2012 
 37 Media: Anglo Saxony’s government vouched for Groenewold’s letterbox firm 
during Wulff’s presidency 
02/11/2012 
 38 Public prosecution department requests waiver of Wulff’s immunity 02/16/2012 
 39 Wulff resigns 02/17/2012 
 40 Debate on Wulff’s honorarium flares up* 02/29/2012 
 41 Public prosecution department examines Wulff’s house* 03/02/2012 
 42 Wulff’s retirement gets accompanied by a Great Tattoo* 03/08/2012 
 34 Public prosecution department expands investigations about Groenewold* 04/25/2012 
 44 Media: Groenewold paid for Wulff’s bodyguards and hotel during Oktober-
fest* 
04/27/2012 
 45 Wulff obtains an interim order against BILD* 05/10/2012 
 46 Glaeseker makes a statement concerning the lobby event* 05/13/2012 
 47 Public prosecution department of Berlin ends investigations against Wulff 05/22/2012 
 48 Public prosecution department of Berlin ends criminal procedure against 
Wulff 
06/01/2012 
 49 Wulff again takes part in political discourse 06/16/2012 
 50 Public prosecution department: Wulff will have to give evidence in the inves-
tigations against Glaeseker 
06/22/2012 
 51 Audit office of Anglo Saxony: federal state supported lobby event 06/27/2012 
 52 Hanover’s public prosecution department considers expanding investigations 
against Wulff 
07/22/2012 
 53 Hanover’s public prosecution may not have sufficient suspicion; accusation 
becomes uncertain 
07/29/2012 
 54 Public prosecution department analyzes diaries of Glaeseker’s wife* 08/06/2012 
 55 Wulff gives evidence in investigations against Glaeseker* 08/11/2012 
 56 Increase of Wulff’s honorarium to 217,000 € per year causes indignation 08/21/2012 
 57 Baden Wuerttemberg’s Prime Minister contradicts Wulff’s statements on the 
lobby event 
08/24/2012 
 58 Wulff’s wife legally proceeds against rumors about a past life in the red light 
district 
09/07/2012 
 59 Television presenter rejects accusations from Wulff’s wife 09/08/2012 
 60 Book publication of Wulff’s wife 09/10/2012 
 61 Public prosecution department investigates whether Wulff raised funds for 
Groenewold from Siemens AG* 
09/30/2012 
 62 Media: Geerkens accommodated Wulff with money after his first divorce in 
2007* 
10/07/2012 
 63 Hanover’s public prosecution department provides interim report* 10/09/2012 
 64 Public prosecution department will not impeach Wulff before the elections in 
Anglo Saxony 
12/02/2012 
 65 Christian and Bettina Wulff break up with each other 01/07/2013 
 66 Hanover’s public prosecution department brings charges against Glaeseker* 03/06/2013 
 67 Wulff couple sells their house* 03/07/2013 
 68 Public prosecution department now investigates in terms of bribery rather than 
acceptance of advantages* 
03/09/2013 
 69 Public prosecution department offers a deal 03/22/2013 
 70 Wulff refuses the deal 04/09/2013 
 71 Public prosecution department brings charges against Wulff 04/12/2013 
* Event was excluded from the event-study analysis that considers Axel Springer Corporation’s stock market performance 
because it coincided with confounding events. 
Table 18: List of Events
[continued] 
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APPENDIX B 
TEST STATISTICS 
To test for significance of abnormal returns, we calculated standardized abnormal returns (SAR) 
for every single event by dividing abnormal returns of security i at day t by the estimated stand-
ard deviation ?̂?𝑖 of abnormal returns during the estimation period. Moreover, we corrected for 
the prediction error (Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen 1991):  
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
?̂?𝑖 √1+
1
𝑇
+
(𝑅𝑚𝑡−𝑅𝑚̅̅̅̅ ̅̅ )
2
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝑡−𝑅𝑚̅̅̅̅ ̅̅ )
2𝜏
𝑡=𝜏−𝑇
, (B.1) 
where 𝜏 is the offset of the estimation period relative to the event day, 𝑇 represents the number 
of days within the estimation period, and 𝑅𝑚̅̅ ̅̅  is the average market return during the estimation 
period. 
In case of multi-day windows, we corrected for serial dependence in accordance with Mikkelson 
and Partch (1988): 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
?̂? √(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)+
(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)
𝑇
+
(∑ 𝑅𝑚𝑡−(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
𝑅𝑚̅̅̅̅ ̅̅ )2
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝑡−𝑅𝑚̅̅̅̅ ̅̅ )
2𝜏
𝑡=𝜏−𝑇
.  (B.2) 
In order to test for average abnormal returns across several events, we utilized an adjustment of 
the statistic of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) that accounts for cross-correlation 
(Kolari and Pynnönen 2010): 
𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
√ 𝑁
(𝑁−1)
∑ (𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡−∑
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
)𝑁𝑖=1
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 √
1−𝑟
1+(𝑁−1)𝑟
,  (B.3) 
where r depicts the average cross-correlation among the estimation periods’ residuals (Kolari 
and Pynnönen 2010). 
Appendix B 151 
Following Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), we computed 
the standardized statistic for cumulative average abnormal returns by: 
𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) =
∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
√ 𝑁
(𝑁−1)
∑ (𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖−∑
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
)𝑁𝑖=1
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 √
1−𝑟
1+(𝑁−1)𝑟
.  (B.4) 
In case of BILD’s circulation, we employed the constant mean return model and set up the test 
statistics with reference to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). Therefore, in a first step, we com-
puted standardized abnormal returns for each event by dividing the abnormal return at date t by 
the standard deviation of excess returns within the estimation period: 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑖
. (B.5) 
To account for multi-date event windows, we computed the statistic for cumulative abnormal 
returns as follows: 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑖√(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)
. (B.6) 
Analogous to formula (B.3), we assessed average abnormal returns for circulation figures to 
account for the aggregated effect of multiple events: 
𝑡(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
√ 1
𝑇−2
(∑ (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 − 
1
𝑇−1
∑
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 )
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
2
)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
. (B.7) 
Finally, cumulative average abnormal returns were tested using:  
𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
√(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)
𝑇−2
(∑ (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 − 
1
𝑇−1
∑
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 )
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
2
)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
. (B.8) 
To circumvent the problem of possibly non-normally distributed excess returns, we applied 
Corrado’s (1989) non-parametric rank test that utilizes only ordinal information and also ac-
counts for cross-correlation (Kolari and Pynnönen 2011). Therefore, abnormal returns of the 
estimation and event window are assigned to ranks Kit: 
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𝐾𝑖𝑡 =  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡), 𝑡 = (𝜏 − 𝑇), … , 𝜏, 𝑡1, … , 𝑡2. (B.9) 
The rank statistic for abnormal returns is given by: 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  
𝐾𝑖𝑡−(𝑇+(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)+1)/2
𝑠(𝐾)
. (B.10) 
For multi-date event windows the statistic is calculated by: 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖) =  
∑ (𝐾𝑖𝑡−(𝑇+(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)+1)/2)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
𝑠(𝐾)√(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)
. (B.11) 
In order to assess average abnormal returns, we calculated: 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) =  
1
𝑁
∑ (𝐾𝑖𝑡−(𝑇+(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)+1)/2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑠(𝐾)
. (B.12) 
Finally, we computed the statistic for cumulative average abnormal returns as follows: 
𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) =  
∑
1
𝑁
∑ (𝐾𝑖𝑡−(𝑇+(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)+1)/2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
𝑠(𝐾)√(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)
. (B.13) 
The underlying standard deviation s(K) is calculated by: 
𝑠(𝐾) = √1/(𝑇 + (𝑡2 − 𝑡1 + 1)) ∑ (
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑁𝑖=1 𝐾𝑖𝑡 −
𝑇+(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)+1
2
))2
𝑡2
𝑡=𝜏−𝑇 , (B.14) 
where N is equal to one for equations (B.10) and (B.11).  
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APPENDIX C 
LIST OF INTELLECTUALS 
# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`03 - `07 
1  Achternbusch, Herbert 212 
2  Adam, Konrad 850 
3  Aichinger, Ilse 138 
4  Albert, Hans 419 
5  Allmendinger, Jutta 172 
6  Alt, Franz 336 
7  Althen, Michael 155 
8  Altvater, Elmar 107 
9  Aly, Götz 449 
10  Amendt, Günter 96 
11  Anderson, Sascha 37 
12  Anz, Thomas 28 
13  Arjouni, Jakob 129 
14  Assheuer, Thomas 43 
15  Assmann, Aleida 63 
16  Assmann, Jan 168 
17  Aust, Stefan 1,685 
18  Baecker, Dirk 131 
19  Bärfuss, Lukas 456 
20  Baring, Arnulf 468 
21  Bednarz, Klaus 274 
22  Beikircher, Konrad 1,234 
23  Belting, Hans 43 
24  Benz, Wolfgang 316 
25  Berg, Sibylle 367 
26  Bertram, Christoph 48 
27  Bertram, Hans 169 
28  Besier, Gerhard 157 
29  Beutelspacher, Albrecht 205 
30  Bichsel, Peter 315 
31  Bieri, Peter 1,044 
32  Biermann, Wolf 2,126 
33  Biller, Maxim 635 
34  Bisky, Jens 237 
35  Bissinger, Manfred 249 
36  Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang 102 
37  Bofinger, Peter 1,033 
38  Böhme, Erich 221 
39  Bohrer, Karl Heinz 148 
40  Bolz, Norbert 274 
41  Breinersdorfer, Fred 243 
42  Breth, Andrea 596 
43  Broder, Henryk Marcin 884 
44  Bronfen, Elisabeth 86 
45  Bruhns, Wibke 275 
46  Brumlik, Micha 573 
47  Brussig, Thomas 618 
48  Brüstle, Oliver 235 
49  Buch, Hans Christoph 344 
50  Bude, Heinz 192 
51  Bueb, Bernhard 282 
# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`03 - `07 
52  Busche, Jürgen 191 
53  Büscher, Wolfgang 414 
54  Castorf, Frank 1,309 
55  Czempiel, Ernst-Otto 42 
56  Dahn, Daniela 101 
57  Dahrendorf, Ralf 439 
58  Dath, Dietmar 234 
59  de Bruyn, Günter 244 
60  de Weck, Roger 500 
61  Delius, Friedrich Christian 180 
62  Deschner, Karlheinz 25 
63  Dettling, Warnfried 128 
64  Di Fabio, Udo 485 
65  di Lorenzo, Giovanni 665 
66  Dieckmann, Christoph 857 
67  Diederichsen, Diedrich 354 
68  Diez, Georg 79 
69  Diner, Dan 185 
70  Dische, Irene 192 
71  Dorn, Thea 358 
72  Dörrie, Doris 828 
73  Dorst, Tankred 695 
74  Drewermann, Eugen 385 
75  Driest, Burkhard 108 
76  Droste, Wiglaf 1,030 
77  Dückers, Tanja 379 
78  Duden, Barbara 257 
79  Dürr, Hans-Peter 130 
80  Dürr, Tobias 77 
81  Duve, Karen 188 
82  Eekhoff, Johann 87 
83  Endler, Adolf 99 
84  Enzensberger, Hans Magnus 1,298 
85  Fetscher, Iring 90 
86  Flasch, Kurt 45 
87  Flassbeck, Heiner 145 
88  Flimm, Jürgen 1,665 
89  Forte, Dieter 169 
90  Franck, Julia 441 
91  Franz, Wolfgang 1,182 
92  Franzobel (Stefan Griebl) 344 
93  Frei, Norbert 158 
94  Freund, Wieland 1,112 
95  Fricke, Thomas 139 
96  Frühwald, Wolfgang 164 
97  Fuhr, Eckhard 1,345 
98  Fuld, Werner 48 
99  Funke, Cornelia 1,575 
100  Gall, Lothar 93 
101  Ganten, Detlev 334 
102  Gaschke, Susanne 65 
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# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`03 - `07 
103  Gaus, Bettina 650 
104  Gauß, Karl-Markus 106 
105  Geiger, Arno 418 
106  Genazino, Wilhelm 745 
107  Gerke, Wolfgang 635 
108  Gerster, Petra 317 
109  Giordano, Ralph 1,192 
110  Glaser, Hermann 24 
111  Glaser, Peter 256 
112  Goetz, Rainald 293 
113  Goldt, Max 493 
114  Goosen, Frank 351 
115  Grass, Günter 6,350 
116  Graßl, Hartmut 179 
117  Greffrath, Mathias 134 
118  Greiner, Ulrich 117 
119  Grill, Bartholomäus 64 
120  Grimm, Dieter 134 
121  Grönemeyer, Dietrich 493 
122  Grün, Anselm 227 
123  Grünbein, Durs 602 
124  Gruss, Peter 226 
125  Gstrein, Norbert 96 
126  Güllner, Manfred 689 
127  Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich 93 
128  Güngör, Dilek 241 
129  Habermas, Jürgen 1,225 
130  Hacke, Axel 297 
131  Hacker, Katharina 415 
132  Hage, Volker 241 
133  Hahne, Peter 1,337 
134  Hamann, Brigitte 119 
135  Hamm, Peter 155 
136  Handke, Peter 1,890 
137  Hank, Rainer 29 
138  Hanke, Thomas 143 
139  Harig, Ludwig 86 
140  Harpprecht, Klaus 232 
141  Härtling, Peter 1,123 
142  Hartung, Klaus 67 
143  Hassemer, Winfried 681 
144  Haußmann, Leander 751 
145  Heidenreich, Elke 1,687 
146  Hein, Christoph 961 
147  Hein, Jakob 265 
148  Hellinger, Bert 73 
149  Henkel, Hans-Olaf 1,286 
150  Henrich, Dieter 53 
151  Henscheid, Eckhard 282 
152  Hensel, Jana 255 
153  Henzler, Herbert 184 
154  Herbert, Ulrich 112 
155  Herles, Wolfgang 164 
156  Hermann, Judith 450 
157  Herzinger, Richard 388 
158  Hettche, Thomas 192 
159  Hickel, Rudolf 508 
160  Hilberg, Raul 109 
# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`03 - `07 
161  Hilbig, Wolfgang 159 
162  Hildebrandt, Dieter 1,320 
163  Hochhuth, Rolf 910 
164  Höhler, Gertrud 567 
165  Honneth, Axel 104 
166  Hoppe, Felicitas 240 
167  Horx, Matthias 736 
168  Hürlimann, Thomas 278 
169  Hurrelmann, Klaus 395 
170  Hüther, Gerald 154 
171  Hüther, Michael 942 
172  Iden, Peter 187 
173  Illies, Florian 597 
174  Issing, Otmar 822 
175  Jelinek, Elfriede 2,137 
176  Jenny, Zoë 3 
177  Jens, Walter 1,061 
178  Jesse, Eckhard 121 
179  Jessen, Jens 125 
180  Joffe, Josef 2,372 
181  Jörges, Hans-Ulrich 621 
182  Jürgs, Michael 415 
183  Kaminer, Wladimir 1,152 
184  Kant, Hermann 108 
185  Karasek, Hellmuth 1,561 
186  Keese, Christoph 945 
187  Kehlmann, Daniel 1,241 
188  Kelek, Necla 549 
189  Kempowski, Walter 920 
190  Kersting, Wolfgang 12 
191  Kilb, Andreas 166 
192  Kilz, Hans Werner 206 
193  Kirchhof, Paul 3,170 
194  Kirchhoff, Bodo 341 
195  Kissler, Alexander 151 
196  Kister, Kurt 105 
197  Kleeberg, Michael 165 
198  Klier, Freya 172 
199  Kluge, Alexander 754 
200  Kluge, Jürgen 388 
201  Klüger, Ruth 219 
202  Knabe, Hubertus 704 
203  Knopp, Guido 1,095 
204  Knüwer, Thomas 23 
205  Köcher, Renate 439 
206  Kocka, Jürgen 77 
207  Koenen, Gerd 209 
208  Köppel, Roger 941 
209  Korn, Salomon 973 
210  Korte, Karl-Rudolf 267 
211  Kracht, Christian 314 
212  Kraushaar, Wolfgang 215 
213  Krekeler, Elmar 1,603 
214  Kremp, Herbert 390 
215  Kresnik, Johann 544 
216  Kreye, Andrian 11 
217  Kroetz, Franz Xaver 497 
218  Kronauer, Brigitte 307 
[continued] 
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# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`03 - `07 
219  Krumrey, Henning 289 
220  Kumpfmüller, Michael 91 
221  Kunert, Günter 295 
222  Küng, Hans 921 
223  Kurbjuweit, Dirk 221 
224  Lange-Müller, Katja 391 
225  Langguth, Gerd 269 
226  Lau, Jörg 85 
227  Lau, Mariam 1,065 
228  Lauterbach, Karl 2,358 
229  Lebert, Benjamin 197 
230  Leggewie, Claus 226 
231  Leicht, Robert 256 
232  Leif, Thomas 287 
233  Leinemann, Jürgen 270 
234  Lenz, Siegfried 974 
235  Lenzen, Dieter 867 
236  Leonhard, Wolfgang 125 
237  Lepenies, Wolf 496 
238  Lesch, Harald 53 
239  Leyendecker, Hans 385 
240  Loest, Erich 369 
241  Löffler, Sigrid 377 
242  Lübbe, Hermann 114 
243  Lustiger, Arno 272 
244  Lütkehaus, Ludger 25 
245  Malik, Fredmund 370 
246  Mangold, Ijoma 139 
247  Markl, Hubert 74 
248  Markwort, Helmut 1,323 
249  Maron, Monika 281 
250  Marquard, Odo 118 
251  Martenstein, Harald 268 
252  Marthaler, Christoph 1,014 
253  Matussek, Matthias 558 
254  Mayröcker, Friederike 249 
255  Meinecke, Thomas 226 
256  Menasse, Eva 204 
257  Menasse, Robert 415 
258  Miegel, Meinhard 572 
259  Miersch, Michael 279 
260  Mika, Bascha 331 
261  Mitscherlich, Margarete 136 
262  Mittelstrass, Jürgen 71 
263  Mlynek, Jürgen 393 
264  Modick, Klaus 95 
265  Moers, Walter 453 
266  Mohr, Reinhard 270 
267  Mommsen, Hans 235 
268  Mosebach, Martin 642 
269  Münkler, Herfried 344 
270  Muschg, Adolf 965 
271  Nadolny, Sten 175 
272  Naumann, Michael 1,984 
273  Negt, Oskar 241 
274  Neuenfels, Hans 904 
275  Nida-Rümelin, Julian 353 
276  Niejahr, Elisabeth 48 
# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`03 - `07 
277  Niethammer, Lutz 40 
278  Niggemeier, Stefan 160 
279  Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth 133 
280  Nolte, Ernst 165 
281  Nolte, Paul 485 
282  Nüsslein-Volhard, Christiane 172 
283  Opaschowski, Horst 467 
284  Ortheil, Hanns-Josef 620 
285  Osang, Alexander 298 
286  Peffekoven, Rolf 239 
287  Perthes, Volker 150 
288  Peymann, Claus 2,070 
289  Piper, Nikolaus 27 
290  Pleitgen, Fritz 1,876 
291  Plenzdorf, Ulrich 191 
292  Politycki, Matthias 204 
293  Pollesch, René 723 
294  Pollmer, Udo 162 
295  Polt, Gerhard 688 
296  Pörtner, Rainer 164 
297  Poschardt, Ulf 637 
298  Posener, Alan 681 
299  Prantl, Heribert 217 
300  Raddatz, Fritz Joachim 318 
301  Radisch, Iris 354 
302  Raffelhüschen, Bernd 603 
303  Ranke-Heinemann, Uta 148 
304  Ransmayr, Christoph 226 
305  Rathenow, Lutz 159 
306  Ratzinger, Joseph 3,485 
307  Raulff, Ulrich 250 
308  Reemtsma, Jan Philipp 885 
309  Regener, Sven 584 
310  Reich, Jens 120 
311  Reich-Ranicki, Marcel 2,222 
312  Reinhard, Wolfgang 61 
313  Reitz, Ulrich 897 
314  Richling, Mathias 431 
315  Rinke, Moritz 490 
316  Ritter, Henning 99 
317  Roggenkamp, Viola 169 
318  Röhl, Bettina 161 
319  Roll, Evelyn 74 
320  Rosendorfer, Herbert 69 
321  Rosh, Lea 695 
322  Ross, Jan 39 
323  Rothmann, Ralf 251 
324  Rötzer, Florian 33 
325  Rühl, Lothar 22 
326  Rühmkorf, Peter 436 
327  Rürup, Bert 3,544 
328  Rutschky, Katharina 216 
329  Sack, Manfred 37 
330  Safranski, Rüdiger 653 
331  Sartorius, Joachim 256 
332  Schindhelm, Michael 801 
333  Schirrmacher, Frank 1,428 
334  Schlingensief, Christoph 2,050 
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# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`03 - `07 
335  Schlink, Bernhard 376 
336  Schlögel, Karl 161 
337  Schmidbauer, Wolfgang 93 
338  Schmied, Wieland 55 
339  Schmitter, Elke 151 
340  Schnibben, Cordt 108 
341  Schöllgen, Gregor 37 
342  Scholl-Latour, Peter 878 
343  Schorlemmer, Friedrich 254 
344  Schroeder, Klaus 353 
345  Schrott, Raoul 224 
346  Schuh, Franz 119 
347  Schwan, Gesine 1,588 
348  Schwarzer, Alice 1,946 
349  Schwelien, Michael 18 
350  Seebacher-Brandt, Brigitte 101 
351  Seewald, Peter 104 
352  Seibt, Gustav 172 
353  Seidl, Claudius 82 
354  Seligmann, Rafael 223 
355  Selten, Reinhard 153 
356  Semler, Christian 607 
357  Sichtermann, Barbara 103 
358  Sick, Bastian 669 
359  Siebert, Horst 168 
360  Siedler, Wolf Jobst 239 
361  Simitis, Spiros 173 
362  Singer, Wolf 285 
363  Sinn, Hans-Werner 2,661 
364  Sloterdijk, Peter 764 
365  Spaemann, Robert 122 
366  Spengler, Tilman 135 
367  Spinnen, Burkhard 345 
368  Spitzer, Manfred 365 
369  Spreckelsen, Tilman 58 
370  Sprenger, Reinhard 170 
371  Steinbach, Udo 273 
372  Steinfeld, Thomas 175 
373  Steingart, Gabor 595 
374  Stölzl, Christoph 1,093 
375  Strasser, Johano 224 
376  Straubhaar, Thomas 1,346 
377  Strauß, Botho 968 
378  Streeck, Wolfgang 28 
379  Streeruwitz, Marlene 278 
380  Stürmer, Michael 1,103 
381  Süskind, Patrick 632 
382  Suter, Martin 1,175 
383  Thalheimer, Michael 733 
384  Theweleit, Klaus 285 
385  Tichy, Roland 151 
386  Timm, Uwe 542 
387  Todenhöfer, Jürgen 315 
388  Treichel, Hans-Ulrich 179 
389  Tugendhat, Ernst 52 
390  Ulfkotte, Udo 193 
391  Ulrich, Bernd 213 
# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`03 - `07 
392  Umbach, Klaus 65 
393  Urban, Martin 43 
394  Vanderbeke, Birgit 142 
395  Veiel, Andreas 69 
396  von Arnim, Hans Herbert 370 
397  von Becker, Peter 72 
398  von Düffel, John 536 
399  von Hentig, Hartmut 142 
400  von Lange, Alexa Hennig 258 
401  von Lovenberg, Felicitas 126 
402  von Matt, Peter 276 
403  von Randow, Gero 74 
404  von Schönburg, Alexander 324 
405  von Stuckrad-Barre, 
Benjamin 
483 
406  von Uslar, Moritz 197 
407  von Weizsäcker, Carl 
Friedrich 
460 
408  von Weizsäcker, Ernst Ulrich 503 
409  von Westphalen, Joseph 86 
410  von, Klaus 91 
411  Wackwitz, Stephan 97 
412  Wallraff, Günter 742 
413  Walser, Martin 2,597 
414  Waltz, Sasha 844 
415  Weder di Mauro, Beatrice 591 
416  Wehler, Hans-Ulrich 318 
417  Weibel, Peter 760 
418  Weidenfeld, Werner 193 
419  Weidermann, Volker 93 
420  Weiler, Jan 367 
421  Weimer, Wolfram 361 
422  Weinrich, Harald 38 
423  Wellershoff, Dieter 271 
424  Welsch, Wolfgang 40 
425  Welzer, Harald 177 
426  Wesel, Uwe 66 
427  Wickert, Ulrich 1,844 
428  Widmann, Arno 553 
429  Widmer, Urs 843 
430  Wiegard, Wolfgang 566 
431  Willemsen, Roger 1,117 
432  Willms, Johannes 128 
433  Winnacker, Ernst-Ludwig 432 
434  Wittstock, Uwe 845 
435  Wohmann, Gabriele 91 
436  Wolffsohn, Michael 387 
437  Wondratschek, Wolf 212 
438  Zadek, Peter 1,060 
439  Zaimoglu, Feridun 979 
440  Zeh, Juli 569 
441  Zimmer, Dieter 562 
442  Zwerenz, Gerhard 87 
Table 19: Intellectuals and Media Mentions 
(2007 Sample) 
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# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`08 - `12 
1  Achternbusch, Herbert 248 
2  Adam, Konrad 51 
3  Aichinger, Ilse 199 
4  Albert, Hans 810 
5  Allmendinger, Jutta 518 
6  Alt, Franz 603 
7  Altvater, Elmar 137 
8  Aly, Götz 931 
9  Assheuer, Thomas 530 
10  Assmann, Jan 154 
11  Assmann, Aleida 126 
12  Ates, Seyran 618 
13  Augstein, Jakob 687 
14  Aust, Stefan 2,400 
15  Bade, Klaus 860 
16  Baecker, Dirk 84 
17  Bahners, Patrick 296 
18  Bärfuss, Lukas 716 
19  Baring, Arnulf 521 
20  Bednarz, Klaus 219 
21  Belting, Hans 98 
22  Benz, Wolfgang 491 
23  Berg, Sibylle 1,085 
24  Bertram, Hans 350 
25  Beutelspacher, Albrecht 644 
26  Bichsel, Peter 340 
27  Bieri, Peter 367 
28  Biermann, Wolf 2,751 
29  Biller, Maxim 596 
30  Bisky, Jens 238 
31  Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang 146 
32  Bofinger, Peter 2,576 
33  Bohrer, Karl Heinz 241 
34  Bolz, Norbert 500 
35  Braunberger, Gerald 28 
36  Bredekamp, Horst 183 
37  Brenner, Michael 331 
38  Breth, Andrea 870 
39  Brock, Bazon 419 
40  Broder, Henryk Marcin 2,493 
41  Bronfen, Elisabeth 95 
42  Brumlik, Micha 624 
43  Brussig, Thomas 806 
44  Buch, Hans Christoph 509 
45  Bude, Heinz 301 
46  Bueb, Bernhard 475 
47  Bullinger, Hans-Jörg 381 
48  Büscher, Wolfgang 975 
49  Butterwegge, Christoph 408 
50  Castorf, Frank 2,054 
51  Dahn, Daniela 234 
52  Dath, Dietmar 649 
53  de Bruyn, Günter 199 
54  Delius, Friedrich Christian 614 
55  Di Fabio, Udo 893 
56  di Lorenzo, Giovanni 2,531 
57  Dieckmann, Christoph 949 
58  Diederichsen, Diedrich 470 
# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`08 - `12 
59  Diez, Georg 403 
60  Diner, Dan 133 
61  Ditfurth, Jutta 626 
62  Döpfner, Mathias 4,028 
63  Dorn, Thea 743 
64  Dörrie, Doris 2,582 
65  Dorst, Tankred 951 
66  Dreier, Horst 394 
67  Drewermann, Eugen 462 
68  Droste, Wiglaf 618 
69  Dückers, Tanja 381 
70  Dürr, Hans-Peter 165 
71  Duve, Karen 660 
72  Enzensberger, Hans Magnus 1,954 
73  Fetscher, Iring 89 
74  Flasch, Kurt 250 
75  Flassbeck, Heiner 485 
76  Fleischhauer, Jan 555 
77  Flimm, Jürgen 2,488 
78  Franck, Julia 771 
79  Franz, Wolfgang 2,817 
80  Franzobel (Stefan Griebl) 51 
81  Frei, Norbert 295 
82  Fricke, Thomas 71 
83  Fried, Amelie 898 
84  Frühwald, Wolfgang 107 
85  Fuest, Clemens 624 
86  Funke, Cornelia 2,793 
87  Gall, Lothar 124 
88  Ganten, Detlev 252 
89  Gauß, Karl-Markus 287 
90  Geiger, Arno 1,131 
91  Genazino, Wilhelm 835 
92  Gerhardt, Volker 149 
93  Gerke, Wolfgang 1,074 
94  Gerster, Petra 347 
95  Geyer, Christian 108 
96  Gigerenzer, Gerd 163 
97  Giordano, Ralph 1,036 
98  Glavinic, Thomas 572 
99  Goetz, Rainald 978 
100  Goldt, Max 790 
101  Goosen, Frank 670 
102  Göttler, Fritz 169 
103  Grass, Günter 8,632 
104  Greiner, Ulrich 833 
105  Grimm, Dieter 89 
106  Grönemeyer, Dietrich 593 
107  Grosser, Alfred 348 
108  Grün, Anselm 663 
109  Grünbein, Durs 876 
110  Gruss, Peter 282 
111  Güllner, Manfred 1,921 
112  Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich 401 
113  Habermas, Jürgen 1,931 
114  Hachmeister, Lutz 243 
115  Hacke, Axel 802 
116  Hage, Volker 279 
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117  Hahne, Peter 2,114 
118  Hamann, Brigitte 115 
119  Hamm, Peter 185 
120  Handke, Peter 2,978 
121  Hankel, Wilhelm 333 
122  Harig, Ludwig 73 
123  Harpprecht, Klaus 519 
124  Härtling, Peter 1,165 
125  Haslinger, Josef 530 
126  Hassemer, Winfried 614 
127  Haußmann, Leander 1,739 
128  Hegemann, Helene 1,217 
129  Heidenreich, Elke 2,880 
130  Hein, Christoph 823 
131  Hein, Jakob 571 
132  Heitmeyer, Wilhelm 277 
133  Hellinger, Bert 163 
134  Hellwig, Martin 137 
135  Henkel, Hans-Olaf 1,550 
136  Henrich, Dieter 51 
137  Henscheid, Eckhard 176 
138  Henschel, Gerhard 311 
139  Herbert, Ulrich 109 
140  Hermann, Judith 595 
141  Hettche, Thomas 362 
142  Hickel, Rudolf 761 
143  Hildebrandt, Dieter 1,838 
144  Hochhuth, Rolf 1,304 
145  Höffe, Otfried 69 
146  Höhler, Gertrud 587 
147  Homburg, Stefan 300 
148  Honneth, Axel 237 
149  Hoppe, Felicitas 564 
150  Hörisch, Jochen 145 
151  Horx, Matthias 960 
152  Hürlimann, Thomas 317 
153  Hurrelmann, Klaus 701 
154  Hüther, Michael 3,014 
155  Hüther, Gerald 672 
156  Illies, Florian 785 
157  Ingendaay, Paul 196 
158  Issing, Otmar 758 
159  Jakobs, Hans-Jürgen 150 
160  Jelinek, Elfriede 2,913 
161  Jens, Walter 1,201 
162  Jesse, Eckhard 271 
163  Jessen, Jens 908 
164  Joas, Hans 87 
165  Joffe, Josef 1,474 
166  Jörges, Hans-Ulrich 783 
167  Jürgs, Michael 675 
168  Kaminer, Wladimir 1,848 
169  Kant, Hermann 260 
170  Karasek, Hellmuth 2,447 
171  Käßmann, Margot 6,860 
172  Kast, Verena 52 
173  Kaube, Jürgen 129 
174  Kehlmann, Daniel 2,639 
# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`08 - `12 
175  Kelek, Necla 1, 070 
176  Kemfert, Claudia 1,651 
177  Kermani, Navid 1,099 
178  Kilb, Andreas 128 
179  Kilz, Hans Werner 413 
180  Kirchhof, Paul 1,663 
181  Kirchhoff, Bodo 507 
182  Kirsch, Sarah 364 
183  Kissler, Alexander 237 
184  Kister, Kurt 245 
185  Kleber, Claus 1,591 
186  Kluge, Alexander 1,582 
187  Kluge, Jürgen 1,239 
188  Klüger, Ruth 408 
189  Knabe, Hubertus 1,191 
190  Knopp, Guido 1,317 
191  Köcher, Renate 907 
192  Kocka, Jürgen 92 
193  Koenen, Gerd 169 
194  Kohlhaase, Wolfgang 670 
195  Köhlmeier, Michael 443 
196  Köppel, Roger 628 
197  Korn, Salomon 723 
198  Korte, Karl-Rudolf 387 
199  Körte, Peter 35 
200  Kracht, Christian 949 
201  Kraushaar, Wolfgang 297 
202  Krechel, Ursula 805 
203  Kroetz, Franz Xaver 806 
204  Kronauer, Brigitte 498 
205  Kruse, Peter 468 
206  Kunert, Günter 311 
207  Küng, Hans 1,316 
208  Kurbjuweit, Dirk 616 
209  Kurz, Constanze 444 
210  Kuttner, Sarah 901 
211  Lange-Müller, Katja 539 
212  Langguth, Gerd 1,125 
213  Lau, Jörg 509 
214  Lebert, Benjamin 223 
215  Leggewie, Claus 462 
216  Leicht, Robert 796 
217  Leif, Thomas 376 
218  Leinemann, Jürgen 160 
219  Lentz, Michael 506 
220  Lenz, Siegfried 2,146 
221  Lenzen, Dieter 1,594 
222  Lepenies, Wolf 477 
223  Lesch, Harald 298 
224  Lewitscharoff, Sibylle 1,119 
225  Leyendecker, Hans 558 
226  Liessmann, Konrad Paul 360 
227  Lobo, Sascha 1,051 
228  Loest, Erich 556 
229  Löffler, Sigrid 625 
230  Lohmann, Hans-Martin 33 
231  Lübbe, Hermann 81 
232  Lübbe-Wolff, Gertrude 123 
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233  Lütkehaus, Ludger 62 
234  Lütz, Manfred 1,084 
235  Maaz, Hans-Joachim 103 
236  Macho, Thomas 150 
237  Malik, Fredmund 247 
238  Markschies, Christoph 654 
239  Markwort, Helmut 1,984 
240  Maron, Monika 749 
241  Marquard, Odo 94 
242  Martenstein, Harald 1,543 
243  Marthaler, Christoph 1,206 
244  Marx, Reinhard 3,006 
245  Matussek, Matthias 799 
246  Mayröcker, Friederike 674 
247  Meckel, Miriam 722 
248  Meinecke, Thomas 423 
249  Menasse, Robert 596 
250  Miegel, Meinhard 468 
251  Miersch, Michael 1,639 
252  Mika, Bascha 689 
253  Misik, Robert 376 
254  Moers, Walter 439 
255  Mommsen, Hans 253 
256  Mosebach, Martin 925 
257  Müller von Blumencron, 
Mathias 
699 
258  Müller-Vogg, Hugo 171 
259  Münchau, Wolfgang 159 
260  Münkler, Herfried 546 
261  Muschg, Adolf 644 
262  Nadolny, Sten 434 
263  Narr, Wolf-Dieter 36 
264  Negt, Oskar 186 
265  Neuenfels, Hans 1,479 
266  Nida-Rümelin, Julian 384 
267  Niggemeier, Stefan 683 
268  Nolte, Paul 308 
269  Nolte, Ernst 164 
270  Nonnenmacher, Günther 53 
271  Nöstlinger, Christine 479 
272  Nuhr, Dieter 2,421 
273  Nüsslein-Volhard, Christiane 191 
274  Opaschowski, Horst 495 
275  Ortheil, Hanns-Josef 848 
276  Osang, Alexander 481 
277  Osterhammel, Jürgen 130 
278  Ostermeier, Thomas 1,040 
279  Oswald, Georg 152 
280  Otte, Max 588 
281  Papier, Hans-Jürgen 1,975 
282  Parzinger, Hermann 1,388 
283  Passig, Kathrin 324 
284  Perthes, Volker 285 
285  Petras, Armin 1,654 
286  Peymann, Claus 3,178 
287  Platthaus, Andreas 212 
288  Pleitgen, Fritz 1,604 
289  Politycki, Matthias 282 
# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
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290  Polleit, Thorsten 451 
291  Pollesch, René 1,538 
292  Pollmer, Udo 258 
293  Polt, Gerhard 1,049 
294  Poschardt, Ulf 1,652 
295  Posener, Alan 1,363 
296  Prantl, Heribert 573 
297  Precht, Richard David 2,497 
298  Prenzel, Manfred 216 
299  Raddatz, Fritz Joachim 365 
300  Radisch, Iris 766 
301  Raffelhüschen, Bernd 973 
302  Ransmayr, Christoph 304 
303  Rathenow, Lutz 226 
304  Ratzinger, Joseph 3,470 
305  Raulff, Ulrich 509 
306  Rauschenbach, Thomas 224 
307  Reemtsma, Jan Philipp 992 
308  Regener, Sven 1,301 
309  Reich, Jens 303 
310  Reichholf, Josef Helmut 349 
311  Reich-Ranicki, Marcel 4,659 
312  Richling, Mathias 964 
313  Rinke, Moritz 1,120 
314  Roche, Charlotte 3,321 
315  Röggla, Kathrin 526 
316  Röhl, Bettina 111 
317  Rosa, Hartmut 165 
318  Rosh, Lea 485 
319  Ross, Jan 368 
320  Rötzer, Florian 22 
321  Rürup, Bert 2,459 
322  Safranski, Rüdiger 708 
323  Sartorius, Joachim 474 
324  Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm 25 
325  Scheck, Denis 1,002 
326  Schellnhuber, Hans Joachim 763 
327  Schindel, Robert 187 
328  Schirrmacher, Frank 1,855 
329  Schlink, Bernhard 1,186 
330  Schlögel, Karl 362 
331  Schmidbauer, Wolfgang 448 
332  Schmied, Wieland 67 
333  Schoeps, Julius Hans 363 
334  Schöllgen, Gregor 80 
335  Scholl-Latour, Peter 944 
336  Schönborn, Christoph 1,163 
337  Schorlemmer, Friedrich 849 
338  Schroeder, Klaus 1,516 
339  Schrott, Raoul 662 
340  Schuh, Franz 331 
341  Schütte, Wolfram 42 
342  Schwan, Gesine 6,552 
343  Schwarzer, Alice 4,821 
344  Scobel, Gert 39 
345  Seel, Martin 136 
346  Seibt, Gustav 214 
347  Selten, Reinhard 183 
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348  Setz, Clemens 654 
349  Sick, Bastian 457 
350  Siedler, Wolf Jobst 137 
351  Singer, Wolf 252 
352  Sinn, Hans-Werner 5,666 
353  Sloterdijk, Peter 2,015 
354  Sofsky, Wolfgang 133 
355  Spaemann, Robert 244 
356  Spengler, Tilman 313 
357  Spies, Werner 616 
358  Spinnen, Burkhard 467 
359  Spitzer, Manfred 716 
360  Spreng, Michael 606 
361  Starbatty, Joachim 448 
362  Steinbach, Udo 177 
363  Steinfeld, Thomas 408 
364  Steingart, Gabor 763 
365  Steltzner, Holger 52 
366  Stemann, Nicolas 950 
367  Strasser, Johano 318 
368  Straubhaar, Thomas 2,035 
369  Strauß, Botho 1,068 
370  Streeck, Wolfgang 49 
371  Streeruwitz, Marlene 589 
372  Stürmer, Michael 1,514 
373  Süskind, Patrick 779 
374  Suter, Martin 2,681 
375  Tellkamp, Uwe 1,913 
376  Thalheimer, Michael 951 
377  Theweleit, Klaus 278 
378  Thomä, Dieter 85 
379  Tibi, Bassam 76 
380  Tichy, Roland 339 
381  Timm, Uwe 1,126 
382  Treichel, Hans-Ulrich 231 
383  Trojanow, Ilija 957 
384  Ullrich, Wolfgang 1,167 
385  Ulrich, Bernd 834 
386  Veiel, Andreas 134 
387  von Alemann, Ulrich 433 
388  von Arnim, Hans Herbert 983 
389  von Becker, Peter 479 
390  von Beyme, Klaus 33 
391  von Braun, Christina 135 
392  von Brück, Michael 55 
393  von Düffel, John 1,529 
394  von Hentig, Hartmut 350 
395  von Lovenberg, Felicitas 518 
396  von Matt, Peter 516 
397  von Randow, Gero 696 
398  von Schirach, Ferdinand 991 
399  von Stuckrad-Barre, 
Benjamin 
1,048 
400  von Thadden, Elisabeth 527 
401  von Uslar, Moritz 503 
402  von Weizsäcker, Carl 
Christian 
926 
403  von Weizsäcker, Ernst Ulrich 771 
# Name 
Media 
Mentions  
`08 - `12 
404  Voßkuhle, Andreas 2,764 
405  Wallraff, Günter 2,811 
406  Walser, Martin 4,704 
407  Waltz, Sasha 1,418 
408  Weder di Mauro, Beatrice 919 
409  Wehler, Hans-Ulrich 320 
410  Weibel, Peter 641 
411  Weidenfeld, Werner 126 
412  Weidermann, Volker 218 
413  Weiler, Jan 966 
414  Weimer, Wolfram 1,108 
415  Wellershoff, Dieter 327 
416  Welsch, Wolfgang 58 
417  Welzer, Harald 585 
418  Wickert, Ulrich 1,722 
419  Widmann, Arno 2,356 
420  Widmer, Urs 847 
421  Wiegard, Wolfgang 486 
422  Willemsen, Roger 2,553 
423  Willms, Johannes 188 
424  Winkels, Hubert 373 
425  Winnacker, Ernst-Ludwig 149 
426  Winterhoff, Michael 659 
427  Wittstock, Uwe 1,121 
428  Wohmann, Gabriele 144 
429  Wolffsohn, Michael 465 
430  Wondratschek, Wolf 306 
431  Yogeshwar, Ranga 1,222 
432  Zaimoglu, Feridun 1,454 
433  Zeh, Juli 1,369 
434  Zeilinger, Anton 304 
435  Zimmer, Dieter 443 
436  zur Hausen, Harald 720 
Table 20: Intellectuals and Media Mentions 
(2012 Sample) 
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APPENDIX D 
MEASURES AND RELIABILITIES 
Measures* 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability 
Relationalism (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Kaufmann and Dant 1992; 
Lado, Dant, and Tekleab 2008) 
 CR = 0.77 
 A. Mutuality 
α = 0.76 
 
 1. Even if costs and benefits are not evenly shared between 
us in a given time period, they balance out over time. 
2. We each benefit and earn in proportion to the efforts we 
put in. 
3. Our business usually gets a fair share of the rewards and 
cost-savings in doing business with the wholesaler. 
4. In our relationship, none of us benefits more than one 
deserves. 
 
 B. Solidarity 
α = 0.80 
 
 5. We are committed to preserving a good working 
relationship with the wholesaler. 
6. We consider the wholesaler to be our business partner. 
7. We conscientiously try to maintain a cooperative 
relationship with the wholesaler. 
8. Our relationship with the wholesaler is more important to 
us than profits from individual transactions. 
 
 C. Flexibility 
α = 0.85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. We would willingly make adjustments to help out the 
wholesaler when faced with special problems or 
circumstances. 
10. We would gladly set aside the contractual terms in order 
to work through difficult situations with the wholesaler. 
11. The wholesaler willingly makes adjustments to help us 
out when we are faced with special problems or 
circumstances. 
12. The wholesaler gladly sets aside the contractual terms in 
order to work with us in difficult times. 
 
Bureaucratization (Dwyer and Welsh 1985)  CR = 0.78  
 A. Centralization 
α = 0.80 
 
 1. My firm has to ask the wholesaler before we make 
significant strategic decisions. 
2. In our dealings with the wholesaler, even quite small 
matters have to be referred to someone higher up to 
answer. 
3. My company is usually discouraged from making 
changes in the wholesaler’s sales programs without 
checking with their rep first. 
4. For many facets of running my firm, we yield to 
recommendations of the wholesaler. 
5. Many aspects of my business are run according to the 
strong suggestions of the wholesaler. 
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Measures* 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability 
 B. Formalization 
α = 0.80 
 
 6. My firm’s dealings with the wholesaler are subject to a 
lot of rules and procedures stating how various aspects of 
my business are to be done. 
7. There are standard procedures to be followed in my 
firm’s dealings with the wholesaler. 
8. In dealing with the wholesaler, my company’s 
responsibilities are clearly specified. 
9. My firm’s relationship with the wholesaler is governed 
primarily by written contracts. 
10. There are precise ways outlined for ordering, receiving, 
and merchandising the products from the wholesaler. 
 
 C. Participation 
α = 0.68 
 
 11. The wholesaler plays an active role in the decisions we 
make regarding the retailing of its products. 
12. We consult the wholesaler concerning inventory 
decisions. 
13. Our ideas for selling and servicing are welcomed by the 
wholesaler. 
14. The wholesaler regularly asks our opinions and 
suggestions for improving its products and services. 
 
Latent Conflict (Etgar 1979)  
CRt=1 = 0.82 
CRt=2 = 0.83 
 A. Goal Divergence 
 
 
αt=1 = 0.84 
αt=2 = 0.82 
 
 
 
 1. The wholesaler often wants to prod us to buy more 
products than are good for us. 
2. The wholesaler often complains that we do not want to 
improve our modes of operation after its standards. 
3. The wholesaler often demands that we concentrate fully 
on its brands, while it is to our advantage to add major 
sidelines to its business. 
4. It is our major function to advise our customers as to 
which product they should choose while our wholesaler  
considers our major function to be developing relations 
between customers and our wholesaler’s products. 
 
 B. Lack of Autonomy 
αt=1 = 0.64 
αt=2 = 0.70 
 
 5. My wholesaler influences strongly my choice of other 
suppliers. 
6. Through couponing, discounting, and advertising, etc., 
our wholesaler practically dictates to us the type of 
promotion we are able to use in our stores. 
7. We have little choice on pricing but to follow our 
wholesaler’s suggested retail price. 
 
 C. Competition over Scarce Resources 
αt=1 = 0.68 
αt=2 = 0.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. The wholesaler restricts considerably our use of 
cooperative advertising monies. 
9. The wholesaler often ties-in less desirable items with 
orders for choice items. 
10. When opening new stores, our wholesaler often fails to 
consider and to protect our sales territory adequately.  
11. The wholesaler often attempts to sell directly via internet 
or discounters and in this way to circumvent us. 
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Measures* 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability 
Affective Conflict (Jehn and Mannix 2001; Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp 1995a) 
 
CRt=1 = 0.92 
CRt=2 = 0.95 
 When our firm reflects on the relationship with the wholesaler, our 
firm feels… 
αt=1 = 0.91 
αt=2 = 0.94 
 
 1. …anger 
2. …frustration 
3. …resentment 
4. …tension 
 
Cognitive Conflict (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Kumar, 
Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a)** 
 
CRt=1 = 0.92 
CRt=2 = 0.92 
 1. We disagree over ideas on how to achieve our goals. 
2. We disagree over how to complete tasks. 
3. We have differences of opinion over how to address 
problems. 
4. The wholesaler and our firm have major disagreements 
on certain key issues. 
αt=1 = 0.91 
αt=2 = 0.91 
 
Manifest Conflict (Barki and Hartwick 2001)  
CRt=1 = 0.88 
CRt=2 = 0.87 
 1. The wholesaler often blocks or prevents me from 
attaining my business goals and objectives. 
2. The wholesaler often blocks or prevents me from taking 
action in the way that I desire. 
3. The wholesaler often blocks or prevents me from 
managing my business in the way I desire. 
αt=1 = 0.88 
αt=2 = 0.86 
 
Conflict Aftermath (Kaufmann and Stern 1988)  
CRt=1 = 0.75 
CRt=2 = 0.72 
 1. I am still very angry at the wholesaler because of the 
events surrounding past disputes 
2. If the tables were turned, I would like to see my 
organization get even for how we were treated by the 
wholesaler during the course of past disputes 
3. If we had to do it all over again, we would not do 
business with the wholesaler. 
αt=1 = 0.73 
αt=2 = 0.70 
 
* 7-point scales (1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”) unless otherwise indicated. 
** 7-point scales (1 = “very infrequently” and 7 = “very frequently”). 
Table 21: Measures and Factor Reliabilities 
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APPENDIX E 
QUESTIONNAIRE
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